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Introduction 
The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl) represents a 
major step in the evolution of "sovereignty," which includes the power of a 
nation-state to govern without external controls.1 A panelist at the 1998 
Cornell International Law journal Symposium introduced the MAl as an 
example of "multilateral sovereignty" to achieve commonly held goals of 
global economic integration.2 This perspective posits that the MAl is an 
exercise in sovereignty by subtraction, aiming to limit governing power 
rather than promote its joint exercise. 
l. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2179 
(3d ed. 1971). 
2. Rainer Geiger, Deputy Director of Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Remarks at the 
Cornell International Law journal Symposium, The International Regulation of Foreign 
Direct Investment: Obstacles & Evolution, Cornell Law School (Mar. 6, 1998). 
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Its critics call the MAl a "slow motion coup d'etat,"3 a "bill of rights for 
investors,"4 a threat to sovereignty,5 and a "corporate rule treaty,"6 because 
it (1) empowers foreign investors to challenge the law-making authority of 
nation states and subnational governments, (2) is composed of a fifty-page 
text of fourteen investor-protection standards that exceed the scope of any 
existing agreement/ (3) and acts through an international forum with the 
power to award monetary damages against the offending government.8 
U.S. negotiators counter that the MAl protects foreign investors from dis-
crimination by giving them rights analogous to those they already enjoy 
under the U.S. Constitution.9 In addition, U.S. negotiators maintain that 
an agreement that poses significant limits on U.S. sovereignty is 
unacceptable.10 
This Article suggests a more modest analogy than a virtual coup d'etat. 
It simply seeks to explain that the MAl would have a greater impact on U.S. 
law making power than acknowledged by MAl supporters, who claim that 
it merely repeats domestic principles of non-discrimination. For example, 
the MAl aims to limit U.S. States' traditional powers to discriminate. 
The first objective of this article is truth in advertising: the MAl would 
disrupt state and local lawmaking capacity. The capacity of cities, coun-
ties, and states to serve as our "laboratories of democracy"11 hangs in the 
balance. States act as successful laboratories for testing future national 
3. Lori Wallach &: Ralph Nader, Forward to MAuDE BARLow &: ToNY CL\RKE, THE 
THREAT TO AMERICAN FREEDOM vii (1998). 
4. Scott Nova &: Michelle Sforza-Roderick, M.AI. Culpa, THE NATION, Jan. 13-20, 
1997, at 5. The attorney representing an investor in the first NAFTA investment case 
posits that, "[t]he MAl investment provisions have quietly created a looming economic 
constitution that protects the rights of foreign MAl investors .... " BARRY APPLETON, 
MUNICIPALITIES AND THE MAl 8 (1998). 
5. See ToNY CLARK&: MAuDE BARLow, THE MuLTILATERAL AGREEMENT oN INVESTMENT 
AND THE THREAT TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY 3 (1997). 
6. ToNY CLARK &: MAuDE BARLow, THE CoRPoRATE RuLE TREATY 1 (1977). 
7. See Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Multilateral Agreement on Investment: 
The MAI Negotiating Text arts. III-IV (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http:/ I 
www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/negtext.htm> [hereinafter MAI Negotiating Text]. 
8. See id. art. V. 
9. For example, "[t]he fundamental principle underlying this and other investment 
agreements is the principle of non-discrimination. Such agreements do not generally 
call into question the sovereign right of governments to regulate so long as the regulation 
does not single out or discriminate against investors based on their nationality." Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?: Hearing Before the 
House Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade, of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th 
Cong., available in 1998 WL 110860, USTESTIMONY database, Mar. 5, 1998 (statement 
of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State). 
10. See Interview by Derrick McGinty with Amb. Jeffrey Lang, Deputy U.S. Trade 
Representative, Washington, DC on the DERRicK McGINTY HoUR (tape transcription at 2) 
(NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 10, 1997). 
11. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,]., dissenting). 
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policy in virtually every sector of governance, including banking regula-
tion, economic development, government purchasing, consumer protec-
tion, working conditions, health and medical insurance, and 
environmentallaw.l2 
The second objective is to bring some order to the MAl sovereignty 
debate. Previous writers have brought conceptual order to the comparison 
of state sovereignty and international law under NAFTA and the WTO 
agreements. 13 This article extends the analysis to the MAl to ( 1) inform 
the bottom-up view of the MAl from the perspective of those who would 
lose power if it is implemented, and (2) shape positive policy options to 
maintain the constitutional balance between federalism and private inves-
tor protection. 
Synopsis 
Part I provides context, summarizing the "sovereignty" trade-offs inherent 
in the parties' expressed negotiating goals. It then defines sovereignty 
interests in constitutional terms, addressing, in particular, the balance of 
state power within the federal system. Part I also summarizes the main 
features of the MAl and how they may affect constitutional limits on state 
power. After reviewing the arguments that MAl implementing legislation 
can preserve state sovereignty or that legal conflicts are not likely to occur, 
Part I summarizes the elements of the MAl threat to state sovereignty in 
terms of: (1) expanding the coverage of state and local governments under 
international agreements; (2) removing investment disputes from U.S. 
12. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Testing Government Action: The Promise of Federalism, 
in ETHICAL VALUES IN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 41 (1993); Im'L Cm. OF THE AcADEMY FOR 
STATE & LoCAL GoVERNMENT AND THE NAT'L CouNCIL FOR URBAN EcoN. DEV., MAl May 
jeopardize Local Development Programs, in EcoNoMIC DEVELOPMENT ABROAD 1, 6 (Oct. 
1997). See generally DAVID OSBORNE, lABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY (1988) (discussing 
economic development and industrial policy). 
13. See john H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance 
and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 CowM.]. TRANSNAT'L. LAw 157, 
188 (1997); Matt Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for Interna-
tional Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub-Federal 
Governments?, 17 Nw.]. Im'L L. & Bus. 609 (1996-97); Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agree-
ments and the New Federalism, 7 MINN.]. GLOBAL TRADE 45 (1998). 
For other perspectives on the definition and importance of sovereignty interests, see 
generally CLARK & BARLow, supra note 5; CLARK & BARLow, supra note 6; Steven P. 
Croley &John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to 
National Governments, 90 AM. ]. Im'L L. 193 (1996); Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea 
Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing their Sovereign Rights? The GATT Dispute Settlement 
Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TuL.]. Im'L & COMP. L. 161 (1996); William J. 
Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 FoRD-
HAM Im'L LJ. 427 (1995); Julie Long, Note, Ratcheting up Federalism: A Supremacy 
Clause Analysis of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements, 80 MINN. L. REV. 231 
(1995); Samuel C. Straight, Note, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settle-
ment and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States 45 DuKE LJ. 216 (1995); Earl H. Fry, Sover-
eignty & Federalism: U.S. and Canadian Perspectives, 20 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 303 (1994); The 
Uruguay Round GATT Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 103d 
Cong., 201-04 and Annex A (F.C.D.H. Oct. 13, 1994) (testimony of Ralph Nader); Louis 
Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, AM. Soc'Y Im'L L. NEWSL., Mar.-May 1993, at l. 
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courts, which maintain a constitutional deference to state interests; (3) 
constraining the role of the U.S. government as a buffer between states and 
the international legal system; and ( 4) shifting power in the legislative pro-
cess through the economic leverage of investor remedies. 
Part II analyzes how the MAl departs from the fundamental values of 
federalism in the U.S. Constitution. This departure is manifest in the 
following: 
- Balancing tests that enable courts to uphold state legislation that pro-
tects the environment, public health, and local economic needs, even 
when the legislation burdens foreign commercial interests. Without a 
test that balances purpose with effect, the MAl would empower investors 
to challenge state lawmaking capacity. 
- National Treatment, limits on performance requirements, and General 
Treatment, in such areas as: ownership of private land; gambling and 
casino licenses; traditional or resident fishing rights; local business 
ownership; franchise encroachment; recycled material markets; packag-
ing requirements; and community reinvestment policy. 
- Compensation for expropriation, in such areas as: use of wetlands, 
coastal land, and surface mines; mandates on health service providers; 
law enforcement through civil penalties; and destruction of property for 
military or public health purposes. 
- Subsidy exceptions to rules against discrimination, which enable states 
to discriminate in favor of state residents when dispensing the largesse 
of taxpayer-funded resources. Absent this exception, MAl National 
Treatment and General Treatment would empower foreign investors to 
challenge subsidy programs that strengthen domestic competitiveness 
such as: financing incentives; venture capital investments; targeted and 
customized workforce training; and business recruitment screening 
criteria. 
- Market participation exceptions to rules against discrimination, which 
enable states to enjoy the same freedom as private market actors to do 
business as a purchaser and seller according to public moral values or 
the economic self-interest of their residents. Absent this exception, MAl 
National Treatment, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and General Treat-
ment would empower foreign investors to challenge market activities 
that strengthen domestic competitiveness such as: use of public land; 
domestic procurement preferences; minority procurement preferences; 
environmental procurement preferences; and selective purchasing that 
avoids doing business with companies based on human rights, labor 
rights, or other noneconomic criteria. 
Part III addresses whether the United States can shield its sovereignty 
interests unilaterally by providing exceptions for subsidies, minority 
affairs, procurement, social services, and other functions that the MAl does 
not contain. This Part explains the three reasons why this is a difficult 
task: (1) the high degree of specificity required to effectively take a coun-
try-specific exception; (2) the fact that exceptions would become the 
targets for future "ratcheting" back to MAl compliance through a process 
496 Cornell International Law journal Vol. 31 
called "standstill and rollback;" and (3) the likelihood that MAl dispute 
panels would not recognize the application of exceptions that contravene 
the purpose and objectives of the MAl. 
The conclusion responds to the risk of relying on country-specific 
exceptions by presenting positive options for maintaining the constitu-
tional balance between federalism and private investor protections. The 
options include: 
- Stronger congressional oversight, which includes a legal impact statement 
and disclosure of the real legislative history of the MAl. 
Implementing legislation, which includes appropriations and implement-
ing language to limit enforcement of the MAl against states without con-
gressional involvement or approval. 
Multilateral downsizing of the MAl, which would reduce the number or 
scope of investor protections, carve out significant areas of domestic 
policy, create internal balancing tests with general exceptions, or limit 
the availability of investor-to-state remedies. 
The appendix oudines these options in much greater detail. 
I. Overview of the MAl Sovereignty Debate 
A. Trade-Offs in the MAl Sovereignty Debate 
The MAl negotiations focus on "sovereignty" in terms of national objec-
tives. The countries negotiating the MAl are members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).14 They are asking 
each other to give up government authority in exchange for private investor 
rights and market access. However, what one country defines as a barrier 
to market access another country defines as an essential sovereignty inter-
est. This clash of values has placed the MAl on an indefinite work sched-
ule.15 In addition, the WTO may pursue the MAl agenda as part of its 
Millennia! Round of negotiations. Investment is also part of the work plan 
for negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas.16 
The United States seeks to use the MAl to dissolve subsidies and pref-
erences that prevent U.S. corporations from establishing themselves in the 
European market. For example, the United States defines European "cul-
tural industry" subsidies as a barrier to market access for Hollywood 
14. OECD member nations include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. See OECD, 
OECD Member Countries (last modified Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
general/member-countries.html>. 
15. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?, supra 
note 9 (statement of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs, U.S. Department of State). 
16. See Work Program for FTAA Negotiating Groups, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, july 3, 1998, 
at 20. 
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movie and television producers.17 French-speaking countries defend cul-
tural industries as the epicenter of their language and culture. They main-
tain that the subsidy is a financing program.18 Furthermore, the United 
States desires to limit preferences designed to strengthen regional econo-
mies. Most notable is the European Union's system of mutual preferences, 
which the EU defines as a cornerstone of its emerging federal system.19 
The most visible controversies involve U.S. sanctions on Iran, Libya, 
Cuba,2° and Burma.21 Europeans argue that U.S. sanctions reveal a prefer-
ence for following international rules only when it suits the United 
States.22 The United States responds that, like any treaty, the MAl con-
tains inherent limits regarding national interests.23 
Furthermore, the EU wants the MAl to constrain the power of U.S. 
"subnational" governments and, consequently, to interfere with the com-
plex U.S. federal system.24 Even though federalism is part of America's 
constitutional balance of power, the U.S. government is willing to compro-
mise. According to U.S. negotiators, if they succeed in providing U.S. inves-
17. See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1998 NATIONAL TRADE EsTIMATE REPoRT 
ON FoREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 116-17 (1998) (radio and television broadcast quotas by 
language and national origin). 
18. Professor Patrickjulliard, Universite de Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne), Remarks at 
the Cornell International Law journal Symposium, The International Regulation of For-
eign Direct Investment: Obstacles & Evolution, Cornell Law School (Mar. 6, 1998). 
19. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?, supra 
note 9 (statement of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs, U.S. Department of State). 
20. See, e.g., Paul Blusteiri &: Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Panel: Move 
Escalates Fight with European Union Over Cuba Sanctions, WASH. PosT, Feb. 21, 1997, at 
A1; Paul Blusteiri &: Thomas Lippman, Trade Clash on Cuba Is Averted: U.S.-Europe Pack 
Seeks to Ease Helms-Burton, WASH. PosT, Apr. 12, 1997, atA1; Brian]. Welke, Comment, 
GATT and NAFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has the United States Violated Multilateral 
Agreements?, 4 TuLSA]. CoMP. &: INT'L L. 361, 367 (1997). 
21. See generally Memorandum of the European Union iri Support of Plairitiffs 
Motion for Summary judgement, National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) v. Baker, 26 F. 
Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) (involving state-level procurement preferences that dis-
criminate against companies that do busiriess iri Burma). 
22. For example: 
In july [1996], the Act [Helms-Burton] achieved what Brussels officials firid rare 
in European Union foreign policy, which was to firmly unite all EU miriisters in 
condemning it as a piece of unnecessary extraterritorial legislation. 
[Also,] EU governments denounced the U.S. anti-terrorist law (Iran/Libya Act) 
as unfairly imposirig American rules on foreign companies. France vowed quick 
retaliation if its companies are affected by U.S. sanctions for irivesting in the two 
countries. 
EU/US: EU Resists US Sanctions Laws on Cuba, Iran and Libya, EuROPEAN REPoRT, Sept. 
5, 1996, at 1. 
23. U.S. officials argued that the WTO had no competence to judge a foreign policy 
matter under the Helms-Burton law, and thus, the United States would simply not show 
up at panel proceedirigs if the EU proceeded with a WTO complairit agairist the law. See 
Blustein &: Swardson, supra note 20, at Al. 
24. See EuROPEAN CoMMISSION, REPoRT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS To TRADE AND 
lNVESTMENT-1994, at 55 (Apr. 1994) [hereinafter EU TRADE REPoRT-1994]; EuROPEAN 
CoMMISSION, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT-1997, at 19-
20 (Apr. 1997) [hereiriafter EU TRADE REPoRT-1997]. 
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tors with "access to substantial new markets, [they] are prepared to bind 
the states and their subdivisions ... "25 The United States plans to resolve 
the MAl standoff, in part, by diminishing subnational powers in exchange 
for greater market access. 
B. Defining Sovereignty as the Balance of Power 
Participants in the U.S. sovereignty debate concerning trade and invest-
ment agreements use "sovereignty" justifications to fortify their positions 
on issues, such as economic nationalism, 26 unilateral enforcement of fair 
trade,27 environmental protection,28 and labor standards.29 
This article focuses on a more constitutional version of U.S. sover-
eignty interests, involving the allocation of lawmaking power between the 
federal government and the states. As John Jackson points out, there are 
many sovereignty interests involving the allocation of power, such as verti-
cal allocation between national and international decision-makers or hori-
zontal allocation between legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
25. DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC Co-oPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON 
INVESTMENT (MAl) 3 (Sept. 1997). 
26. Pat Buchanan, former Presidential Candidate, stated: 
This is the constitution of the United States. The reason the founding fathers 
went to Philadelphia was because there was chaos in internal and external trade 
and they gave the Congress of the United States full authority to regulate trade 
and commerce . . . You [Congress] are supposed to represent us when these 
deals are brought back by the President. Why don't you tell Clinton, 'negotiate 
what you want, but we're not giving up our right to amend it.' 
... [l]n 1994, the President came home with a 23,000-page General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade treaty . . . the first 20 pages brought in something brand 
new - a world trade organization suddenly created a UN of world trade where 
America lost its veto power and had no weighted voting. Now, if you [Congress] 
had all the authority to amend, you could have said we will take that big fat 
treaty, but we're not giving up our sovereignty. 
Pat Buchanan, Remarks on CNN CROSSFIRE 5, 10 (Sept. 18, 1997). 
27. See The World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Review Commission 
Act: Hearing on S.l6 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong. 11, 13-16 (1995) 
(statements of Jerry Junkins, President and CEO of Texas Instruments; Curtis Barnett, 
Chairman and CEO of Bethlehem Steel Corporation; and George Scalise, Senior Vice 
President of the National Semiconductor Corporation and Chairperson of the Public 
Policy Committee, Semiconductor Industry Association). 
28. See Letter from 13 environmental organizations to Charlene Barshevsky, U.S. 
Trade Rep. (Feb. 10, 1998) (The organizations included the Center for International 
Environmental Law, Community Nutrition Institute, Defenders of Wildlife, Earth Island 
Institute, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, National Audubon Society, National Envi-
ronmental Trust, National Wildlife Federation, Pacific Environment &: Resources 
Center, Rainforest Action Network, The Sierra Club, and Western Ancient Forest Cam-
paign) (on file with author). See also All Hail the Multinationals/: The secret trade deal 
that corporations hope you never hear about, SIERRA, july-Aug. 1998, at 16-17. 
29. See joint Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) Statement on the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAl) to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (1997) (on file with author). Five hundred organizations and sixty-seven 
countries endorsed the Joint NGO Statement. See also The Uruguay Round of GATT, 
supra note 13, at 208, annex (testimony of Ralph Nader). 
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government.30 Professor Matt Schaefer anticipated the objectives of the 
MAl when he wrote that "constraining sub-federal actors in the U.S., Can-
ada and other economically powerful federations may be more important 
to world welfare than constraining central government action in smaller 
nations."31 He describes such limits on state-level power as a superna-
tional "constitutional function" that are necessary in the absence of suffi-
cient limitations in the national Constitution.32 
In 1991, a GATT panel ruled that the constitutional allocation of 
power between the U.S. federal government and states is irrelevant in an 
international trade dispute.33 The EU posits that state law creates "market 
fragmentation"34 in violation of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade.35 In short, while U.S. state sovereignty is only part of a broader 
framework, it is a central issue in MAl negotiations. 
State sovereignty arguments against international agreements are 
politically popular because many advocates for policy change believe that 
citizens maintain greater access to subnational and even national govern-
ments than they do to international bodies.36 Barriers to access include 
weakened constituent relationships (e.g., voter accountability); lengthened 
physical distances; increased structural distances (multiple layers of gov-
ernment); and conflicting jurisdictions, missions, cultures, and values. 
Critics may dismiss this affinity for defining sovereignty as access to power 
as politically convenient. Nonetheless, the essential balance underlying 
U.S. principles of federalism is maintained by advocacy groups that 
respond to conflicts while protecting individual rights.37 
However, the weight of this essential balance has not deterred U.S. 
negotiators from offering to bind the states so long as U.S. investors receive 
a quid pro quo - access to new markets. Negotiators maintain that they 
30. john jackson sets the tone for this article with his advice to "those who use sover-
eignty objections against policy proposals to make such objections more concrete and 
explicit so that they can be better compared to contrasting arguments." jackson, supra 
note 13, at 188. jackson creates a taxonomy of sovereignty issues based upon (1) gen-
eral implications of accepting substantive treaty norms, (2) institutional decision-mak-
ing procedures, (3) dispute settlement process, and (4) domestic constitutional or legal 
traditions. See id. at 171-87. 
31. Schaefer, supra note 13, at 614. Schaefer notes that states like California and 
New York have economies larger than all but a handful of nations in the world. See also 
Fry, supra note 13, at 308-09. 
32. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 610, 620-21, 651. 
33. United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic Malt Beverages, june 19, 1991, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993) [hereinafter Alcoholic and Malt Beverages]. 
34. EU TRADE REPoRT-1994, supra note 24, at 9. 
35. See EU TRADE RI:PORT-1997, supra note 24, at 19, which states: 
There are more than 2700 State and municipal authorities in the US which 
require particular safety certifications for products sold or installed within their 
jurisdictions. These requirements are not always uniform or consistent with 
each other, or even transparent. In particular, individual States sometimes set 
environmental standards going far beyond what is provided for at [the] Federal 
level. Agricultural and food imports are also often confronted with additional 
state-level requirements, which may lead to obstacles to trade. 
36. See jackson, supra note 13, at 171. 
37. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 39-42. 
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can trade state sovereignty for market access under the federal treaty 
power.38 
During the WTO debate in 1994, Lawrence Tribe argued before the 
Senate Commerce Committee that approving NAFTA and the Uruguay 
Round agreements under the "fast-track" process was a violation of the 
treaty approval requirements under the Constitution.39 Both houses of 
Congress approved these agreements upon a simple majority vote dispite 
the Constitutional requirement that the Senate approve a treaty by a two-
thirds supermajority.40 Tribe argued that the treaty process is designed to 
protect the sovereignty of U.S. states and the Senate, with two votes per 
state, is the historical and political body with the constitutional capacity to 
protect state interests.41 Bruce Ackerman counters this argument with his 
theory that, out of sheer dint of multiple deviations from the Treaty Clause, 
Congress passed through a "constitutional moment" when it effectively 
amended the Constitution through acceptance of its own practice.42 
The import of presenting the MAl to Congress as a treaty goes beyond 
political considerations concerning which house is most likely to give the 
MAl favorable attention.43 Providing treaty status to the MAl may 
strengthen Congress ability to trump the deference it must give state law 
when it adopts an agreement under the fast-track process. The power to 
preempt state law under the Treaty Clause is well established.44 Thus, a 
38. See U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. l. 
39. See GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467, Before the U.S. Senate 
Commerce, Science and Transp. Comm. 103d Cong. 290-339 (1994) (statements and 
remarks of Lawrence H. Tribe and Bruce Ackerman) [hereinafter GATT Implementing 
Legislation Hearings). 
40. See U.S. CoNST. art. II § 2, cl. l. 
41. See The World Trade Organization and the Treaty Clause: The Consittutional 
Requirement of Submitting the Uruguay Round of GATT as a Treaty, Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 103d Cong. 10, 24-26 (Oct. 18, 
1994) (Testimony of Lawrence Tribe). 
42. See Bruce Ackerman&: David Golov, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 
4 (1995). 
43. The House now appears to be a more hostile environment for consideration of 
the MAl than the Senate. As a barometer, the House recently defeated fast-track negotiat-
ing authority on September 25, 1998, by a vote of 180 "for" to 243 "against." The bipar-
tisan opposition to fast-track included 71 Republicans who voted "against" and all but 
29 Democrats who voted "for." See Special Report, Bipartisan Opposition Leads to 180-
243 House Defeat of Fast Track, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 28, 1998, at l. Peter Beinart 
tracked the political support curve for pre-1998 fast-track votes in the House: 
The original vote to grant [fast-track authority] was 323 ~o 36. When the author-
ity expired in 1979, Congress renewed it by a vote of 395 to 7 and, in 1988 the 
margin was 376 to 45. By 1991 ... fast track faced its first serious opposition 
passing by only 40 votes. In 1993, it was renewed again, 295 to 126. The 
authority expired in 1994 and is probably dead for the rest of the century. 
Peter Beinart, The Nationalist Revolt: Fast Track Is Only the Beginning, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Dec. 1, 1997, at 20. 
44. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 
(1924); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1769). See also Louis HENKIN, FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE UNITED STATES CoNSTITUTION 157 (2d ed. 1996);john H. jackson, US Constitutional 
Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and Policy, in NATIONAL CoNSTITUTIONS AND INTER-
NATIONAL EcoNOMIC LAw 65, 73-78 (Meinhard Hilf &: Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 
1993). 
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treaty may imply a lower standard of accountability than the preemption 
power under the Commerce Clause or the 14th Amendment. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court recently required Congress to make a clear 
statement of its intent to preempt State law.45 
C. Main Features of the MAl 
MAl standards are different than constitutional standards for balancing the 
interests of private investors with the power of government. The starting 
point is the MAl definition of "investment," which covers "every kind of 
asset."46 The MAl protects investors and their investments with fourteen 
substantive investor protections, the most significant of which include the 
following:47 
- National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment48 protect foreign 
investors from treatment that is "less favorable" than treatment of 
domestic or any other foreign investors. The MAl definition of invest-
ment extends the reach of these investor protections beyond current 
trade agreements to include investments in non-MAl countries.49 They 
are analogous to the dormant commerce clause doctrine that limits the 
authority of U.S. states to impose burdens on interstate and interna-
tional commerce.50 While analogous, the commerce clause doctrine 
provides a major exception when states act as market participants, 
rather than market regulators. Nor does the analogy hold with respect 
to the balancing test that U.S. courts have developed under the last sixty 
years of Supreme Court precedent. 
- Limits on performance requirements51 under the MAl are analogous to 
the National Treatment limits, except that discriminatory effect is not at 
issue. An investor need only prove that prohibited requirements are 
involved, such as export performance (in all cases) or hiring local resi-
dents (unless the investor receives a state subsidy).52 The MAl omits 
45. See e.g., Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (no preemption of state law 
under 14th Amendment authority to protect religious freedom); Wisconsin Public Inter-
venor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 603-08 (1991) (no preemption of state law under com-
merce clause authority to regulate the field of pesticide use). See also Elena S. Rutrick, 
Local Pesticide Regulation Since Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 20 ENV. A!=F. 65, 
68-71 (1993). 
46. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. II(2). 
47. The MAl includes 2 "relative" and 12 "absolute" provisions that could affect state 
sovereignty. The relative provisions include National Treatment and Most Favored 
Nation Treatment. The absolute provisions include Transparency, Temporary Entry, 
Nationality Requirements, Employment Requirements, Performance Requirements, and 
Monopolies/State Enterprises. They also include General Treatment, Expropriation, 
Protection from Strife, Transfers, Information Transfer and Data Processing, and Subro-
gation. There are a number of others, such as Investment Incentives, which negotiators 
may defer for later rounds of negotiation or have yet to define. 
48. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(National Treatment and Most 
Favoured Nation Treatment). . 
49. See infra Part Il.A, notes 102-07. 
50. See infra Part II.B.3. 
51. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. Ill(Performance Requirements)(!). 
52. See infra Part II.C.l. 
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significant NAFTA exceptions to promote domestic economic develop-
ment and trade-related performance requirements.53 
Expropriation and Compensation54 provisions of the MAl are analogous 
to Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment limits on taking of property with-
out just compensation. However, the definition and scope of expropria-
tion under the MAl are indeterminate compared to the highly developed 
body of U.S. law. 
General Treatment under the MAl includes a nearly verbatim translation 
of substantive due process limits on state regulation that "impairs" the 
use or enjoyment of an investment. 5 5 This standard is not broader than 
National Treatment, and it does not require any showing of de facto dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court abandoned its own similar doctrine 
more than 60 years ago. 56 Moreover, General Treatment provides a for-
eign investor with "treatment no less favorable than that required by 
international law."57 As suggested by an OECD Working Group, this 
language could open the door for investors to use the MAl dispute pro-
cess to enforce standards set in WTO agreements. 58 
Like the WTO agreements, the MAl would provide enforcement 
through state-to-state dispute settlement,S9 but unlike the WTO, the 
enforcement mechanism under the MAl would provide monetary damages 
paid by the offending national government.60 The major enforcement 
clout is that the MAl would privitize the dispute settlment process. It 
would empower inyestors to protect themselves by seeking monetary dam-
ages from any "competent" domestic tribunal or from international arbitra-
tion.61 The applicable law in investor-to-state disputes would be the MAl 
text and applicable rules of international law, not the horizontal and verti-
cal checks and balances of the Constitution, which have resulted in 
nuanced balancing tests after 210 years of interpretation by U.S. courts.62 
In short, the MAl's fourteen investor protections, investor-to-state rem-
edies, and international dispute forum could create a system that rivals the 
53. See infra Part Il.C.l, notes 427-31. 
54. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(Expropriation and 
Compensation)(2). 
55. See id. art. IV(Investment Protection)(l.2). 
56. See infra Part II.C.3. 
57. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treatment)(l.2). 
58. There seems to be agreement that the MAl should in no way (undermine] 
rights of the contracting parties or the investor contained in other international 
treaties. However, there is controversy as to what extent such other treaty rights 
should be incorporated into the MAl because such incorporation may have the 
consequence that the MAl dispute setdement mechanism would be available 
with regard to such rights irrespective of whether these other treaties provide for 
arbitration or not. 
WoRKING GRouP C, ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-oPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION, OECD DocuMENTS: TowARDs MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT RuLES 
134, 146 (1996) [hereinafter OECD DocuMENTS]. 
59. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(State-State Procedures)(C). 
60. See id. art. V(Proceedings and Awards)(C)(6)(c). 
61. See id. art. V.(lnvestor-State Procedures)(D)(2). 
62. See id. art. V(Applicable law)(D)(l4)(a). 
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more deferential U.S. constitutional limits on the lawmaking power of 
states regarding foreign investment. 
D. Sovereignty Preservation Arguments 
In terms of state sovereignty, the legal effect of adverse international deci-
sions against non-conforming federal or state law in the United States is 
not automatic.63 While the complaining nation may seek countermeasures 
such as trade sanctions (under the WT0)64 or monetary damages against 
the U.S. government (under the MAI),65 the U.S. federal government can 
act as a buffer by seeking a negotiated solution or by choosing to endure 
the sanction (a tariff increase on U.S. goods or services) rather than 
change the law. Federal officials used this authority as a key argument to 
assuage sovereignty concerns regarding the MAI66 and the WTO agree-
ments.67 The United States has already played the role of buffer and nego-
tiator in response to an EU complaint against a government procurement 
law in Massachusetts68 and in a dispute involving state treasurers and 
Swiss banks.69 In contrast, the MAl empowers private investors to direcdy 
sue for monetary damages,1° which complicates and reduces the interme-
diary role for national governments. 
While not "automatic," the impact of the MAl on state and local 
authority could prove significant at the following three stages of the policy-
making process: preemption by federal courts, administrative implementa-
tion, and legislation. 
1. Preemption by Federal Courts 
MAl negotiators have offered to protect state sovereignty by denying foreign 
investors or governments standing to sue states in federal courts. 
NAFTA71 and the WTO agreements12 utilized this approach. Both imple-
63. See jackson, supra note 13, at 172. 
64. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes art. 22 Apr. 15, 1995, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 
I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
65. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Disputes Between an Investor and a 
Contracting Party)(D). 
66. For example, Ambassador jeffrey Lang said that, " ... even if we disagree with the 
results of a [MAl] dispute settlement process, we are free to continue to do what we were 
doing before. There may be consequences for that, but we're not going to agree to any-
thing that limits our ability to take any action we want, at the state level or at the federal 
level." McGINTY, supra note 10, at 2. 
67. See The World Trade Organization and U.S. Sovereignty Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 7-8 Qune 14, 1994) (testimony by Rufus 
Yerxa). 
68. See Robert Greenberger, States, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling 
Business Groups and U.S. Partners, WALL Sr.]., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20. 
69. See David Sanger, How a Swiss Bank Gold Deal Eluded a U.S. Mediator, N.Y. 
TIMES, july 12, 1998, at A1-6. 
70. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Disputes Between an Investor and a 
Contracting Party)(D). 
71. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1994). 
72. See 19 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1994); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (1994). 
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menting laws provide that only the U.S. federal government has standing 
to sue states in U.S. courts to enforce the agreements. If applied to the 
MAl, this limitation would prevent investors from suing in a domestic 
forum, an option that the MAl explicitly provides. 73 By the same token, the 
U.S. government would have standing to enforce the MAl ~gainst states in 
federal court and need not wait for an adverse ruling by an international 
arbitration panel.74 
In this regard, the NAFTA/WTO model places state law in an inferior 
position to federal law. Namely, "no provision of the Agreement, nor the 
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is 
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect."75 In other 
words, even if the United States loses a WTO case against a federal law, 
there are no domestic legal grounds to strike down the federal law. Never-
theless, the U.S. government could sue to preempt state law in federal 
court because of a conflict with NAFTA, WTO agreements, or the MAl. 
2. Administrative Implementation 
Trade and investment agreements may constrain agency implementation of 
laws or executive orders. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
ceased its efforts to implement an executive order that included use of ceo-
labels to promote procurement of environmentally preferable goods. Inter-
agency disputes seemed to cause the EPA's suspension of work on the 
aforementioned executive order. 
3. Legislation 
The United States and foreign governments are lobbying against proposed 
state legislation on the grounds that it conflicts with WTO agreements or 
NAFTA Specifically, they argue that proposed state laws risk future trade 
sanctions.76 Corporate lobbyists are fortifying their political clout by argu-
ing that proposed legislation violates trade agreements. 77 
73. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Means of Settlement)(D)(2)(a) 
(providing that if a case is not settled, "the investor may choose to submit it for resolu-
tion: a. to any competent courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party to 
the dispute."). 
74. Referring to federal action to preempt state law under the WTO agreements, 
Matt Schaefer observes that: "[w]hile U.S. federal government authority does not 
depend on the existence of an adverse panel report, political considerations almost cer-
tainly make an adverse panel report a precondition to a federal suit." Schaefer, supra 
note 13, at 643-44. The MAl would increase the pressure for pre-panel preemption of 
states if there is a significant threat of monetary damages: "[s]uch a scenario [the threat 
of retaliation] would put pressure on the U.S. government to ensure that the state whose 
measures were held to be inconsistent with NAFTA or WTO commitments changes its 
laws." Id. at 645. 
75. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1994); 19 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
(1994) (emphasis added). 
76. See Robert E. Pierre, Md. Bill Targeting Nigeria Stirs Ire; State Dept. Opposes Sanc-
tions Proposal, WASH. PosT, Mar. 27, 1998, at B1; Fred Hiatt, Commentary: Foreign 
Affairs in Annapolis, WASH. PoST, Mar. 30, 1998, at A25. 
77. The Illinois Retail Dealers Association successfully lobbied against Illinois legis-
lation that sought to replicate labeling standards based on the model of California Prop-
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While one can dismiss the impact of lobbying as merely a political 
trend of the corporate age, it is a trend with significant legal teeth. 78 First, 
lobbying based on international agreements carries the inherent prestige of 
an international agreement, and it provides a legal rationale for legislators' 
votes that might well be cast for political reasons. Second, lobbying based 
on international agreements carries the implied threat of retaliation from 
another country or preemption by the U.S. federal government, particu-
larly when the message is carried by federal officials. Third, lobbying 
based on NAFTA Chapter ll or the MAl is based on the explicit threat of 
litigation seeking monetary damages, particularly when the message is car-
ried by investors with the legal capacity to file a claim. The first investor 
claim filed under NAFTA succeeded in convincing Canada to settle for 
monetary damages and repeal a federal law. 79 
The magnitude of corporate monetary relief may diminish the role of 
the federal government as a buffer. Moreover, the leverage that the risk of 
monetary damages may create against the federal government may trans-
form the federal role from neutral buffer into active partisan on behalf of 
the investor. 
In sum, the U.S. negotiators seek to avoid a direct confrontation with 
the U.S. Constitution by interposing the U.S. government as a buffer. By 
proposing to block investor standing to use U.S. courts, they can block the 
"automatic" effect of the MAl on state and local law. Nevertheless, this 
preemption empowers the federal government at the expense of states. 
This shift in the balance of power is a meaningful change in state 
sovereignty. 80 
A second kind of sovereignty protection is to include state law in coun-
try-specific exceptions. Using NAFTA as a model, the negotiators propose 
two kinds of exceptions that relate to states. The first is a blanket excep-
osition 65. They argued that the Uruguay Round Agreements would pre-empt state 
authority .. See 1993 IL H.B. 2181, 88th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1993-94). 
78. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 621 (stating that even non-enforceable rights are 
worth strengthening because they can be tools of persuasion in the domestic political 
process). 
79. Most prominendy, the Ethyl Corporation of Richmond, Virginia lobbied against 
legislation that banned cross-border transportation of its gasoline additive, MMT, in the 
Canadian Parliament. Ethyl cited both the NAFTA standards of investor protection in its 
complaint seeking $251 million in monetary damages through the investor-state dispute 
process. Canada setded the case for $13 million to cover Ethyl expenses, lost profits, 
and agreed to repeal the law. See Canada Settles NAFTA Dispute by Lifting Ban on Gaso-
line Additive, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, july 24, 1998, at 19; MICHELLE SFORZA & MARK VAL-
LIANATOS, PREAMBLE CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, ETHYL CORPORATION v. GOVERNMENT OF 
CANADA: CHEMICAL FIRM UsES TRADE PACT TO CONTEST ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (1998). 
80. Disturbingly, federal constraints upon state action grow even as states are 
increasingly acknowledged as innovators in public policy. To revitalize federal-
ism, the three branches of the national government should carefully examine 
and refrain from enacting proposals that would limit the ability of state legisla-
tures to exercise discretion of basic and traditional functions of state 
government. 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, POLICY ON FEDERALISM 1 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter NCSL POLICY ON FEDERALISM]. 
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tion for all existing nonconforming state measures. This strategy "grandfa-
thers" only existing law, while constraining future lawmaking capacity. 
The second exception covers future lawmaking at both the federal and state 
levels within a few key areas, such as procurement, subsidies, social serv-
ices, and minority affairs. 
The question is to what degree the United States must negotiate limits 
on the scope or duration of these exceptions. The Europeans, for example, 
propose taking similar exceptions for the policies that the United States 
targets as a high priority for the negotiations.81 To the extent that these 
exceptions survive the negotiating process, there are several factors that 
significandy limit their viability. As explained in Part III.C, these factors 
include (1) the high degree of specificity required to effectively take a coun-
try-specific exception; (2) the fact that exceptions would become the 
targets for future "ratcheting" back to MAl compliance through a process 
called "standstill and rollback;" and (3) the likelihood that MAl dispute 
panels would not recognize the application of exceptions that contravene 
the purpose and objectives of the MAl. 
Finally, a third kind of sovereignty protection, the option to withdraw, 
was prominendy discussed in the WTO sovereignty debate.82 However, 
the option to withdraw is notably diminished by the MAl. The United 
States may withdraw from the WTO after giving six months notice.83 
While this may not be a practical option, it makes Congressional oversight 
a more significant concern for dispute resolution panels that might other-
wise interpret vague MAl terms against U.S. sovereignty interests.84 In 
comparison, the MAl would require nations to wait at least five years from 
the date the MAl enters into force before they could give a six-month notice 
to withdraw, but the MAl would continue to apply for fifteen years to any 
investment that exists at the time of notice.85 It may take less time to 
amend the U.S. Constitution than to withdraw from the MAl. 
E. Likelihood of Conflict Arguments 
1. Trade Is Not Investment 
There are two other arguments that relate to the likelihood of MAl/state 
law conflict other than sovereignty defenses. The first is a legal argument 
that many of the state laws cited below should be challenged under NAFTA 
81. See Foreign Investment: Environmental Discussions Top Agenda of OECD Invest-
ment Treaty Negotiations, lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1918, 1919-20 (Nov. 5, 1997). 
82. See The World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Review Commission 
Act, supra note 27, at 11-20 (statements of Amb. Alan Wolff, former General Counsel 
and Deputy United States Trade Representative; and Amb. Alan Holmer, former Deputy 
United States Trade Representative). See also jackson, supra note 13, at 172. 
83. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 
XV(2), 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
84. See jackson, supra note 13, at 186 (discussion of proposal by Sen. Dole to create 
a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission); see also A Bill to Establish a Commission 
to Review the dispute Settlement Reports of the World Trade Organization and or Other 
Purposes, S. 16, 104th Cong. (1995). 
85. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. XII(Final Provisions). 
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or WTO trade agreements rather than under an investment agreement. 
However, the jurisdictions of trade and investment agreements are not 
mutually exclusive. For example, Canada failed in its attempt to dismiss 
the NAFTA investment complaint of the Ethyl Corporation on jurisdic-
tional grounds. The case involved a challenge against a Canadian law that 
banned the inter-provincial transport of a gasoline additive.86 Canada 
argued that the trade measure was not appropriate for investor-to-state dis-
pute resolution. After the NAFTA panel rejected this argument, the Cana-
dian government prompdy setded the case for $13 million in damages and 
a commitment to repeal the federallaw.87 
The issue regarding the laws cited in Part II is not whether they could 
be attacked under a trade agreement, but whether they are also vulnerable 
to challenges under the MAl because an investor can prove damages to an 
investment.88 
2. History of Investment Disputes 
Advocates of the MAl argue that the MAl is not likely to threaten state 
lawmaking powers because NAFTA and bilateral investment agreements 
(BITs) include many MAl provisions, and in the history of NAFTA and 
BITs, no one has challenged U.S.law.89 There are two errors in this argu-
ment. First, as a matter of economics, the United States has negotiated its 
BITs to protect U.S. investors in developing countries, which are unlikely to 
have investors with investments in the United States on any meaningful 
scale. As for NAFTA Chapter 11, the first case was only recendy setded in 
favor of the investor. Not surprisingly, the attorney representing the inves-
tor in that case believes that the success of his strategy will set a precedent 
that other trade lawyers will follow.90 Shordy after the Ethyl setdement 
was announced, another major NAFTA complaint was filed against Canada, 
this one involving regulation of hazardous waste.91 
NAFTA and the BITs do not equate with the MAl. The MAl contains 
much broader investor protections. For example, even though NAFTA 
Chapter ll is the model for the MAl, the MAl adds a sweeping new 
86. The Ethyl complaint was based on three investor protections in Chapter 11: (1) 
national treatment; (2) performance requirements; and (3) expropriation. See Proposed 
Canadian Ban of Gas Additive Violates NAFTA, Says U5-Based Ethyl Corp., Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 1409 (Sept. 11, 1996). 
87. See Canada Settles NAFTA Dispute by Lifting Ban on Gasoline Additive, Inside U.S. 
Trade, July 24, 1998, at 19. The NAFTA complaint by the Ethyl Corporation of Rich-
mond, Virginia sought $251 million in damages. See Neville Nankivell, Ottawa May Live 
to Regret Decision to Ram Through Law on MMT, FIN. Posr, July 11, 1998, at 17; SFORZA 
&: VALLIANATOS, supra note 79, at l. 
88. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. II(Scope and Application)(2). 
89. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Win, Lose, or Draw for the U.S.?, supra 
note 9 (statement of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs, U.S. Department of State). 
90. See Ethyl Corp. files NAFTA claim over passage of MMT legislation, Daily Envtl. 
Rep. (BNA) 2 (Apr. 16, 1997). 
91. The U.S. company, S.D. Meyers, is seeking $10 million from Canada for its ban 
on the export of PCB waste between 1995 and 1997. See Company to Sue Canada Over 
Alleged Breach of NAFTA Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 4, 1998, at 9. 
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"impairment of use" provision to the NAFTA scope of General Treatment. 92 
Unlike the MAl, neither NAFTA Chapter 11 nor the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement cover local government. The BITs have a much 
more limited scope for application of National Treatment and MFN Treat-
ment.93 The scope of the MAl contracting parties, definition of investment, 
and investor protections is unique in legal history. 
F. Gears of the Power Shift 
The shift in the balance of power in the federal system directly effects the 
capacity of the federal government to preempt state law that conflicts with 
MAl investor protections. While this is certainly possible, it is the least 
likely scenario for how the MAl could constrain state lawmaking powers. 
To summarize the foregoing review, the MAl is most likely to affect state 
sovereignty at the following four levels, all of which are explained in Part II: 
International law. The MAl significantly expands the coverage of state 
and local governments under existing international agreements.94 For 
example, it would expand investor protections under NAFTA to cover 
local government and procurement, and it would expand NAFTA Gen-
eral Treatment to include protection from "impairment" of use or enjoy-
ment of an investment. 
- Dispute settlement and constitutional law. The MAl would take invest-
ment disputes out of U.S. courts, which constitutionally defer to state 
interests. 
Buffering role of the U.S. government. The MAl's investor-to-state reme-
dies would short-circuit the state-to-state buffering role of the U.S. gov-
ernment to restrain a complaint against state law for political or policy 
reasons.95 The threat of MAl monetary damages would also create a 
much more direct fiscal disincentive as compared with WTO trade 
sanctions. 96 
Power-shift in the legislative process. MAl investor protections would fur-
ther empower the lobbying clout of multinational corporations in the 
federal, state, and local legislative process. Not only could foreign inves-
92. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7., art. IV(General Treatment)(1.2). 
93. For example, U.S. BITs do not apply National Treatment to air transportation, 
ocean and coastal shipping, banking, insurance, government grants, government insur-
ance and loan programs, energy and power production, custom house brokers, owner-
ship of real property, ownership and operation of broadcast or common carrier radio 
and television stations, ownership of shares in the Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion, common carrier telephone and telegraph services, submarine cable services, use of 
land and natural resources, mining on the public domain, primary dealership in U.S. 
government securities, and maritime or maritime-related services. Nor do U.S. BITs 
apply MFN Treatment to mining on the public domain maritime or maritime-related 
services, primary dealership in U.S. government securities, and ownership of real prop-
erty. See, e.g., Annex to the Russian Federation-United States Treaty Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection oflnvestment, 31 I.L.M. 794 Oune 17, 1992); 
Protocol to United States-Argentina Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investment, 31 I.L.M. 124 (Nov. 14, 1991). 
94. See infra Parts II.A, II.B., and II.C. 
95. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 627. 
96. See Parts l.D and II.C. 
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tors claim that laws inconsistent with the MAl violate international stan-
dards, they could threaten to seek damages under the MAl and cite the 
taxpayer burden that the new remedies would create. The magnitude of 
this threat could also induce the federal government to lobby against 
state legislation.97 
II. The MAl vs. the Current Balance of State/Federal Powers 
Some MAl investor protections are analogous to constitutional provisions 
against discrimination. In particular, two MAl "relative" treatment provi-
sions are analogous to the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution. 
The analogy, however, does not convey at least four major differences 
between the MAl and U.S. constitutional norms. 
- Relative provisions. First, the MAl discrimination provisions (National 
Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment) do not contain the sov-
ereignty exceptions and balancing tests that the Supreme Court has 
articulated under the U.S. Constitution. 
- Absolute provisions. Second, the MAl would create "absolute" investor 
protections (such as General Treatment and limits on performance 
requirements) that go far beyond the "relative" investor protections 
against discrimination. 
- Indeterminate language. Third, the most important investor protections 
of the MAl are expressed in vague, indeterminate language. For exam-
ple, some commentators have described the MFN language (where it 
appears in WTO agreements) as "political theatre"98 and an "oratory 
wish list."99 The MAl empowers dispute panels to interpret such broad 
language. While U.S. constitutional norms are also broad, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted them over the past 210 years into a highly 
nuanced system of precedent. 
- judicial deference to legislative purposes. Fourth, U.S. constitutional 
norms are interpreted within a legal framework that separates power 
vertically (federal/state) and horizontally Gudicial/legislative/execu-
tive). Except for some types of discrimination, courts will give substan-
tial deference to legislative purposes through balancing economic and 
non-economic interests. MAl panels would likely apply MAl provisions 
with a singular purpose of investor protection. 
This part of the Article summarizes (1) selected MAl provisions; (2) 
the most likely areas of potential conflict with state or local law; (3) the 
sovereignty issues raised by that conflict; and ( 4) the significance of pro-
posed MAl provisions for mitigating the subtraction of state sovereignty. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to endorse the wisdom or timeliness of 
the state law examples. Rather, it is to illustrate how the MAl could create 
97. See Part II.C. 
98. Robert E. Hudec, International Economic Law: The Political Theatre Dimension, 
17 U. PA.j. lNT'L EcoN. L. 9 (1996). 
99. Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade System 
Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17 MICH.]. INT'L L. 967, 1006-07 (1996). 
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legal standards for lawmaking that 'Yould rival constitutional standards 
and change the balance of power in the U.S. federal system. 
A. National Treatment 
1. MAl Provisions 
The MAl would require Contracting Parties to give investors from another 
MAl country "no less favorable" treatment in a range of investment activi-
ties. Treatment of another MAl investor must be "no less favorable than the 
treatment it accords [in like circumstances] to its own investors and their 
investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other 
disposition of investments."100 The MAl forbids not only explicit discrimi-
nation, but also discrimination in effect ("de facto" discrimination). 101 
MAl negotiators have not decided whether National Treatment requires 
subfederal jurisdictions to treat foreign investors at least as favorably as in-
state or out-of-state investors.10 2 
In addition to "no less favorable" treatment, the MAl provides a Gen-
eral Treatment requirement that, "[i]n no case shall a Contracting Party 
accord treatment less favourable than that required by international 
law."103 This means that courts and policymakers should interpret MAl 
National Treatment by using the National Treatment text and panel deci-
sions under other international agreements such as GATT, NAFTA, WTO 
agreements and perhaps European Community law where relevant. 104 
100. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. lll(Treatment of Investors and Invest-
ments)(!). The "[in like circumstances]" language is not part of the consensus text. 
101. See OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Commentary to the MAl 
Negotiations Text (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http:/ /www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/ 
negtext.htm> [hereinafter MAl Commentary]. 
102. Two alternatives exist. First, a state could treat a foreign investor at least as 
favorably as it would treat an U.S. investor from another state. Alternatively, the state 
could treat the foreign investor at least as favorably as it would treat investors from that 
same state. See id. art. lll, 'f 7. A proposal from one OECD country would resolve this 
question in favor of "in-state" treatment: 
1.4 If a subfederal entity of a Contracting Party accords to its own investors and 
their investments treatment more favourable than to investors and investments 
of other sub-federal entities of the same Contracting Party it shall in accordance 
with paragraphs 1 to 3 extend the more favourable treatment to investors of 
other Contracting Parties and to their investments. 
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 1. Even if negotiators do not address the 
question of favorable investor treatment in sub federal jurisdictions, such "in-state" treat-
ment is likely to result if MAl panels follow previous GATT panels that dealt \vith sub-
federal measures. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 274. 
103. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(Investment Protection)(!). General 
Treatment is discussed in greater detail in Part II.C, infra. 
104. In the recent Shrimp/Turtle case before a WTO dispute panel, the United States 
argued for the broadest possible scope of "customary international law." Countries 
challenging U.S. law argued the scope should include only international agreements 
ratified by all parties in the dispute. The United States argued that the scope of "custom-
ary international law" should also include "international conventions; international cus-
tom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; general principles of law 
recognized by nations; judicial decisions; and scholarly writings." WTO Secretariat, 
United States: Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, at 
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Interpretation using international law expands the following standards of 
National Treatment: 
"Investors and their investments" - definition and location. The MAl 
applies National Treatment to "every kind of asset," ranging from owner-
ship shares in an enterprise to concessions and revenue-sharing con-
tracts.105 An investor106 is also entitled to National Treatment even if 
his investment is located outside the country or state allegedly not pro-
viding National Treatment.107 This expands the National Treatment 
doctrine in trade agreements. 
"No less favorable" - investor benefits. MAl negotiators rejected a propo-
sal to provide the "same" or "comparable" National Treatment in favor 
of "no less favorable" treatment. The rationale for the "comparable" 
standard was "to prevent unlimited competition for international invest-
ment funds with consequential costs and distortions of investment 
flows."108 However, most delegations to the MAl considered that a 
"comparable" standard would unacceptably weaken the standard of 
treatment from the investor's viewpoint."109 Investor protection appears 
as the MAl objective, although this protection distorts the free flow of 
investment capital at taxpayer expense. 
"No less favorable" - explidt discrimination. GATT panels have ruled that 
parties cannot use the defense that an explicitly discriminatory practice 
is minimal in its effect. no 
"No less favorable" - effects test. GATT Panels have interpreted the GATT 
National Treatment language111 to require an effects test, 112 to deter-
mine whether domestic laws violate National Treatment by creating a 
99 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Report] (citing the United States as quoting arti-
cle 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court ofjustice). 
105. The MAl defines "invesnnent" as "every kind of asset owned or controlled, 
direcdy or indirecdy, by an investor," including an enterprise, ownership shares or 
stocks, contract rights and property rights such as leases. MAl Negotiating Text, supra 
note 7, art. II(Scope and Applications)(2). 
106. The MAl defines "investor" as (i) a "natural person having the nationality of, or 
who is permanendy residing in, a Contracting Party ... " and (ii) "a legal person or any 
other entity constituted or organized under the applicable law of a Contracting Party, 
whether or not for profit, whether private or government owned or controlled, and 
includes a corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association 
or organisation." ld. art. II(Scope and Applications)(!). 
107. See MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. III(Treannent)(2). Compare MAI Nego-
tiating Text, supra note 7, art. Ill(National Treannent)(l) (prescribing no territorial limit) 
with MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(Performance Requirements)(!), and MAI 
Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treannent)(l) (both limited invesnnents 
"in its [the Contracting Party's] territory"). 
108. MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. Ill(Privatization), 'I 3. 
109. Id. 
llO. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 270-71. See also United 
States: Taxes on Petroleum & Certain Imported Substances, June 17, 1987, GATT B.l.S.D. 
(34th Supp.) at 156 (1988) (stating "the impact of a measure inconsistent with the Gen-
eral Agreement is not relevant for a determination of nullification or impairment by the 
Contracting Parties"). 
lll. GATT states that imported products "shall be accorded treannent no less favour-
able than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
tions and requirements" affecting their internal sale. General Agreement on Tariffs and 
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risk of discrimination.113 The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) also creates an explicit effects test, providing that, "[f]ormally 
identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less 
favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favor of serv-
ices or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or 
service suppliers of any other Member."114 
"In like circumstances"- basis of comparison. MAl negotiators have yet to 
decide whether to include or exclude the phrase "in like circumstances." 
The arguments on either side are similar. The main dispute concerns 
whether the MAl text should explicidy recognize exceptions allowing de 
facto discrimination.115 However, interpretation under the relevant 
international law makes the presence of the phrase in "like circum-
stances" inconsequential. For subnational measures, NAFTA uses the 
similar phrase, "like product," in connection with the terms "direcdy 
competitive or substitutable."116 The use of the term "like product" 
would not support many non-market based classifications to distin-
guish investors. For example, the United States tried to defend a Minne-
sota tax benefit for microbreweries that Canada challenged as a 
violation of National Treatment under GATT. The panel agreed with 
Canada that classification of companies on the basis of size is not a 
relevant basis of comparison for taxation of beer. Micro beer competes 
with macrobeer, or as the panel put it, "beer is beer."117 Nor was it 
relevant that the tax treated companies the same, regardless of national-
ity. The fact that Canadian companies selling beer in Minnesota were 
large firms meant that the state law was a de facto violation of National 
Trade, Oct:30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 at III.4 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
112. See Japan: Customs Duties, Taxes &: Labeling Practices on Imported Wines &: 
Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.l.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 119 (1988). 
113. See EEC: Payments&: Subsidies Paid to Processors&: Producers of Oilseeds &: 
Related Animal-Feed Proteins, jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.l.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 125 (1991). 
114. General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal Texts 325 (GATT Secreta-
riat 1994), 33 l.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
115. The argument for not including the phrase is that: "National treatment and MFN 
treatment are comparative terms. They permit fair and equitable difference in treatment 
justified by relevant differences of circumstances. In this context, nationality is not rele-
vant." The argument for including the phrase is that: 
[g]overnments may have legitimate policy reasons to accord differential treat-
ment to different types of investments. 
In like circumstances' ensures that comparisons are made between investors 
and investments on the basis of characteristics that are relevant for the purposes 
of the comparison. The objective is to permit the consideration of all relevant 
circumstances, including those relating to a foreign investor and its investment, 
in deciding to which domestic or third country investors and investments they 
should appropriately be compared, while excluding from consideration those 
characteristics that are not germane to such a comparison. 
MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. III, 'I 6. 
116. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 301, 
32 l.L.M. 296-456, § 605-800 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
117. Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 297. 
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Treatment.118 
In sum, National Treatment under the MAl protects investors from 
explicit discrimination, regardless of the purpose or economic significance 
of the discriminatory measure. Even if a measure is not discriminatory on 
its face, the MAl protects investors from treatment that places them at a 
competitive disadvantage. The MAl may tolerate some "relevant" differ-
ences of treatment, but the MAl not has defined policy objectives to deter-
mine relevancy. 
2. Potential for Conflict 
The following categorie~ of state law are likely to violate National Treat-
ment under the MAl. The categories are drawn from a broader survey con-
ducted in early 1997.119 The examples begin with the most explicit forms 
of discrimination and then move on to laws that might place foreign inves-
tors at a competitive disadvantage. For reasons discussed below in subpart 
III.A.3, those regulatory statutes that discriminate on the basis of citizen-
ship would probably not survive a constitutional challenge. The more 
interesting state sovereignty questions arise regarding market participation 
(procurement and use of state-owned land) and laws that may create de 
facto disadvantages for foreign investors because of constitutionally per-
missible environmental or social objectives. 
- Ownership of private assets. At least nineteen states restrict in some way 
the ownership of private assets, including real estate, the use of public 
lands, and business licenses based on residency or citizenship. In two 
states (Nebraska and Oklahoma), the restrictions are based in the state 
constitution.120 Eight states (Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin)121 limit owner-
ship of land by nonresident foreign citizens. Six states (Colorado, Indi-
ana, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota)122 limit foreign 
ownership of land without reference to residency. Other limits on for-
eign ownership include sale of state land (Arizona, Colorado, Montana, 
and Oregon),123 mining claims (Nevada),l24 water rights (Oregon),125 
118. See id. at 296. 
119. For the full survey, see WESTERN GoVERNORS' Ass'N, MuLTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON 
INVESTMENT: PoTENTIAL EFFECTS ON STATE & LoCAL GoVERNMENT (1997) [hereinafter 
WESTERN GoVERNoRS' REPoRT]. 
120. See NEB. CoNST. of 1875 art. I, § 25 (1920); OKL. CoNST. art. XXII, § 1 (1981). 
See also WESTERN GoVERNoRS' REPoRT, supra note 119, at 10. 
121. See IowA CoDE ANN. § 567.3(1) (West 1995); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.300 
(Banks-Baldwin 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.221 (West 1966); MISs. CoDE ANN. § 89-
1-23 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-408 to 409 (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CoDE 
§ 47-10.1-02 (1995); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§§ 41, 43, 44, and 46 (West 1996); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West 1995). 
122. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 36-1-124 (1990); IND. CoDE ANN. § 32-1-8-2 (Michie 
1966); Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.571 (West 1995); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-402 to 406 (1995); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 121-124 (1995); S.D. ComAED LAws ANN.§§ 43-2A-2 to 43-2A-7 
(Michie 1997). 
123. See Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-610 (West 1995); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 36-1-124 
(1990); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 77-2-306, 77-2-334 (1975); OR. REv. STAT. § 273.255 
(1995). 
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and public utilities (Alaska and Hawaii).126 
Use of public land. Nine states restrict use of public land according to 
residency or citizenship. These restrictions include permits for mineral 
extraction (Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming), 127 oil or gas extraction 
(Arizona),l28 logging (Arizona, Idaho, and Oregon),129 and preferences 
to adjoining property owners for leasing state land (Oregon and 
Wyoming).130 
- Limits on gambling and casino licenses. At least eight states limit gam-
bling and related interests on the basis of residency. Alaska, 131 North 
Dakota, 132 Oregon, 133 Nebraska, 134 and South Dakota 135 limit gam-
bling licenses to state residents or require an in-state preference for 
amusement or gambling concessions and services. These laws could 
affect a range of business owners from the corner pub to large hotels 
and riverboat casinos. Texas136 and Wisconsin137 make state residence 
a requirement to own a racetrack where pari-mutual wagering is con-
ducted. North Dakota requires corporations with an ownership interest 
in a race horse to have a place of business within the state.138 
- Preferences for traditional and resident fishing rights. A number of states 
explicitly discriminate in favor of state residents in the allocation of 
commercial fishing rights in coastal waters. These policies include sig-
nificantly higher fees for nonresidents (Alaska, California, and Ore-
gon)139 and limits on permits for cultivating oysters (Maryland)l40 and 
harvesting lobsters (Massachusetts).141 Other states set limits that do 
not explicitly discriminate, but create de facto conservation limits on 
124. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 517.010 (1995). 
125. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 543.050, 543.260 (1995). 
126. See ALAsKA STAT. § 42.20.010 (Michie 1995); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 269-17.5 
(Michie 1995). 
127. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 38.05.045, 38.05.135, 38.05.140, 38.05.185, 38.05.190 
(Michie 1995); MoNT. CooE ANN. § 77-3-305A (1975); WYO. STAT. §§ 36-3-102(b), 36-6-
101(a)- 36-6-101(c) (1995); State of Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners and Wyo-
ming Farm Loan Board Rules and Regulations Governing Leasing of Sub-Surface 
Resources, Ch. 6, §§ 5, 13(b) (effective Mar. 1, 1982), Ch. 7, §§ 3(c), 7. 
128. See Aruz. CooE ADMIN. 12-5-503, 12-5-515, 12-5-705B, 12-5-801(c), 12-5-1101(1), 
12-5-2102 (1994); Aruz. REV. STAT. § 37-291(A) (Michie 1997). 
129. See Aruz. ADMIN. CooE 12-5-1001 (1994); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 37-291(A) (West 
1997); IDAHO CooE § 58-1004 (1995); OR. CaNST. art. VIII, § 7 (1995). 
130. See OR. REV. STAT. § 273.825 (1995); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105(a) (Michie 
1996). 
131. See ALAsKA STAT. § 43.35.030 (Michie 1995). 
132. See N.D. ADMIN. CooE § 99-01-20-03, 05 (1995). 
133. See OR. REV. STAT. § 461.215 (1995). 
134. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-614 (1995). 
135. See S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 42-7A-43 and 42-?B-25 (Michie 1995). 
136. See TEX. REV. Cw. STAT. ANN. art. 179e, § 6.06(a)(12),(b),(d) (West 1998); 16 
TEX. ADMIN. CoDE§ 301.1 through§ 305.102 (West 1995). 
137. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 562.05(3)(w)(a) (West 1995). 
138. See N.D. ADMIN. CooE § 69.5-01-05-16(1) (1995). 
139. See ALAsKA STAT. § 16.43.160(b) (Michie 1996); CAL. FISH &: GAME CoDE 
§ 7852(a) and (c) (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 508.285 (1995). 
140. See Mo. CoDE ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 4-llA-09, 4-llA-05 (1990). 
141. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 130, § 38 (Law. Co-op. 1989). 
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commercial fishing licenses based on size of the fleet (California)142 
and priority for traditional fishing families when stocks are depleted 
(Washington).143 These limits would clearly tend to limit access by for-
eign fishing fleets. 
Examples of National Treatment Conflicts: 
19 States with Limits on Ownership of Private Land striped - this limit only) 
9 States with Limits on Sale or Use of State Land (triangles- this limit only) 
8 States with Limits on Fishing Rights (grey checker- this limit only) 
8 States with Limits on Gambling/Casino Licenses (black- multiple) 
10 States with Multiple Conflicts (black) 
II 
II Hawaii 
- Protection of local business ownership. A number of states have laws that 
protect local ownership of businesses. Maryland, 144 Florida,l45 and 
New Hampshire146 forbid petroleum refiners from owning more than a 
maximum percentage (e.g., five percent) of the service stations in the 
state. All of these laws have been tested and upheld by federal 
courts.147 Minnesota forbids out-of-state bank holding companies from 
acquiring more than a thirty percent market share of retail commercial 
banks within the state.HS 
- Franchise encroachment. Several states may adversely affect the rights of 
foreign franchisors or franchisees to purchase, sell, or control owner-
ship interests by increasing bargaining power of local franchisees. Iowa 
requires a franchisor that wants to open a franchise near an existing one 
to give the existing businesses a prior right to either buy the proposed 
142. See CAL. FISH & GAME ConE§ 8230(b)(4) (West 1998). 
143. See WASH. REv. ConE. ANN.§ 75.28.720 (West 1997). 
144. See Mo. ConE ANN. art. 56, § 157E (1992). 
145. See FLA. STAT. ch. 526.151(1) (West 1991). 
146. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 339-C:1 and 339-C:21 (1995). 
147. See Maryland v. Exxon, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); State ex rel. Gas Kwick v. Donner, 
453 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Opinion of the justices, 117 N.H. 533 (1977). 
148. See MINN. STAT.§ 48.61 (1996). 
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outlet or receive compensation for diverted market share.149 Massachu-
setts empowers an existing franchisee to ask a state court to enjoin a 
new franchise on the grounds that the new franchise is unwarranted 
given anticipated market conditions, endangers the permanent invest-
ments of the existing franchisee, or fails to increase competition to the 
benefit of the public.I5o 
- Recycled material markets. Private and public sectors promote recycled-
content markets through procurement strategies. Thirteen states use 
private market regulation or tax benefits to promote a market for 
recycled newsprint, glass, or plastic.151 Twenty-nine states use public 
procurement preferences to do the same.l52 California, 153 Oregon, 154 
and Connecticut155 are leaders among the eight states that mandate a 
minimum percentage of recycled content in newsprint. California156 
and Wisconsin157 are among the states that mandate a minimum per-
centage of recycled content in glass or plastic containers. From the per-
spective of foreign firms, the minimum recycled-content requirements 
for newsprint and containers represent the most problematic laws. If a 
foreign producer of newsprint or beer bottles, for example, does not 
have efficient access to the recycled content, it is placed at a comparative 
disadvantage in gaining access to that market. There is little doubt that 
these laws are effective in influencing investment decisions. In 1989, 
there was one Canadian paper mill that could process recycled paper; 
today there are twenty-three.158 Other Canadian companies have 
shifted their capital investments for production into the United States, 
prompting a company executive to complain that "[r]ecycled-content 
laws have single-handedly changed the economics of location of the 
industry."159 Canada officially cites state recycled content laws as a 
149. See IowA CoDE §523H.6(1) (1995); see Holiday Inns Franchising v. Branstad, 
537 N.S. 2d 724 (Iowa 1995). 
150. See MAss. GEN. LAws CH. 93B, § 4(3)(1) (1995). See also Heritage jeep-Eagle v. 
Chrysler Corp., 655 N.E. 2d 140 (1995). 
151. The 13 states include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Mary-
land, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
See RAMoND CoMMUNICATIONS, STATE RECYCLING LAws UPDATE 9 (Year-End ed. 1995). 
152. The 29 states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. at 
Purchasing Preferences for Recycled Products (chart). 
153. See CAL PUB. REs. CoDE§ 42760 (West 1996). 
154. See OR. REv. STAT. § 459.505 (1994). 
155. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 229-256n (1995). 
156. See CAL Pus. REs. CoDE § 4549 (West 1996). 
157. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.297 (West 1997). 
158. See Paul Bagnell, Recycled Paper Running Short: Pulp and Paper Makers Urge 
Canadians to Recycle More So They Can Stop Importing So Much from the U.S., FIN. PosT, 
Oct. 31, 1996, at 13. 
159. Geoffrey Elliot, quoted in Countries Can't Use Trade to Promote Environmental 
Action, Conference Told, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 901 (May 20, 1992). 
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leading barrier to U.S. market access.l6° 
Packaging requirements. In addition to federal requirements for packag-
ing, at least twelve states regulate the content of packaging materials, 
eleven of which do so for environmental and public health purposes.161 
In addition, some of these states regulate packaging content as part of 
hazardous waste reduction or disposal programs,162 sales of agricul-
tural goods, 163 or state recycling initiatives.164 Investors may challenge 
intrastate variation under National Treatment as placing foreign firms 
at a commercial disadvantage because of the additional cost of 
compliance.165 
Domestic procurement preferences. Forty-three states engage in explicit 
discrimination in favor of government purchasing from domestic produ-
cers or suppliers. This comprises a major portion of the foreign com-
plaints about U.S. barriers to trade.166 Three examples of domestic 
preferencing include: thirty-seven states with "buy local" programs;167 
160. See CANADIAN DEP'T oF FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE,. REGISTER oF 
UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE 15 Qan. 1999); U.S. Barriers Still in Place, Says 1995 
Canadian Register, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 625 (Apr. 5, 1995). 
161. See ALA. CODE§ 41-9-195 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 46.06.090 (Michie 1977); Aruz. 
REv. STAT. § 49-922 (1997); CAL. PuB. REs. CODE§ 42310 (West 1997); CoNN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 22a-255j (1997); 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 60/8 and 5/21.5 (West 1998); IowA CoDE 
§ 455D.19 (1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1737 (West 1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. 
13:1E-99.1 (West 1999); N.Y. ENVTL. CoNSERV. LAw § 15-0514 (McKinney 1998); and 
OR. REv. STAT. § 459.005 (1997). 
162. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CoNSERV. LAw § 27-1510 (McKinney 1998) (regulating 
packaging for disposal of medical waste); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1731 (1997) 
(regulating hazardous waste due to packaging content); ALAsKA STAT. § 46.06.031 
(Michie 1977) (regulating hazardous waste due to packaging content, among other 
sources of waste). 
163. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.§ 239.093 (West 1997) (requiring information identifying 
manufacturer, price, net weight, etc. for food packages); NJ. STAT. § 4:10-35 (1998) 
(requiring specified packaging for potatoes). 
164. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. 13:1E-99.1 (West 1999) (tax on sale of litter-generating 
products); N.Y. ENVTL. CoNSERV. LAw § 27-0717 (McKinney 1990) (bureau of waste 
reduction and recycling); ALA. CoDE§ 41-9-195 (Michie 1996); Aruz. REv. STAT.§ 49-834 
(West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 403.7195 (West 1997); D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 6-3419 (West 
1997). 
165. See EU TRADE REPoRT- 1997, supra note 24, at 19-20. 
166. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT 36-37 (1994); CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE, REGISTER OF UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE 13 (1996);jAPAN SUBCOMMITIEE ON 
UNFAIR TRADE POLICIES AND MEASURES, lNDUSTRlAL STRUCWRE COUNCIL, REPORT ON UNFAIR 
TRADE PoLICIES 19 (1994). 
167. The 40 states that have "buy local" programs include Alabama, Alaska, Arkan-
sas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See james D. Southwick, Binding the 
States: A Survey of State Law Conformance with the Standards of the GATT Procurement 
Code, 13 U. PA. ]. INT'L Bus. L. 57, 79 (1992). 
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sixteen states with "buy America" programs;168 and fourteen states that 
have both. 169 There is considerable variety amongst the domestic pref-
erence. States can apply them to products (which does not exclude all 
foreign bidders), to bidders (which does not exclude all foreign prod-
ucts), or to both.170 Most states use additional rules to ensure that 
domestic preferences promote economic development without creating 
a net loss for taxpayers. For example, Oregon, 171 Kansas, 172 and 
Texas173 are among twenty-five states that apply their domestic prefer-
ences in the case of a tie bid.174 All things being equal, these states 
prefer to enjoy the multiplier effect of spending tax dollars at home. 
Other states, including California, 175 Wisconsin, 176 and Minnesota, 177 
require state agencies to purchase U.S.-made goods or produce. 
Minority procurement preferences. In addition to the domestic prefer-
ences, which are explicit violations of National Treatment, there are 
other preferences that are probably de facto violations. While neutral in 
their language, these preferences might have an adverse or anticompeti-
tive impact on foreign companies. The most popular among these are 
minority procurement preferences. For example, Washington 178 
requires bidders for public contracts to meet goals for inclusion of sub-
contracts with minority and women-owned businesses. Wisconsin 179 
has a preference for minority contractors or subcontractors in terms of a 
minimum percentage of annual construction work during each fiscal 
year. High-volume preferences like these have drawn complaints from 
foreign governments.180 The domestic preferences noted above would 
also violate the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
168. The 16 states that have "buy America" programs include Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. See id. at 75. 
169. The 14 states that have both include Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
Texas, and Wisconsin. See id. at 75, 79. 
170. See id. 
171. See ORE. REv. STAT. § 279.021 (1994). 
172. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3740 (1995). 
173. See TEX. REv. CN. STAT. ANN.§ 903(c) (West 1995). 
174. Ten states have a local preference for tie bid cases on products only: Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode 
Island (food products only), and South Carolina. Three states have a preference for local 
bidders in the case of a tie bid: Louisiana, Kansas, and Tennessee. Twelve states have a 
local preference in case of a tie involving in-state bidders and products: Alabama, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, 
Virginia, and Utah. See Southwick, supra note 167, at 79-82. 
175. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4331 (West 1996). 
176. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.754 (West 1996) (only when it is "economically 
feasible"). 
177. See MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 16B.l01 to 103 (West 1966) (only when it is "economi-
cally feasible"). 
178. See WASH. REv. CODE§ 39.04.220(3) (Michie 1996). 
179. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.855 (West 1996). 
180. See, e.g., EuROPEAN CoMMISSION, supra note 166, at 37. 
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Examples of National Treatment Conflicts: 
Domestic Procurement Preferences 
37 States with "Buy Local" Preferences (light grey- local only) 
16 States with "Buy America" Preferences (striped- America only) 
D 
D Hawaii 
~ Buy American 
D BuyLocal 
14 States with both (dark grey) 
0 Both T- Tie Bid Only 
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(AGP), 181 which applies national treatment and other GATT disciplines 
to state procurement.182 However, the United States listed several coun-
try-specific reservations to avoid an AGP conflict with other procure-
ment programs, including those that promote business development by 
minorities, women, veterans, and development of distressed areas and 
general environmental quality.183 In addition, individual states listed 
their own reservations regarding the AGP.l84 
Investment incentives. Virtually every state employs large scale invest-
ment incentives; the number of state incentives grew 100% between 
1983 and 1989.185 Very few of these programs explicitly discriminate 
181. See Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP), Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex 4, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: 
The Legal Texts 438 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter AGP]. 
182. Most governors committed their states to the AGP without legislative ratification 
even though the legislatures enacted the procurement policies at issue under the AGP. 
183. See AGP, supra note 181, Annex 5, 'I 1, and Annex 2, '1'1 2-3. 
184. For example, reservations for individual states include Hawaii (software devel-
oped in the state and construction); Kansas (construction; automobiles and aircraft); 
Kentucky (construction); Mississippi (services generally); New York (transit cars, buses 
and related equipment); Oklahoma (construction); South Dakota (beef); Tennessee (con-
struction and services generally); and Washington (fuel, paper products, boats, ships 
and vessels). See id. United States Appendix to the Agreement on Government Procure-
ment, Annex 2. 
185. See WILLIAM ScHWEKE ET AL, BIDDING FOR BusiNESs: ARE CmES AND STATES SELL· 
lNG THEMSELVES SHORT? 20 (1994). 
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in favor of state residents.186 The MAl would raise the issue of whether 
there is a de facto violation of National Treatment.187 The definition of 
"actionable subsidies" under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) would support an investor making a 
claim under MAl. The SCM prohibits WTO members from causing 
adverse effects, including injury to the domestic industry of another 
member, 188 and maintaining tax breaks or subsidies that result in dis-
placement of foreign imports, price undercutting by the subsidized 
product, or other competitive advantages.189 The following are exam-
ples of programs that could make a difference in the global competitive-
ness of a firm, particularly when used in conjunction with each other. 
Tax·breaks for raw materials for manufacturing. Forty-five states190 pro-
vide complete excise tax exemptions for raw materials. As a result of 
transportation costs, this exception may provide an advantage to estab-
lished domestic firms. These states include Washington (exemption 
from sales tax), 191 California (exemption from sales and use tax)192 
and Texas (tax exemption for nonprofit development corporations that 
purchase raw materials)J93 
Industrial development bonds. Forty-nine states offer subsidized revenue 
bond financing as an incentive for economic development invest-
ments.194 Arizona, 195 California, 196 and Montana197 are among the 
186. The ones that discriminate include Montana (does not allow a small business 
with a nonresident alien shareholder to take an investment tax credit. MoNT. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-31-123); Oklahoma (requires applicants for agricultural loans to be state residents. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74 § 5063.23 (West 1996)); and Arizona (limits eligibility for eco-
nomic development assistance to businesses or other qualified projects clearly in the 
best interest of the state. Aruz. REv. STAT.§ 41-1505.07 (1998)). 
187. An OECD working group recommended absolute MAl limits on development 
incentives (not just National Treatment) because: (1) they distort private-market invest-
ment patterns; (2) they often provide a windfall, i.e., an incentive to do something an 
investor would have done anyway; and (3) they tend to stimulate competition among 
governments that is costly to taxpayers without producing a net gain in national or 
global productivity. OECD DocUMENTS, supra note 58, at 131. The Working Group rec-
ommendation was not heeded by the MAl negotiators who felt that "companies should 
be able to continue to benefit from incentives and that the MAl should not interfere with 
how governments seek to promote investment" apart from non-discrimination rules, at 
least until a second round of negotiations. OECD, MAIN FEATURES OF THE MAl 'I 55 
(1996); Anders Ahnlid, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Special Topics 'I 4 (Dec. 
1996) http:/ /www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/ahnlid.htm). For a summary of the domestic 
debate on incentives, see WILLIAM ScHWEKE ET AL., IMPROVING YouR BusiNESS CLIMATE: A 
GuiDE To PuBLIC INVESTMENT IN EcoNoMIC DEVELOPMENT (1997); and NATIONAL CouNCIL 
FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INCENTIVES: A GUIDE TO AN EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE 
POLICY (1996). 
188. See WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994, 
art. 5(a), WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - REsuLTS oF THE URUGUAY 
RouND, 33 l.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM]. 
189. See id. art. 6.3. 
190. See ScHWEKE ET AL., supra note 187, at 18. 
191. See WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 82.04.435, 82.08.02565 (West 1996). 
192. See CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE § 6377(a)(1) (1996). 
193. See TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 5190.6, § 2(4), 32 (West 1996). 
194. See ScHWEKE ET AL., supra note 187, at 19. 
195. See Aruz. REv. STAT. § 41-1505.07 (1995). 
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many states that designate financing programs for state-based busi-
nesses that engage in export development. If the criteria for financing 
are part of explicit conditions that include export performance, it would 
count as a prohibited subsidy under the SCM, 198 which would support 
an investor claim under the MAI.l99 
Customized job training. Forty-four states promote global competitive-
ness of state-based firms through investments in work force training.200 
Among the leaders are California,2°1 Alaska,2°2 and Nebraska.203 As 
with designated financing programs, a key National Treatment issue is 
the extent to which the state agencies explicitly include export promo-
tion as a condition of participating in the program. 
One way that state and local officials can affect the conditions of 
global competition is by combining their incentives into a package for 
recruitment, retention, or expansion of firms. Incentive packages for 
recruiting new firms can raise National Treatment issues because of their 
unique nature. The recruitment process has generated "disappointed bid-
der" litigation. The MAl would give disappointed foreign bidders a new 
cause of action and a friendlier forum if a domestic firm wins an incentive 
package to the exclusion of the foreign firm. 
An effect-test discrimination could arise from the efforts of some 
states to reform how they allocate investment incentives.204 For example, 
North Carolina screens companies that apply for state incentive programs 
and limits the awards to only those companies that agree to: (a) make high-
impact investments that support job creation, higher than average wages, 
and productivity-boosting technology; (b) make investments that would 
not otherwise occur (e.g., in economically afflicted areas); and (c) guaran-
tee to meet performance standards.205 This more disciplined approach 
may pose a National Treatment conflict because the job creation criteria 
196. See CAL. Gov'T CoDE§ 15392.7 (1996). 
197. See MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-9-402, 2-15-3015 and tit. 80, ch. 12. 
198. See SCM, supra note 188, art. 3.l(a). 
199. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treatment)(!.!). 
200. See SCHWEKE ET AL., supra note 187, at 18. 
201. See CAL. UNEMP. INs. CoDE § 10200 (West 1996). 
202. See ALAsKA STAT. § 44.47.758 (Michie 1995). 
203. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1203 (1995). 
204. States are under growing criticism that their incentive packages do not boost 
productivity or stimulate investments that would not otherwise occur. The City of Rio 
Rancho, New Mexico provides an example of an ill-conceived investment package. In 
1993, the city awarded Intel Corp. an incentive package based on the company's "ideal 
incentive matrix." It included $ll8 million in incentives and environmental regulatory 
relief. The package was so large that the city was unable to afford essential services such 
as water and schools for the growing population that was attracted by the Intel facility. 
See David Friedman, The New Ovil War: Politidans Dangle Wasteful subsidies to Lure 
Companies to relocate or Stay Put. At What Cost?, INc., May 15, 1996, at 98. See generally 
SCHWEKE ET AL., supra note 185, at 49-54; ScHWEKE ET AL., supra note 187; and NATIONAL 
COUNCIL FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 187. 
205. See Corporation for Enterprise Development, Making Development Incentives 
More Accountable, in IMPROVING YouR BusiNESS CLIMATE 9-10 (1996); OFFicE OF THE Gov-
ERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, REPORT BY GoVERNORS BUSINESS INCENTIVES TASK FORCE 
(1994). 
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make it easier for a domestic firm or a firm that uses domestic suppliers 
(as opposed to a foreign firm's existing nonlocal inputs) to win the incen-
tives. The screening criteria also concentrate state resources enough to 
boost the global competitiveness of companies based in that state.206 
A more fundamental National Treatment conflict is raised by incentive 
programs aimed at business retention. These "stay-at-home programs" are 
much more likely to exclude foreign investors who are competing with the 
firms that local officials are trying to retain.207 
While state officials want to preserve their ability to promote eco-
nomic development resources,2°8 they would prefer to do so in a way that 
provides net new jobs for their own and neighboring states and minimizes 
wind-fall benefits for investors at taxpayer expense.209 Rather than deal 
with such bottom-up issues of inter-governmental competition, MAl negoti-
ators concluded that "companies should be able to continue to benefit 
from incentives and that the MAl should not interfere with how govern-
ments seek to promote investment."21° 
3. Sovereignty Issues 
From the high altitude of political debate, where the air is thin, National 
Treatment under the MAl covers ground that looks similar to the dormant 
foreign commerce clause under Article I Section 8 of the Constitution.211 
Like National Treatment, the dormant commerce clause can be used to 
negate the use of state government power that places foreign traders and 
investors at a commercial disadvantage. It is "dormant" because the 
Supreme Court invented the doctrine to preempt state law in the absence 
of congressional action that conflicts with state law.212 The dormant com-
merce clause precludes state action that discriminates against foreign com-
merce, either explicitly or in effect. This is also the general purpose of 
206. Another potential MAl issue is that some state and local governments do not 
publish their screening criteria. This would violate the transparency obligations under 
the MAl. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(Transparency)(1). 
207. See Walter Hellerstein &: Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State 
Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 789, 853-55 (1996). 
208. See WESTERN GoVERNoRS' AssoCIATION, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE PACTS, Resolution 97-010 Ouly 24, 1997) [hereinafter 
WGA RESOLUTION]. 
209. See, e.g., Mo. CoDE ANN. art. 83A, § 5-1101 (1996), in which the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly found that "the widespread adoption of tax subsidies intended to move 
jobs from one state to another reduces revenues in all participating states without 
increasing the total number of jobs." Id. art. 84, § 4. The General Assembly proposed 
that the governor negotiate an agreement with neighboring states to repeal "any law in 
each state that provides a tax subsidy . . . that is intended to create new jobs or entice 
new jobs to the state." I d. 
210. MAIN FEATURES OF THE MAl, supra note 187, 'i 55; Ahnlid, supra note 187, at 914. 
211. The Commerce Clause reads: "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes 
... " U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
212. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-2 (2d ed. 1988). 
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National Treatment.213 
Lawrence Tribe interprets congressional authority to regulate foreign 
commerce under Article I Section 8 as "all but exclusive."2l4 By negative 
inference, the federal courts have interpreted this broad power as a man-
date for states to withdraw efforts to affect national interests in foreign 
commerce.215 To this end, the Constitution and the MAl share a common 
purpose of promoting free trade. The fundamental difference is that the 
Constitution simultaneously embodies a commitment to promote free poli-
tics with a system of "dual sovereignty."216 
At various times, and as recendy as the late 1970s, the Supreme Court 
has overturned state laws that burden foreign commerce, even in the 
absence of discrimination or anything that resembled a conflict with fed-
eral law. The most recent exercise of what Charles Tiefer calls this "strong 
preemption" doctrine was the Court's decision in Japan Line Ltd. v. County 
of Los Angeles. 217 
The Japan Line decision extended the life of a doctrine that the United 
States must speak with "one voice" in international commerce or foreign 
affairs.218 The Court applied one-voice doctrine to invalidate a California 
property tax on containers in foreign commerce, even though the court 
upheld the tax under the interstate commerce clause.219 Japan Line's claim 
of multiple taxation triggered the argument for a single voice, which the 
Solicitor General supported with an amicus brief that cited a threat of retal-
iation from the European Union.220 In effect, the Supreme Court volun-
teered to police state laws that rankled foreign nations at the request of the 
Executive Branch and when Congress had taken no action to support or 
oppose such a policy.221 
In the 1994 decision of Barclays Bank PLC. v. Franchise Tax Board of 
213. See generally Daniel A Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory 
State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1401 
(1994). 
214. TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-21. Notwithstanding his view of the general preemp-
tive sweep of the commerce clause, Tribe observed that the inference of preemption of 
state authority without explicit words to that effect presents "no small problem" within 
the context of specific cases where states have a valid local regulatory purpose. Id. at 
§ 6-2, n.6. ' 
215. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
216. "just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Fed-
eral Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one 
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will 
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory v. Ashcroft, SOl U.S. 
452, 458 (1991). See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 Games Madison) (discussing role 
of separation of powers between federal and state governments as a safeguard for 
liberty). 
217. 441 U.S. at 434. See Tiefer, supra note 13, at 49-59. 
218. See japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445. For the application of "one voice" doctr~e to 
foreign affairs power, see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), which overturned an 
Oregon law that barred inheritance of property by citizens of communist countries that 
did not give reciprocal inheritance rights to U.S. citizens. 
219. See id. 
220. 'japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452, n.l7. 
221. See Tiefer, supra note 13, at SO. 
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California,222 however, justice Ginsburg wrote an opm10n for a nearly 
unanimous court223 that neutered the one-voice doctrine without explicitly 
overturning it. Barclays Bank and the Colgate-Palmolive Company chal-
lenged the California "unitary" formula for apportioning world-wide 
income to establish the base for state income taxation. The companies 
cited the risk of multiple taxation and the burden of compliance as viola-
tions of the dormant foreign commerce clause. 224 As in Japan Line, the 
Executive Branch supported the multinational plaintiff with a brief that 
cited the threat of retaliation and the need for national uniformity.225 The 
United Kingdom and the European Community formally entered the case 
to express their opposition to the California unitary tax law. 226 
The Barclays opinion rejected the risk of retaliation as simply not rele-
vant, except to Congress, which the court cited as the appropriate branch 
for making such a political decision to preempt state authority.227 The 
Court dismissed Executive Branch statements on the need for "one voice" 
in the absence of congressional action as merely "precatory."228 Rather 
than reject the value of a national government that could speak with one 
voice, the Court sought to clarify constitutional roles as to which branch of 
government should do the speaking. Under Article I Section 8, the Court 
reasoned that Congress is the branch that can preempt states when one 
national voice is required,229 not the Executive Branch.230 
222. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. 298. 
223. While Justice Blackrnun expressed reservations in his concurring opinion about 
giving too much deference to state sovereignty based upon congressional inaction, 512 
U.S. at 59 (Blackrnun, J., concurring), Justice Scalia expressed a preference for even 
stronger deference so long as there is no facial discrimination against foreign commerce 
and no violation of established precedent. See 512 U.S. at 62-63 (Scalia,]., concurring 
and dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote for herself and Justice Thomas in support of 
the Court's reasoning that the "one voice" doctrine did not apply, but she dissented on 
the analysis of multiple taxation. See 512 U.S. at 65 (O'Connor, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
224. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 307. 
225. See id. at 328, nn.29-30. 
226. See id. at 328, n.30. 
227. See id. at 351. 
228. Id. at 356. 
229. See id. at 338, 351, 355. The allocation of "one voice" power to Congress as a 
statutory preemption doctrine (not a dormant commerce or foreign affairs doctrine) 
could be understood as a synthesis of two dissonant opinions. The earliest is Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which held that state 
interests in federalism are protected not by categories of autonomous rule, but by the 
representation of state interests within the political process of Congress. The latest is 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which recently ruled that Congress must exercise 
its power to preempt (under the 14th Amendment) with sufficient specificity that it 
remains accountable for its exercise of preemptive power. Considering that this shift 
was coupled with a strong presumption against preemption in Barclays (Congress can 
express its intent not to preempt by doing nothing), the echoes of Garcia-type limits on 
state power are barely audible. 
230. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 634 ("courts may even find toleration [for state 
action] evinced where Congress has explicitly prohibited private causes of 
action ... even though the state action at issue violates the treaty. This would accord 
with the policy behind such a ban: private causes of action themselves might be an 
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Throughout the history of dormant commerce clause doctrine, a con-
sistent purpose of judicial scrutiny is to guard against the risk that local 
legislatures will make decisions that are harmful to traders or investors 
who are not represented in the political process.231 The Court in Barclays 
found that the "foreign domicile of the taxpayer (or the taxpayer's parent) 
is a factor inadequate to warrant retraction" of the Court's previous holding 
that unitary taxation does not create an unconstitutional risk of multiple 
taxation.232 In terms that anticipate the sovereignty arguments under the 
MAl, the Barclays court observed that "the image of a politically impotent 
foreign transactor is surely belied by the battalion of foreign governments 
that has marched to Barclays' aid, deploring worldwide combined report-
ing in diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, and even retaliatory legislation."233 
Under this post-Barclays context, MAl negotiators claim that National 
Treatment is consistent with U.S. constitutional norms. There are two pos-
sible arguments that could sustain this claim. The direct argument, which 
is addressed in this part, is that the MAl only limits state measures that are 
unconstitutional. The indirect argument, which is addressed in part IV, is 
that the country-specific exceptions protect constitutional state powers. 
Within the scope of this article, it is only possible to skim the surface 
of a National Treatment/dormant commerce clause comparison. The goal 
of this comparison, however, is modest. It is simply to illustrate that while 
National Treatment and the dormant commerce clause share a common 
theme, they differ fundamentally in the respect they afford to the values of 
federalism. 
a. Explicit Discrimination - Prima Facie Violation v. Strict Scrutiny 
Under the National Treatment test of "no less favorable treatment," a law 
that explicidy discriminates against a foreign investor would constitute a 
prima facie violation of the MAI.234 The defendants would have to show 
that the measure qualifies under one of the two general exceptions: protec-
tion of essential security interests or preservation of public order.235 
Neither applies to the state laws cited above.236 
Under the dormant commerce clause, there is a presumption that a 
facially discriminatory statute is unconstitutionaJ.237 This presumption is 
interference with the commerce clause"). See NAFTA Statement of Administrative 
Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, at 450 (1993); NAFTA, supra note 116, at 289. , 
231. This concern about the abuse of the political process against those who are not 
represented locally "reflects not a cynical view of the failings of statesmanship at a sub-
federal level, but only an understanding that the proper structural role of state 
lawmakers is to protect and promote the interests of their own constituents." TRIBE, 
supra note 212, § 6.5. 
232. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 338. 
233. Id. 
234. See supra note 110 (explicit discrimination). 
235. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2), 
(3). 
236. See infra Appendix II.A. for a discussion of general exceptions. 
237. See City of Philadelphia v. New jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Oregon Waste Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994). 
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sometimes referred to as a "per se rule;" a compelling state interest and 
demonstration that there are no viable alternatives can overcome the pre-
sumption. 238 The more appropriate description in these cases is "strict 
judicial scrutiny." 
In Maine v. Taylor,239 the Court's strict scrutiny test upheld a statute 
that imposed an outright ban on importing baitfish to state waters that 
border Canada. Maine successfully defended its law by convincing the 
courts that its import ban was the only way that the state could protect its 
fisheries from parasites that infected non-native shipments.240 The com-
merce clause test for explicit discrimination is strict, but it allows the court 
to defer to legitimate state interests, unlike National Treatment under the 
MAl. 
If there is one category of laws where MAl National Treatment and the 
dormant commerce clause could be proven analogous, it would be where 
states explicitly prohibit foreign investors from owning land or acquiring 
permits to fish, use water, or operate casinos or other businesses. The 
argument that these laws discriminate on the basis of citizenship or resi-
dency without a sufficient redeeming noneconomic purpose is well devel-
oped by scholars.241 
Notwithstanding the potential case against them, at least seventeen 
states explicitly discriminate against ownership of land by foreign inves-
tors, and two of these prohibitions are enshrined in state constitutions.242 
Most of these laws avoid a European-style concentration of wealth in the 
hands of absentee lairds, which would tend to make the state an economic 
colony but also deprive the state of a civic class of resident landowners.243 
In some states, the popularity of this policy lives on, 244 with several legisla-
ture enacting such statutes during the family farm crisis of the 1970s.245 
The 'most vulnerable state statutes are those that discriminate on the 
238. See Fort Gatiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 
504 U.S. 353 (1992); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Maine v. Taylor, 
447 u.s. 131, 135 (1986). 
239. 447 u.s. 131 (1986). 
240. See id. at 143. See also TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-6; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 
385, 398 (1948) (upholding discrimination only if the out-of-state interests "constitute a 
particular source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.") 
241. See, e.g., Mark Shapiro, The Dormant Commerce Clause: A Limit on Alien Land 
Laws, 20 BROOKINGs]. lNT'L L. 217 (1993); Charles H. Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: ARe-
Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15 (1962); Fred L. Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in 
American Real Estate, 60 MINN. L. REv. 621 (1976); William B. Fisch, State Regulation of 
Alien Land Ownership, 43 Mo. L. REv. 407 (1978). 
242. See supra notes 120-22. 
243. See james A. Fretcher, Alien Land Ownership in the United States: A Matter of 
State Control, 14 BROOKINGS]. lNT'L L. 147 (1988). Sadly, some ofthese laws were also 
adopted during xenophobic episodes of concern about japanese immigration or Com-
munist control of assets, but most were repealed after the Supreme Court indicated that 
it would accept a challenge to them on equal protection grounds (after previous deci-
sions to the contrary). See Shapiro, supra note 241, at 221 (citing Takahashi v. Fish and 
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 425 (1948) and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 
(1948)). 
244. See WGA REsoLUTION, supra note 208, 'I B.2.c. 
245. See Shapiro, supra note 241, at 221-23. 
1998 Sovereignty by Subtraction 527 
basis of citizenship alone rather than residency and citizenship.246 How-
ever, the residency requirement stands on more rational ground - the 
unique intra-state character of land. Some commentators and sitting 
Supreme Courtjustices believe character of land is a compelling local con-
cern247 and outside the scope of "interstate or foreign commerce" as 
understood by the framers of the Constitution.248 
The textualists on the Court argue that wholesale preemption of state 
power is unjustified by a negative inference from the grant of congressional 
commerce power in Article I Section 8.249 Defining land as "not com-
merce" is one literal boundary for inhibiting the expansion of federal -
and now multinational - power at the expense of states. 
The archaic roots of sovereignty are visible in the laws that limit access 
to fisheries and water rights.25° Yet, it was not until the 1970s that the 
Supreme Court overruled cases holding to the common law doctrine that 
states own wild fish, game, and other natural resources.251 However, 
rather than declare the death of all state dominion over birds of the air and 
fish of the sea, the Court has employed a balancing test252 and recognized 
a strong state interest in both conserving natural resources, including ani-
mals253 and minerals.254 The Court has not overruled the cases in which 
the state asserted ownership of tidewater habitat of nonmigratory spe-
cies.2SS In addition, a number of state laws that reserve the right to har-
vest shellfish and lobsters to their own residents remain on the books.256 
As with land ownership laws, the Court has yet to erase the boundary that 
limits nonresident access to tidewater resources. 
The Court has struck down state laws that impose a discriminatory 
license fee against nonresidents wishing to hunt and fish if the fee has no 
246. See supra notes 120-26. 
247. "Even when federal general law was in its heyday, an exception was carved out 
for local laws of real property." United States v. Litde Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 
580, 591 (1973); see Fretcher, supra note 243. 
248. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 963 (1982) (Rehnquist, 
]., dissenting). 
249. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610-20 (1997) 
(Thomas,]., dissenting); see also Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 331-32 (Scalia,]., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
250. See supra notes 140-43. 
251. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (invalidated an Oklahoma law 
that prohibited interstate shipping of minnows harvested within the state), which over-
ruled Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upheld South Dakota law that prohib-
ited interstate shipping of game birds killed in the state); see also Douglas v. Seacoast 
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977). 
252. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-10; Pike v. Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
253. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336. 
254. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982). Regarding access to under-
ground water, the court held that while a state may not hoard resources for the benefit of 
its own residents, it may impose reasonable barriers to access for non-protectionist 
purposes. 
255. See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877); Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 
371 (1823). 
256. See supra notes 140-71. 
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environmental or administrative justification.257 However, these cases dis-
play constitutional nuances that are not shared by National Treatment, 
such as a de minimis test in which the courts will tolerate disparate treat-
ment of nonresidents.258 Yet, at least one modern case has excepted a 
political rationale for high "trophy" fees. In Montana Outfitters Action 
Group v. Fish & Game Commission,259 a federal court upheld a highly dis-
criminatory nonresident fee (a fee ratio of 28:1 in favor of state residents) 
for elk hunting. The court reasoned that the elk are no longer migratory 
and the fee was needed to maintain the political motivation of Montana 
citizens to subsidize a conservation program that primarily benefits out-of-
state hunters.260 This logic could have much broader application in the 
future to "discriminatory" user-fees that support eco-tourism. 
In the realm of land ownership and access to fishing or hunting rights, 
the argument over what is "commerce" has little to do with commerce. 
Instead, it has much to do with the need to strike a balance between state 
and federal power. States which adopt discriminatory laws to limit foreign 
access to resources risk violating the dormant commerce clause. However, 
the very lack of subtlety in the most discriminatory state laws illustrates 
the conflict between the allocation of power under the MAl as compared 
with the Constitution. 
The MAl could take the next generation of commerce clause cases out 
of the Supreme Court (in favor of a friendlier international forum), thus 
arresting the natural evolution of constitutional law. Such a relocation is a 
major sovereignty concern for states, especially since the Barclays opinion 
revealed that nine justices would not defer to the Executive Branch con-
cerns about international retaliation to a state law that is not facially dis-
criminatory. One year after Barclays, in United States v. Lopez, the Court 
. again reset the balance of federal and state powers in the direction of the 
traditional deference to state powers.261 judicial deference to state author-
ity becomes even more significant when the laws are facially neutral in 
their treatment of foreign as compared with domestic investors. 
257. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), which 
was decided under the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV § 2 (for citizens, 
not corporations), but comports closely to commerce clause analysis. The leading prece-
dent in the P&:I line of cases is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), in which the 
Court invalidated a shrimp license fee disparity of $2,500 for non-resident boats to $25 
for resident boats. Regardless of the constitutional basis for the claim, the Supreme 
Court's analysis of discrimination cases involving access to commercial fishing is very 
much the same. See Constitutionality of State Laws Which Discriminate Against Nonresi-
dents or Aliens as to Fishing and Hunting Rights, 52 L. Ed. 2d 824. 
258. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 371. 
259. 417 F. Supp. 1005 (DC Mont. 1976). 
260. See id. 
261. Lopez was not a preemption case, but the Court ruled that Congress must meet a 
burden of proof before it legislates in an area of traditional state regulation. When Con-
gress adopted the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it exceeded congressional authority under 
the commerce clause since possession of a gun in a local school zone is not economic 
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 
(1995). 
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b. Facially Neutral Laws - Effects Test v. Balancing Test 
The National Treatment standard of "not less favorable treatment" for for-
eign investors creates an effects test for laws that are not facially discrimi-
natory. 262 The only question in determining a violation is whether the less 
favorable treatment results in a commercial disadvantage for foreign as 
compared to domestic firms. This is a question of "simple business eco-
nomics, applied to undisputed facts," not a balance of regulatory benefits 
versus burdens.263 As noted above, there are no MAl general exceptions 
that are appropriate defenses for the state laws cited above.264 In this 
respect, National Treatment is significandy expanded in comparison to 
GATT, which provides for a variety of general exceptions under Article XX, 
including public morals, human or animal health, and conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources, among others.26S 
In contrast to the MAl, since the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
sought to balance the interests of dual sovereignty by scrutinizing both the 
purpose and effect of a state law. The Court will uphold a state law if (1) it 
is rationally related to a legitimate state end, and (2) the regulatory burden 
imposed on commerce is outweighed by the state interest involved.266 
Whether the burden is outweighed turns on the nature of the local interest 
and whether it can be protected by less restrictive means.267 
There are legions of state laws that regulate in a manner that creates a 
differential burden on foreign and interstate commerce without facial dis-
crimination. The laws cited above involving recycled content, packaging, 
and local competition are merely examples. 268 In their comprehensive 
comparison of GATT National Treatment and the dormant commerce 
clause, Professors Farber and Hudec identify two types of GATT disputes 
involving the National Treatment effects test. The first provides different 
treatment for two classes. The classification, however, places most of the 
foreign products, services or firms in the disadvantaged category. The sec-
ond creates a uniform standard of treatment. It also creates a greater bur-
den of compliance and results in a competitive disadvantage for foreign 
262. See supra note 112 (effects test). 
263. See Farber&: Hudec, supra note 213, at 1431. 
264. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(!) 
and (2). 
265. See infra the discussion of general exception in Appendix Il.A. The National 
Treatment under the WTO requires a rigorous two-step process of finding first, the viola-
tion, and second, whether the offending measure fits within the rigorous test for Article 
XX exceptions. The defending nation bears the burden of proof. See Farber &: Hudec, 
supra note 213, at 1426. 
266. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945); Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 
263, 270 (1984); TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6.5. 
267. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
268. See supra notes 149-51 and 165. There are 2,700 state and local laws that 
require safety certifications that create expensive compliance burdens for foreign firms, 
as do the voluminous state laws on labeling of food, appliances, pharmaceuticals, and 
alcoholic beverages. See EU Trade Report - 1997, supra note 24, at 17-23. 
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firms because of their different geographic or market positions.2 69 
For example, the Maryland gasoline retailer law could be challenged 
as a discriminatory classification under the MAl because it prohibits verti-
cally integrated oil refiners, none of which were based in Maryland when 
the law was enacted,270 from owning a retail service station.271 This is 
certainly "less favorable" treatment that would flunk a National Treatment 
challenge under the MAI.272 However, the Supreme Court upheld this law 
under the commerce clause balancing test in Exxon v. Maryland. 273 The 
Court recognized the legislative purpose to preserve retail competition and 
prevent unfair trade practices such as predatory pricing.274 
The Exxon Court deferred to the facial neutrality of the Maryland law 
because it applied "evenly" to all vertically integrated firms, whether in-
state or out-of-state. The fact that there were no in-state vertically inte-
grated firms did not concern. the Court, even though the factual context 
meant that this law functioned as an anti-takeover policy restricting market 
access. The Court reasoned that the Commerce Clause "protects the inter-
state market, not particular inter-state firms, from prohibitive or burden-
some regulation."275 
Lawrence Tribe suggests that the Court upheld the Maryland law 
because it did not adversely affect the interstate flow of goods (save for two 
companies) as it existed at the time.276 By contrast, National Treatment 
under the MAl is an instrument of protection for market access by individ-
ual firms, regardless of any adverse consequences that a large firm's pric-
ing may create for smaller local competitors. The underlying clash of 
values is illustrated by Tribe's commentary, which explains that "the nega-
tive implications of the commerce clause derive principally from a political 
theory of union, not from an economic theory of free trade."277 As a conse-
269. See Farber&: Hudec, supra note 213, at 1422. 
270. Only two of 199 stations affected by the law were owned by out-of-state compa-
nies. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 137-38 (1978) (Black-
mun, ]., dissenting). 
271. The law required those that did own stations to divest them. See Mo. CooE ANN. 
art. 56, § 157E (Supp. 1997). Similarly, the Massachusetts franchise law permits a local 
franchisee to challenge a franchisor's decision to open another franchise on grounds 
that to do so would encroach upon the local market. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch 93B, 
§ 4(3)(1) (1995). 
272. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33; Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 
110. 
273. 437 U.S. 117 (1978). The Court later distinguished the statute in Exxon on 
grounds of facial neutrality from a Florida statute that it overturned on commerce clause 
grounds. The Florida statute discriminated among financial service companies based 
on the extent of their contacts with the local economy. See Lewis v. BT Investment Man-
agers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 45-49 (1980). 
274. See 437 U.S. at 121, 127. 
275. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127-28 (Stevens,].). justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that 
the overwhelmingly local composition of the retailer market was a context that created a 
discriminatory burden on out-of-state oil companies while protecting the in-state retail-
ers. See id. at 140-41 (Blackmun, ]., dissenting). 
276. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-6. 
277. Id. § 6-6. 
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quence, the Court frequendy resolves the balancing of interests in favor of 
deference to a state. 
There are many state laws in Farber's and Hudec's second category of 
uniform standards that create disparate costs of compliance. For example, 
in American Can Company v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 278 the Ore-
gon Supreme Court upheld what justice Scalia calls a "garden variety"279 
imposition on interstate commerce. In American Can, the court upheld the 
Oregon "botde bill," which required beverage producers to use returnable 
containers, as an appropriate legislative means of addressing environmen-
tal needs. In National Treatment terms, such content requirements not 
only shift a disproportionate cost of compliance to out-of-state producers, 
they also impose inappropriate "production or process methods" on "like 
products. "280 
In Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof to establish that their com-
pliance burdens were not only disproportionate, but suf(iciendy burden-
some to violate constitutional standards.281 GATT panels have ruled that 
even a risk of discrimination would violate National Treatment.282 Once a 
plaintiff establishes a prima Jade violation of competitive disadvantage in a 
GATT case, the government has the same burden of defense as if the law 
were facially discriminatory.283 
Professors Farber and Hudec illustrate the structural difference 
between GATT National Treatment and the dormant commerce clause. 
The commerce clause provides for an intuitive balance between regulatory 
justification and commercial disadvantage. Whereas Article III of GATT 
separates the question oflegal violation from the question oflegal justifica-
tion, a prima facie case for violation requires only a showing of commercial 
disadvantage. Once the violation is established the burden shifts to the 
defending government to prove that the measure being challenged falls 
under one of the general exceptions.284 However, as noted before, the 
GATT general exceptions simply are not available under the MAl. As a 
result: 
... because the finding of violation involves only the issue of commercial 
burden under a monolithic "less favorable treatment" standard, GATT may 
find it difficult to control disguised protectionist measures at one end of the 
spectrum without having to find all other regulation with adverse trade 
278. 15 Or. App 618,517 P.2d 691 (Op. Ct. App. 1973). Accord Brotherhood ofLoco-
JP.Otive Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, 393 U.S. 129, 142 (1968). 
279. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, ]., 
dissenting). 
280. See discussion of "like circumstances," supra notes ll1-18. 
281. 512 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1994). See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1977). 
282. See EEC - Payments &: Subsidies Paid to Processors &: Producers of Oilseeds &: 
Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Oct. 16, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at '1141 (1989-
90). 
283. See Farber&: Hudec, supra note 213, at 1422. 
284. See id. at 1426. 
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effects to be in violation .... 285 . . [The GATT panel decisions on facially 
neutral measures do not solve] the question of how to confine this analysis 
so that it will not sweep up all government regulations that involve any dif-
ferential commercial burden for foreign goods. 286 
Farber and Hudec, absent the use of a U.S. Supreme Court balancing 
test, invented a solution based on common sense and a more intuitive inter-
pretation of the competitive impact of such laws. They point to the refined 
definition of National Treatment within the WTO General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) as an "updated restatement" that WTO members 
adopted.287 In particular, GATS provides that the test of modifying "condi-
tions of competition," does not apply to "inherent competitive disadvan-
tages which result from the foreign character" of the firms affected by the 
law.288 
Farber and Hudec presume that the "inherent disadvantage" exception 
to GATS National Treatment will avoid finding violations when the regula-
tion has "routine normalcy (dare we say, credibility?)" that makes it look 
like it has no protectionist purpose. They interpret "inherent" disadvan-
tages as synonymous with "inevitable," meaning that GATS National Treat-
ment should apply to a regulation, even if it is enacted in good faith and 
without protectionist motives, if the legislature could "avoid disadvantaging 
the foreign supplier."289 The net effect of the Farber and Hudec interpreta-
tion is to reinvent National Treatment with a built-in balancing process 
akin to Article XX analysis. 
While it may be within the interpretative power of a WTO or MAl dis-
pute panel, the Farber and Hudec intuitive test of balancing regulatory pur-
pose with commercial effect is more aspirational than predictive. Since the 
time of Farber and Hudec's article, subsequent GATT Article XX decisions 
have evidenced a "monolithic" focus on the supremacy of trade values with 
little or .no deference to domestic legislative purposes.290 Without the 
structural counter-balance of GATT's Article XX exceptions, it is reasonable 
to expect that MAl dispute panels would be even less likely than WTO 
panels to show deference to conflicting regulatory purposes. 
Unless and until the Farber and Hudec interpretation transforms inter-
national dispute panels' approaches, the comparison of MAl National 
Treatment and the dormant commerce clause boils down to the following 
for laws that are not facially discriminatory: The MAl provides a mono-
lithic test of commercial effect. The dormant commerce clause provides a 
test that balances commercial effect with legislative purpose. The MAl 
does not provide such a test. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 1427. 
287. Id. at 1428. 
288. GATS, supra note 114, art. XVII. 
289. Id. 
290. See infra cases cited at notes 579-80. 
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c. Alcoholic Beverages - State Regulation Under the 21st Amendment 
The 21st Amendment would prove irrelevant to a challenge of state law 
that regulates alcoholic beverage dealers, producers, or products under the 
MAI.29l Under the dormant commerce clause, however, the 21st Amend-
ment places a finger on the balancing scale as a constitutionally protected 
state interest.292 Section 2 of the amendment reads: "The transportation 
or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States 
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws 
thereof, is hereby prohibited." 
The Supreme Court has adjusted the commerce clause balance for 
interstate or foreign commerce in alcohol by deferring to state laws that 
would otherwise violate the dormant commerce clause.293 However, the 
state law must regulate "the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in 
liquor."294 The 21st Amendment does not protect a state alcohol law that 
amounts to "mere economic protectionism."295 In addition, a nonprotec-
tionist state law that conflicts with federal regulation of interstate or for-
eign commerce, such as antitrust enforcement, is merely a factor in a 
court's analysis.296 
Two cases suggest that the 21st Amendment probably expands state 
sovereignty to impose regulatory burdens that would not survive a 
National Treatment challenge under the MAl. This would fail because the 
increased costs of compliance disadvantage the competitive position of for-
eign firms. In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Company,297 
the Supreme Court upheld a license fee on the business of importing 
liquor from another state, which is otherwise a violation of the dormant 
commerce clause. In North Dakota v. United States, the Court also upheld a 
state law that imposed burdensome reporting and labeling requirements 
on the federal government regarding liquor at military installation sales 
291. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, 'I 5.47. 
292. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-24 (the 21st Amendment is a "constitutional 
adjustment" of the balance of federal/state powers); NowAK & RoTUNDA, CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAw§ 8-8 (1991) (the 21st Amendment gives states "wide latitude" to regulate without 
federal interference). 
293. The 21st Amendment has placed liquor in a category different from that of 
other articles of commerce. Though the precise amount of power it has left in 
Congress to regulate liquor under the Commerce Clause has not been marked 
out by decisions, this much is settled: local, not national, regulation of the 
liquor traffic is now the general Constitutional policy. 
Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 138 (1944) (Black,]., concurring). 
294. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). 
295. Id. 
296. See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) (upholding fed-
eral prosecution of price fixing in the liquor distribution business); California Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
297. 299 U.S. 59 (1936). More recently, however, the Court invalidated a state tax on 
foreign liquor imports, holding that the 21st Amendment does not constrain limits on 
state power under the export/import clause, which is an explicit limit on state power as 
compared with the implicit limits of the dormant commerce clause, and which also has 
implications for foreign policy. See Department of Revenue v. james B. Beam Distilling 
Company, 377 U.S. 341, 346 (1964). 
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within the state. 298 
These cases upheld regulatory burdens and effective discrimination, 
which are similar to the laws that the United States was unable to defend in 
the Canadian challenge against state laws in the Beer II decision.299 These 
included relatively higher licensing fees300 and requirements that foreign 
producers use wholesale distributors30l and common carriers.302 
d. Subsidies - Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Compared to the turbulent rapids that mark the course of state regulatory 
power, the rivers of subsidy that flow from state and local government are 
much calmer waters. Relatively few of the hundreds of subsidy laws and 
programs are facially discriminatory.303 Although the Supreme Court has 
"never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies,"304 the Court 
recendy acknowledged in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy that "direct subsidi-
zation of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of the negative 
commerce clause."305 Even Supreme Court decisions rejecting regulations 
as discriminatory have recognized that direct subsidies are a valid excep-
tion to the preemptive scope of the dormant commerce clause.306 
Where subsidies do run afoul of the dormant commerce clause, it is 
because they are tax subsidies that are "functionally indistinguishable" 
from discriminatory taxes that function like tariffs.307 The dissenters in 
West cynn Creamery,308 complained not about the holding, but the implica-
tions of justice Stevens' "functional" rationale, which maintains that the 
dormant commerce clause forbids state laws that "artificially encourage in-
state production" or "neutralize the advantage possessed by lower cost out-
of-state producers."309 This rationale would support a "commercial disad-
vantage" claim that a state law violates National Treatment. 
While the dissenters sought to use their rationale to attack any state 
298. 495 u.s. 423 (1990). 
299. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 206. 
300. The states included Alaska and Vermont. See id. 'I 6.1(m). 
301. The states included Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. 'I 6.10). 
302. The states included Arizona, California, Maine, Mississippi, and South Carolina. 
See id. 'I 6.1 (l). 
303. See, e.g., supra notes 191-203. 
304. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994). 
305. Id. (quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988), 
and citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815 (1976) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
306. See C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 395 (1994) (after 
rejecting a local law that required delivery of all solid waste to a newly constructed 
processing center, the Court said that the town could simply finance the facility out of 
general taxes or municipal bonds); South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 
467 U.S. 82, 99, 103 (1984). (plurality opinion and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
307. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186'(1994); Bacchus Imports v. 
Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
308. 512 u.s. 186 (1994). 
309. Id. at 193 and 205 (quoting Baldwin v. GAF Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)). 
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subsidy,310 the majority holding dealt specificly with taxes that coupled an 
in-state producer subsidy with a simultaneously adopted tax on all produ-
cers, from which the subsidy is drawn as a functional "tax rebate."311 The 
rebate character of the subsidy distinguishes it from all direct subsidies 
that stand alone on funds from general revenue.312 This decision shows 
how the Court uses a formal distinction between types of subsidies to stop 
short of a doctrine that would encroach any further on state power.313 
The Court's own rationale and commentators suggest that the com-
merce clause deference to direct subsidies will continue, even in the era of 
free trade. In addition to the federalism rationale advanced by the dissent-
ers, the majority was satisfied that a simple subsidy "merely assists local 
business," whereas a tax rebate shifts the burden discriminately to out-of-
state competitors.314 Thus, the courts can rely on taxation with represen-
tation as a discipline on subsidies paid from general taxpayer funds.315 
Taxpayers are often willing to pay for subsidies that support nonprotection-
ist "positive externalities," such as job creation, business retention, and 
environmental protection.316 Even in non-subsidy cases, the Supreme 
Court has accepted the regulatory legitimacy of protecting local jobs as 
opposed to protecting the market share of local business.317 
As noted in Part III.A.2 above, some subsidy targets ( e:g., "stay-at-
home" packages) could be challenged as inherendy more protectionist than 
others (e.g., new business recruitment).318 Likewise, more subde screen-
ing of subsidies, designed to eliminate investor windfalls, restrain inter-gov-
ernmental competition, and maximize net new jobs, will disadvantage 
foreign firms.319 There is litde indication, however, that the Supreme 
Court would find such targeting or screening criteria to constitute a "func-
310. See 512 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, ]., joined by Blackmun, ].). 
311. 512 U.S. at 199. 
312. See id. at 197. 
313. See Walter Hellerstein &: Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State 
Business Development Incentives, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 789, 836-46 (1996); Note, Func-
tional Analysis, Subsidies, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, llO HAR.v. L. REv. 1537, 
1541-42 (1997) [hereinafter Note, Functional Anarysis]. 
314. 512 U.S. at 197. 
315. See Hellerstein &: Coenen, supra note 313, at 847. 
316. See Note, Functional Analysis, supra note 313, at 1547-48. 
317. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204 
(1983) (local construction contracts with public funds); Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen v. Chicago, RI &: PR Company, 393 U.S. 129 (1968) (minimum-size train 
crews); TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-13. When nation A imposes a protective tariff (or tax 
subsidy that functions as a tariff) on goods from nation B, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, for nation B to take countermeasures like retaliatory tariffs (because the 
original product does not benefit) or counter-subsidies (because goods are exported to 
multiple countries). In the case of a simple subsidy, the counter-measure of a counter-
subsidy is more feasible because the reciprocally subsidized products compete wherever 
they are sold in the same market. See Note, Functional Analysis, supra note 313, at 1545, 
n.57. 
318. See Hellerstein &: Coenen, supra note 313, at 850. 
319. See supra note 205-09. 
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tiona!" violation of the dormant commerce clause.320 
The ultimate basis of a National Treatment challenge to state subsidy 
programs is their economic effect on the conditions of competition. The 
relevant effect is not limited to their efficacy in influencing business loca-
tion decisions.321 Rather, the relevant effect is on competitiveness of firms 
that receive the subsidies in comparison to those that do not. These effects 
will vary drastically based on the industry and the unique situation of sub-
sidy receivers and competitors. Especially when used in multi-million dol-
lar packages, the most innovative state programs could establish a prima 
fade case that a subsidy package uniquely places a foreign investor at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
The value of state innovation in this sector is not merely that it pro-
motes local economic competitiveness.322 The most progressive state 
experiments today are the ones that actually impose disciplines on that 
competition. Foreign investors who can make a case that the screening 
criteria or subsidy strategies work to their commercial disadvantage can 
challenge these disciplines. · 
e. Market Participation - Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause 
just as U.S. courts show considerable deference to subsidies, even though 
they commercially disadvantage foreign firms, the courts are not likely to 
invoke the dormant commerce clause to invalidate state procurement and 
other market activities. No matter how discriminatory it may be, market 
activities are not "regulation" of international or interstate trade, which is 
the national interest that courts are empowered to safeguard from excessive 
burdens of subnational regulation.323 While state regulation of foreign 
commerce will attract closer scrutiny by the courts, the exception for mar-
320. Even in a tax exemption context, "the [Supreme] Court has pointedly refused to 
distinguish between incentives affoded new and existing business operations," even 
though the latter are obviously more likely to exclude out-of-state firms. Hellerstein &: 
Coenen, supra note 313, at 854 (citing Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 
388, 406 (1984) (declining to draw any distinction between a discriminatory tax that 
"diverts new business into the State" and one that "merely prevents current business 
from being diverted elsewhere")). See also Philadelphia v. New jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 
623-624 (1978) (distinguishing between protectionism and "incidental burdens on 
interstate commerce"). 
321. A study of 74 foreign investment projects by 30 companies showed that incen-
tives did influence the location decisions of foreign investors in two-thirds of the cases 
studied. See STEPHEN E. GUISINGER Er AL., INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE 
REQUIREMENTS: PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 47-49 
(1985). Studies of U.S. domestic business, however, conclude that subsidies have at best 
a marginal effect on the choice oflocation. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Selected Issues in 
State Business Taxation, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1986); Richard Pomp, The Role of 
State Tax Incentives in Attracting and Retaining Business: A View from New Yorh, 29 TAX 
NoTES 521, 525 (1985); SCHWEKE Er AL., supra note 185, at 35. Stephen Guisinger 
observes that if competing investment incentives offset each other, the absP.nce of incen-
tives could be a costly change in policy. "If one country were to eliminate its incentives 
while others maintain theirs, the country's share of foreign investment projects might 
decline substantially." GUISINGER Er AL., supra, at 38-39. 
322. See Hellerstein &: Coenen, supra note 313, at 851. 
323. See Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980). 
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ket participation applies equally to laws that affect domestic and interna-
tional commerce. 324 
In general terms, the MAl would significantly expand the application 
of National Treatment to market activities of state and local government in 
comparison to existing international agreements. Under GATT, National 
Treatment generally carves out government procurement altogether; the 
MAl would not.325 GATT retains a number of general exceptions that rec-
ognize legitimate government purposes related to market activities of state 
government, such as conservation of exhaustible natural resources;326 the 
MAl would not.327 Both NAFTA Chapter 11328 and the General Agreement 
on Trade In Services (GATS) have a general exception for government pro-
curement; the MAl would not.329 The WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (AGP) does provide for National Treatment,330 but it does not 
cover local government331 or state procurement below a minimum level,332 
and it applies only to those states that choose to join the agreement.333 
The MAl, on the other hand, applies to all subnational governments and 
lacks a minimum threshold.334 Finally, the MAl's investor-to-state reme-
dies provide the most significant change in the reach of National Treatment 
in comparison with existing agreements. 
just as the Supreme Court has developed a functional rationale for its 
deference to state subsidies, it has developed several rationales for its defer-
ence to state market participation. For example, states are entitled to pro-
mote the economic welfare of their own citizens when managing publicly 
owned resources.335 In addition, when acting as market participants, 
states are entitled to exercise the same control as any other market actor 
over how and with whom they do business.336 Lawrence Tribe has 
observed that these public and private rationales are inconsistent alterna-
324. See South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (plurality 
opinion); NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 292, § 8.9. 
325. See GATT, supra note 111, art. Ill.8; MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. 
II(Scope and Application)(!) and VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2). 
326. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX. 
327. See id. art. Ill.8; MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. ll(Scope and Applica-
tion)(!) and VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2). The MAl general exceptions are protec-
tion of "essential security interests," maintenance of "international peace and security," 
and maintenance of "public order." Id. art. VI(2). These may be relevant to military 
procurement, which is not a significant state-level activity. 
328. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1108.7. 
329. See GATT, supra note 111, art. III.8; MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. 
Il(Scope and Application)(!) and VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2). 
330. See AGP, supra note 181, art. Ill.!( a). 
331. See id. Annex 2- United States. 
332. The AGP minimum threshold for subnational government is 35,000 SDRs 
(approximately $500,000 US) for goods and services and 5 million SDRs (approxi-
mately $7 million US) for construction. See id. Annex 2 - United States. 
333. At present, 37 states have accepted the AGP through correspondence from the 
governor. See id. Annex 2 - United States. 
334. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. II(Scope and Application)(!) and 
VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2). 
335. See id.; McReady v. Virginia, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391 (1877). 
336. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
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tive rationales for the market participant exception.337 However, both 
rationales are consistent with the distinction between regulating the private 
market versus managing public resources, where states act as "guardian 
and trustee" of the public interest.338 Neither rationale is consistent with 
National Treatment under the MAl, which tests a law only in terms of 
whether it places foreign investors at a commercial disadvantage.339 
When states limit use or sale of state land to their own citizens,340 
they act within the economic welfare rationale of the market participation 
doctrine. The Supreme Court has upheld state limits on distributions of 
"government largesse" to state residents,341 who should be free to reap 
what they have sown with their own investment of tax dollars.342 When 
states limit nonresident access to natural resources that the state does not 
literally own (e.g., access to an underground aquifer), the Court has over-
turned the limit as a regulatory burden on commerce.343 Likewise, when a 
state imposes regulatory limits on the "downstream" use of state-owned 
resources after they are harvested (e.g., milling of timber), the Court has 
overturned the limit as a regulatory burden.344 The Court has upheld, 
however, residency limits on the sale or use of state-owned land or 
resources as within the scope of market participation.345 Such discrimina-
tion on the face of these laws would establish a prima facie violation of 
National Treatment.346 
The domestic purchasing preferences of most state governments347 do 
not have any regulatory complications, and are therefore within the scope 
of the private market rationale. While the purchasing preferences for small 
and minority businesses are facially neutral, foreign governments have crit-
icized their implicit bias that excludes foreign firms from approximatly 
twenty percent of procurement in California and Texas to as much as sev-
337. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-11. 
338. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 (quoting Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915)). 
339. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the general exceptions to the MAl 
would apply to state activities as market participants. The MAl general exceptions are 
protection of "essential security interests," maintenance of "international peace and 
security," and maintenance of "public order." MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 
VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2). 
340. See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text (limits on sale or use of public 
land). 
341. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 441. 
342. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 313, at 845. 
343. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
344. See South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
345. Although the Court invalidated Alaska's requirement that timber companies pro-
cess logs in the state before exporting them, the Court acknowledged a number of alter-
native ways for the state to promote economic welfare. These included restricting sales 
to state residents, operating state-owned sawmills, and providing direct subsidies to in-
state processors. See id. at 95. In McReady v. Virginia, the Court recognized the state's 
right to sell its own land to its own citizens or to manage the land "to be used as a 
common by its people for the purposes of agriculture." 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391, 395-96 
(1877). 
346. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explicit discrimination). 
347. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (buy-America or buy-local pro-
curement preferences). 
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enty percent in Kentucky.34S 
Environmental purchasing preferences for recycled content have had a 
dramatic impact on the cost of market access for foreign investors.349 The 
national treatment issue is whether they continue to require significant 
processing costs that are disproportionately higher for foreign firms 
because of their geographical or market positions.3so The answer is likely 
to be yes if increasing numbers of states expand their environmental prefer-
ences beyond paper into other materials (e.g., wood, plastic, glass, and 
cermamics ). A potential state defense is that recycled materials are not 
"like products" or that the foreign firms that use virgin materials are not in 
"like circumstances," with their recyclable competitors. However, this 
defense has failed in the context of GATT litigation when products that 
compete with each other are treated differently based on how they are 
made rather than how they perform as products.351 
State and local market participation is a highly sensitive issue under 
the MAl because the market is so large. Individual foreign firms would 
have a strong economic incentive under the MAl to file National Treatment 
complaints against state laws that limit market access. The commerce 
clause justification is that the market participation exception allows states 
to act like firms in the private market. A discriminatory effect is not rele-
vant, so long as the courts view the states' market participation as serving 
a nonregulatory purpose. Yet even state regulation of foreign commerce 
receives a sliding-scale degree of deference when courts balance purpose 
and effect under the dormant commerce clause. 
Farber and Hudec read GATS as a "restatement" that relaxes the effects 
test ("conditions of competition") when the adverse conditions are "inher-
ent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character" of a 
firm.352 But the way to defend a law under this inherent-disadvantage test, 
they argue, is to establish the law's routine normalcy, so that the regulation 
does not look protectionist, even though it may have an adverse affect on 
commerce.353 This is where the analogy to a balancing test stops because 
a search for routine normalcy begs the question. How can a state be a 
laboratory if it cannot experiment with solutions that are beyond the rou-
tine? There is no escape from the fact that the most liberal interpretation 
of an effects test cannot turn it into a balancing purpose test as well. 
National Treatment under the MAl is an effects test only. By contrast, 
the purpose-and-effect balancing of the dormant commerce clause is 
designed to reconcile competing values of national versus local allocation 
of power and economic versus noneconomic objectives of government. 
The movement that the balancing test produces ·is not a weakness or cover 
348. See EU TRADE REPORT - 1997, supra note 24, at 27; see also Alcoholic and Malt 
Beverages, supra note 33 (like products). 
349. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (Canadian paper mills). 
350. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 313, at 1422. 
351. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (like products). 
352. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 213, at 1429. 
353. See id. 
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for protectionism. The movement in the balancing test is like the pendu-
lum of a clock. The gravitational pull between legislative purpose and 
commercial effect is an energy source. By subtracting legislative purpose 
out of the balance, the MAl would stop the clock, and with it, the dynamic 
of state laboratories when their experiments affect foreign commerce. 
4. Significance of Proposed MAI Revisions 
The Chairman's Proposal to change the National Treatment text would 
make permanent the phrase that requires member nations to provide 
"treatment no less favourable tha[n] the treatment it accords in like circum-
stances to its own investors and their investments ... "354 This language is 
followed by an interpretative note in the text that recognizes that govern-
ments may have legitimate policy reasons to treat foreign investors differ-
ently in relation to domestic investors or investors from third countries.355 
If a law pursues a policy objective that is legitimate under the MAl, the 
Chairman's Proposal makes it possible to justify "different treatment" if the 
measure is otherwise not discriminatory.356 
The example in the Chairman's Proposal is limited to "securing com-
pliance with domestic laws that are not inconsistent with national treat-
ment .... "357 In other words, if a law violates National Treatment in the 
first place, then a panel would not even consider whether there are "like 
circumstances." A "different effect" on foreign investors could not rise to 
the level of de facto discrimination. As noted above, de facto discrimination 
means an effect on the competition of domestic as compared with foreign 
competitors. By negative inference, "in like circumstances" could justify a 
different effect that has no bearing on competition. 
One could argue that the inclusion of the phrase, "in like circum-
stances," makes it more likely that a recycled-content statute would pass 
under national treatment since there is no explicit discrimination. How-
354. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(2)(1). 
355. The full text of the interpretive note reads: 
National Treatment and most favoured nation treatment are relative standards 
requiring a comparison between treatment of a foreign investor and investments 
and treatment of domestic or third country investors and investments. Govern-
ments may have legitimate policy reasons to accord differential treatment to dif-
ferent types of investments. Similarly, governments may have legitimate policy 
reasons to accord differential treatment as between domestic and foreign inves-
tors and their investments in certain circumstances, for example, where needed 
to secure compliance with domestic laws that are not inconsistent with national 
treatment and most favoured nation treatment. The fact that a measure applied 
by a government has a different effect on an investment or investor of another 
Party would not in itself render the measure inconsistent with national treat-
ment and most favoured nation treatment. The objective of "in like circum-
stances" is to permit the consideration of all relevant circumstances, including 
those relating to a foreign investor and its investments, in deciding to which 
domestic or third country investors and investments they should appropriately 
be compared. 
Id. Annex 2(2)(3) n.S. 
356. Id. Annex 2, 2(13). 
357. Id. Annex 2(3)-(17), 2(15) n.3. 
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ever, the arguments against these laws include that they either place foreign 
producers at a competitive disadvantage, or they distort investment deci-
sions at the expense of foreign producers. In addition, the laws discrimi-
nate based on how a product is made, not how it is used. In short, the 
insertion of "in like circumstances," with its interpretative note, is unlikely 
to offset the authority of international law. 
B. Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Treatment 
1. MAI Provisions 
The MAl would protect investors from discrimination based upon their 
activities in third countries. This activity usually arises in the context of 
sanctions or withdrawal of public purchasing on human rights grounds. 
Canada and the EU propose further MAl language that would make sanc-
tions on investors or secondary boycotts an explicit violation of the 
MAI.358 Such a bright line, however, is not necessary. The MAl provisions 
for MFN359 are implicit and likely to result in the same degree of investor 
protection, and ultimately the same degree of controversy, as a ban on boy-
cotts or sanctions. 
There are two elements that expand MFN Treatment under the MAl in 
comparison to GATT, NAFTA, and WTO agreements. The first is the MAl's 
expansive definition of "investment"360 and "investor."361 An investor 
from a MAl-member nation need only have a minority interest in an invest-
358. While over half of the OECD nations likely support this language, the United 
States opposes it because of its explicit conflict with the Helms-Burton sanctions on 
investors that have investments in Cuba. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91. The proposal reads: 
No Contracting Party may take measures that 
(i) either impose or may be used to impose liability on investors or invest-
ments of investors of another Contracting Party; 
(ii) or prohibit, or impose sanctions for, dealing with investors or investments 
of investors of another Contracting Party; 
because of investments an investor of another Contracting Party makes, owns or 
controls, directly or indirectly, in a third country in accordance with [interna-
tional law and] regulations of such third country. 
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex I (Draft Article on Secondary Investment Boy-
cotts) (emphasis omitted) (brackets in original). 
359. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting Party 
and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it 
accords [in like circumstances] to investors of any other Contracting Party or of 
a non-Contracting Party, and to the investments of investors of any other Con-
tracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
and sale or other disposition of investments. 
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(National Treatment and Most Favoured 
Nation Treatment)(2) (brackets in original). 
360. The MAl defines "investment" as "[e]very kind of asset owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by an investor" including, among other assets, an enterprise, own-
ership shares or stocks, contract rights, and property rights such as leases. Id. art. 
II(Definitions )(2). 
361. The MAl defines "investor" as a "natural person having the nationality of, or who 
is permanently residing in, a Contracting Party" and "a legal person or any other entity 
constituted or organised under the applicable law of a Contracting Party, ... whether 
private or government owned or controlled, and includes a corporation, trust, partner-
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ment located in a non-member nation to challenge a policy that discrimi-
nates against the third-nation investment.362 The second element is that 
MFN under the MAl is not limited to treatment of investments in the terri-
tory of a Contracting Party.363 MAl negotiators explained that their intent 
is to protect the "international activities of established foreign inves-
tors."364 The lack of territorial limits for MFN stands in contrast to the 
"absolute" investor protections, such as General Treatment and limits on 
performance requirements. The latter are limited to investments in the ter-
ritory of a Contracting Party.365 
In this regard, the standing of investors to seek a remedy for treatment 
of non-MAl countries is more liberal under the MAl than under NAFTA.366 
Thus, the MAl definitions, coupled with MFN treatment, create a global 
umbrella for protection of investments, as long as the complaining investor 
is a national or resident of a non-MAl nation. 
2. The Potential for Conflict 
Human and labor rights advocates argue that the MAl would prohibit Con-
tracting Parties and subnational governments from using their sovereign 
purchasing power to enforce human and labor rights.367 The leverage for 
ship, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association or organisation." ld. art. 
II(Definitions )(l ). 
362. The MFN provisions would prohibit discrimination based on differential treat-
ment of one MAl-member nation when compared with other MAl-member nations. 
However, differential treatment based on human rights abuses by OECD nations is not 
the focus of current policy debates. Rather, the current policy d~bates focus on human 
rights violations by non-OECD nations. This third-party dynamic raises two causes for 
concern about how the MAl might affect economic measures that discriminate against 
human rights violators. First, MFN treatment might constrain enforcement measures 
against non-OECD/non-MAI member rogue states. Second, if the MAl comes into force, 
the umbrella of MFN protection would make a strong incentive for rogue states to join 
the MAl. Military regimes in Myanmar and Nigeria, for example, show great enthusiasm 
for most goals of the MAl. See Ken Silverstein, So You Want to Trade with a Dictator?, 
MoTHER joNES, May/June 1998, at 40. 
363. See MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. III(National Treatment and Most 
Favoured Nation Treatment)(2). Compare MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 
III(National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(2), with id. art. 
III(Performance Requirements(!), and id. art. IV(l). 
364. The broader context of MAl negotiators' explanation was that if the MAl were to 
limit MFN to a Contracting Party's treatment of investments "in its territory," the Con-
tracting Parties would "not have obligations with regard to investors of another Con-
tracting Party in a third country." MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. III(National 
Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(2). Instead, the MAl negotiators 
intended "not to unduly limit the scope of the agreement, for example by excluding the 
international activities of established foreign investors and their investments." ld. 
365. Compare MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(National Treatment and Most 
Favoured Nation Treatment)(2), with id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(!), and id. 
art. IV(l). 
366. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1117 (requiring investors to own or control an 
investment in a non-MAl nation before they can claim a remedy under NAFTA on behalf 
of that investment in a non-MAl nation). 
367. See jiM EGAN & jAMES ISBISTER, INQUIRY INTO THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON 
INVESTMENT 5 (1998); HuMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM OF HARvARD LAw ScHoOL, THE MuLTILAT· 
ERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: ITs IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 
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enforcement, they argue, is to deny violators access to markets, or at the 
very least, to avoid doing business with investors that violate human rights, 
do business with repressive regimes, or contribute to economic activity 
upon which repressive regimes depend for tax revenues, foreign currency, 
and politicallegitimacy.368 A U.N. subcommission on human rights called 
on OECD nations to review the draft MAl to ensure that its provisions are 
consistent with their human rights obligations.369 
Within the past thirty years, a majority of U.S. states and many cities 
set human rights standards for companies with which they do business. 
The best known example is the South Africa selective purchasing boycott, 
in which nineteen states and sixty-two local governments participated.37o 
In 1998, twenty-three state and local governments used purchasing prefer-
AND THE WoRK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs 4 (1997). The Harvard report 
also reviews the potential impact of the MAl on economic measures that fall outside the 
scope of this Article. These include U.S. investment bans, visa limits, limits on invest-
ment incentives, and conditions on foreign aid or debt relief. These measures also 
include sovereignty interests of prospective MAl members, such as the South African 
constitutional commitment to domestic ownership as a component of land reform. See 
id. at 19. 
368. Burton Levin, a former U.S. Ambassador to Burma, stated that "[f]oreign invest-
ment in most countries acts as a catalyst to promote change, but the Burmese regime is 
so single-minded that whatever they might obtain from foreign sources they pour 
straight into the army while the rest of the country is collapsing." See Craig Forcese, 
Municipal Buying Power and Human Rights in Burma: The Case for Canadian Munici-
pal 'Selective Purchasing' Policies (1998) (unpublished paper on file with author) (quot-
ing CANADIAN FRIENDS OF BuRMA (CFOB), DIRTY CLOTHES-DIRTY SYSTEM 51 (1996)). 
369. Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 4(a), The International Eco-
nomic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights 'I 5 (Aug. 21, 1998). A delegate to the 
subcommission supported this resolution by arguing that 
This freedom for investors could have tragic consequences as the MAl could 
counter and negate the positive measures that states have taken or may propose 
to take to end discrimination faced by vulnerable people and communities in 
relation to the human rights to food, health, housing, land and work. Necessary 
measures such as food subsidies, control of land speculation, agrarian reform, 
and the implementation of health and environmental standards are all under 
threat of being viewed as 'illegal' under the MAl. 
Mr. Miloon Kothari, Statement at the 50th Session of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriniination and Protection of 
Minorities 3 (Aug. 12, 1998) (transcript on file with author). 
370. See Kevin Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and 
Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TuL. L. REv. 469, 471 (1987); South Africa: The Eagle 
Waits to Peck, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 1986, at 34. There is considerable variety among the 
South Africa laws, which applies to banks with loans in South Africa, companies selling 
strategic military or police products, firms not receiving a minimum "Sullivan Princi-
ples" rating, and firms doing business in South Africa. The "doing business in" statutes 
are the model for the Massachusetts Burma Law. These states included California, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, New jersey, and Wisconsin. See id. at 4 73. For addi-
tional scholarship on South Africa laws, see also Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main 
Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 FoREIGN PoL'Y 158 (1992); Anne R. Bowden, 
Note, North Carolina's South African Divestment Statute, 67 N.C. L. REv. 949 (1989); Peter 
]. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion Upon the Federal 
Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813, 815 (1986); Gracejublinsky, Note, State and 
Municipal Governments React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Con-
stitutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CrN. L. REv. 543 (1985). 
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ences to avoid business with companies that operate in Burma371 and 
Cuba,372 extract oil from Nigeria,373 operate in Northern Ireland without 
following the MacBride code of corporate responsibility,374 or withhold 
financial assets (in Swiss banks) from the families of Holocaust victims.375 
At least eight other states and four cities considered similar legislation in 
1998.376 
These policies will inspire future investor-to-state disputes under the 
MAl. Most recently, the Swiss government threatened a WTO complaint in 
response to the announcement that California, New York State and City, 
and Pennsylvania would lead a U.S. boycott of services by Swiss banks in 
America if Switzerland and the private banks do not negotiate a settlement 
with Holocaust survivors and descendants.377 However, a few weeks after 
the states' policy was announced, the Swiss banks came to a compromise 
settlement with the class of Holocaust survivors and heirs.378 
On another front, the European Union and japan filed a September 
1998 WTO complaint against the Massachusetts Burma law, which the 
371. The 22 jurisdictions include the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the county of 
Alameda, CA; and the cities of Ann Arbor, MI; Berkeley, CA; Boulder, CO; Brookline, 
MA; Cambridge, MA; Carrboro, NC; Chapel Hill, NC; Madison, WI; New York, NY; 
Newton, MA; Oakland, CA; Palo Alto, CA; Portland, OR; Quincy, MA; San Francisco, CA; 
Santa Cruz, CA; Santa Monica, CA; Somerville, MA; Takoma Park, MD; West Hollywood, 
CA FRANKLIN REsEARcH &: DEVELOPMENT CoRPORATION, BuRMA SELECTIVE PuRCHASING 
LAws (1998); INVESTOR REsPONSIBILITY REsEARCH CENTER, STATE&: LoCAL GoVERNMENTS 
WITH CouNTRY-SPECIFIC SELECTIVE PuRCHASING LAws app. F chart (1998) [hereinafter 
IRRC REPORT). For a specific example, see MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 7, § 22(G-M) (1966). 
372. The jurisdiction is Dade County, FL. See USA Engage, States and Municipalities 
with Prepared or Enacted Sanctions Laws (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http:/ I 
www.usaengage.org/resources/map3.html>; USA Engage, State and Local Sanctions 
Watch List (visited jan. 11, 1999) <http:/ /www.usaengage.org/news/status.html>. 
373. The jurisdictions include Berkeley, CA; Amherst, MA; Alameda Co., CA; and 
Oakland, CA See IRRC REPORT, supra note 371, app. F chart. 
374. The 14 jurisdictions include the states of New jersey and New York. The 12 
cities include Albany, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Lakewood, New York City, Philadel-
phia, Rensselaer City, Rochester, San Francisco, Scranton, and Yonkers. See id. 
375. The leading jurisdictions included the City of New York and the states of Califor-
nia, New York, and Pennsylvania. See Henry Weinstein &: john Goldman, Nazi-Era 
Claims Spark Sanctions on Swiss Banks, LA TIMES, july 2, 1998, at A1; New York governor 
signs bill to punish firms who don't resolve Holocaust-era insurance claims, jERUSALEM PosT, 
july 10, 1998, at 5. 
376. The states included Connecticut (Burma), California (Burma), Maryland (Nige-
ria), Massachusetts (Indonesia), North Carolina (Burma), Rhode Island (Indonesia), 
Texas (Burma), and Vermont (Burma). The cities included Davis (Burma), Los Angeles 
(Burma), Minneapolis (Burma), New York (Burma), and Seattle (Burma). See USA 
Engage, USA ENGAGE, Ferr Trade, Unilateral and Economic Trade Sanctions (visited Sept. 
25, 1998) <http:\ \www.usaengage.org>. 
377. See john Goshko, Sanctions on Swiss Banks to Proceed, WASH. PosT, july 2, 1998, 
at A-3; john Zarcorostas, Bern withdraws threat over Holocaust claims, ]. CoM., july 8, 
1998, at 3A; David Sanger, How a Swiss Bank Gold Deal Eluded a U.S. Mediator, N.Y. 
TIMES, july 12, 1998, at 1-6. The issue still lingers regarding insurance claims of Holo-
caust survivors, where insurance is a traditional domain of state regulation. Weinstein 
&: Goldman, supra note 375, at A1; New York governor signs bill to punish firms who don't 
resolve Holocaust-era insurance claims, supra note 375, at 5. 
378. See john Goshko, Swiss Banks' Pact Ends NY Threat of Sanctions, WASH. PosT, 
Aug. 14, 1998, at A14. 
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U.S. government has pledged to defend.379 In the meantime, a coalition of 
multinational companies has challenged the same law in U.S. federal court 
on constitutional grounds.380 The EU has filed an amicus brief in support 
of the plaintiffs.3Sl In fact, the EU is represented by the same law firm that 
represents USA *Engage, the corporate coalition challenging the state law. 
Lest the EU present itself as a unified Europe in this conflict, the European 
Parliament responded to the EU's own WTO complaint by passing a resolu-
379. See MichaelS. Lelyveld, US vows to defend action by state,]. CoM., Sept. 11, 1998, 
at 3A; EU to Request WTO Panel Ruling On Massachusetts Law, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 
11, 1998, at l. The EU Demarche complains of three violations of the AGP: (1) art. 
VIII(b ), which prohibits conditions on a tendering company that are not essential to 
ensure the firm's capability to fulfill a contract; (2) art. X(3), which prohibits qualifica-
tion criteria based on political rather than economic considerations; and (3) art. XIII( 4), 
which prohibits making contract awards based on political rather than economic consid-
erations. See European Commission Demarche to the U.S. Department of State, 
reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, jan. 31, 1997, at 10. The European Union did not cite 
violation of the AGP provisions on MFN treatment, which provide for "treatment no less 
favorable than ..•. that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party." 
AGP, supra note 181, art. II.1(b). In comparison, the MAl provisions for MFN treatment 
would offer a stronger complaint than the AGP provisions because the MAl provides for 
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to "investors of any other Contracting 
Party or of a non-Contracting party, and to the investments of investors of any other 
Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting party . ... " MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, 
art. III(National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(2) (emphasis added). 
380. See National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. 
Mass. 1998). See infra notes 387-404 and accompanying text. 
381. See Amicus Curiae Brief for Plaintiff, National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) v. 
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998). See also Nancy Dunne, EU in Burma Law 
Protest, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 1998, at 3. 
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tion that criticized the European Commission for requesting a WTO panel 
and deplored the escalatiort of human rights violations in Burma. 382 
3. Sovereignty Issues 
The state policies that incite such legal battles are not foreign expeditions. 
For example, California Treasurer Matt Fong represents 20,000 California 
Holocaust survivors or their children.383 In the footsteps of the European 
refugees of the 1940s, thousands of expatriate Nigerians and Burmese 
became residents and citizens of the United States to avoid prison, torture, 
or ethnic cleansing.384 U.S. state legislators responded to their constitu-
ents' liberty interests, just as the state officials leading the boycott against 
Swiss banks acted to protect their constituents' financial rights.385 
Multinational corporations, who support both the MAI386 and the liti-
gation against Massachusetts,387 complain that state initiatives are burden-
some incursions into two exclusive zones of federal power: conduct of 
foreign policy388 and regulation of foreign commerce,389 both of which 
382. Relevant excerpts from the resolution include: 
The European Parliament ... 
3. Believes that, in the interest of a foreign policy founded upon the principles 
of human rights and democracy, the scope of the WTO to take these principles 
into account should be enlarged rather than restricted and calls upon the Euro-
pean Union to use its weight as the biggest trading power of the world to this 
end· 
4: Criticizes in this context the Commission decision to insist on a conflict 
resolution panel within the WTO over the law of the US State of Massachusetts, 
which set a pricing penalty on purchases of goods by state authorities from 
companies that do business in Burma. 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, REsOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BURMA 1 (Sept. 17, 
1998). 
383. See Goshko, supra note 377, at A3; Weinstein&: Goldman, supra note 375, at Al. 
384. See U.S. DEP'T OF ST., 1997 HuMAN RIGHTS REPORT- NIGERIA AND BuRMA (Feb. 
1998); U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, MYANMAR (1997). 
385. See, e.g., Mark Matthews, Challenging Nigeria and Big Oil; Hopkins Student Fights 
Homeland's Rulers, BALT. SuN, jan. 4, 1998, at 1A; Teresa Malcolm, Oil Blight Lingers for 
Ogoni, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Mar. 27, 1998, at 4. 
386. Multinational corporations complain as members of the U.S. Council for Inter-
national Business. 
387. Multinational corporations complain as members of the National Foreign Trade 
Council (NFTC) and USA *Engage. 
388. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of PlaintifPs Motion 
for Consolidation and Expedited Consideration of the Merits, at 6-12, 17-19, NFTC v. 
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) [hereinafter NFTC Memorandum]. For the 
"one voice" theory of foreign relations power, plaintiffs rely primarily on Zschernig v. 
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
389. See NFTC Memorandum, supra note 388, at 27-28. For the "one voice" theory of 
foreign commerce power, plaintiffs rely primarily on japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). For a range of scholarship on the Burma law controversy, 
see Daniel M. Price and john P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and 
Local Sanctions, HARv. INT'L LJ. 443 (1998);jennifer Loeb-Cederwall, Note, Restrictions 
on Trade with Burma: Bold Moves or Foolish Acts?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 929 (1998); Anne 
Q. Conaughton, Factoring U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions Into International Trade 
Decisions, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1211 (1998); Michael Wallace Gordon, The Conflict of 
United States Sanctions Laws with Obligations Under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1259 (1998); David R. Moran, No Panacea: Analyzing Sanctions 
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require the United States to speak with "one voice." They argue that 
human rights standards for government purchasing are not valid local leg-
islative purposes, and even if they are, their discriminatory nature is impos-
sible to justify under a strict-scrutiny balancing test.39° Considering the 
nature of the state's legal arguments,391 the arguments by the Natinal For-
eign Trade Council (NFTC) are a rough translation of MFN Treatment 
under the MAl into the language of constitutional doctrine. The following 
points illustrate how MFN Treatment and constitutional law may differ. 
This, of course, depends on whether the courts accept all of the plaintiffs 
assertions. 
- Speaking with "one voice." More than 30 years after the Supreme Court 
used the "one voice" doctrine upon which the NFTC relies (for both 
foreign affairs and commerce clause), a nearly unanimous Court repu-
diated the doctrine in Barclays.392 Arguably, MFN Treatment under the 
MAl would resolve any ambiguity over which federal "voice" the courts 
should enforce (ie., the Executive rather than Congress) and whether 
the federal government's voice preempts all state voices (even harmoni-
ous voices). 
Meaning of discrimination. In the constitutional litigation, Massachu-
setts argues that its standard treats all companies similarly regardless of 
their status as foreign or domestic. The dormant commerce clause is 
not violated because it has a valid purpose for avoiding companies that 
do business with Burma, and it does not encroach upon a federal com-
mercial interest such as protectionism. 393 In contrast, the MFN stan-
dard of "treatment no less favorable" than that given to an investment 
from any other country precludes even the question of discrimination 
among third-party nations unless the general exceptions make that dis-
crimination possible. 
Balancing test. The NFTC asserts that there is nothing to balance 
because the federal interest is exclusive. Massachusetts points to state 
regulatory statutes that were challenged as intrusions into federal for-
eign affairs power. The Supreme Court weighed these similar statutes 
and found one acceptable and the other exceedingly intrusive into the 
Before Imposition, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1403 (1998); Alejandra Carvajal, Note, State and 
Local "Free Burma" Laws: The Case for Sub-National Trade Sanctions, 29 LAw & PoL'Y 
lNT'L Bus. 257 (1998); David R. Schmahmann &james Finch, The Unconstitutionality of 
State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma 
(Myanmar), 30 VANo.j. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997). 
390. NFTC Memorandum, supra note 388, at 23, 34. 
391. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary judge-
ment, NFTC v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) [hereinafter Massachusetts 
Memorandum]. 
392. See discussion of Barclays, supra Part II.A.3 and notes 222-32, 281-83 and 
accompanying text. 
393. See Massachusetts Memorandum, supra note 391, at 38-40. As noted above in 
the discussion of National Treatment, supra Part II.A., the dormant commerce clause 
protects the market, not individual firms. See Exxon v. Maryland, 436 U.S. 117, 127-28 
(1978). See also Lewis, supra note 370, at 492-502. 
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conduct of foreign affairs.394 As noted under National Treatment, the 
MAl uses a monolithic test of commercial disadvantage that is akin to 
the exclusive federal interest argument. The only permissible justifica-
tions that the MAl would "balance" under its general exceptions are 
"essential security interests," United Nations obligations for mainte-
nance of international peace and security,395 and maintenance of "pub-
lic order," which applies when a "serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society."396 
Market participation. The absence of relevant MAl general exceptions is 
parallel to the NFTC position that the market participation exception 
does not apply to exclusive federal powers in the execution of foreign 
affairs and regulation of foreign commerce.397 Even if the exception 
does apply, the NFTC argues that the exception is limited to protection 
of local economic interests, not factors unrelated to the immediate busi-
ness between the state and the corporation.398 While recognizing the 
Supreme Court's caution that it has had "no occasion to explore the 
limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the foreign commerce 
clause,"399 Massachusetts cites both federal and state courts that have 
applied the exception to foreign commerce. This includes human rights 
criteria outside the scope of contract goods or services.400 These cases 
reason that when states act as market participants, they exercise the 
same rights as private corporations undertaking the same activity.401 
In 1986, the United States justice Department endorsed the market par-
ticipant exception as applied to South Africa boycott legislation,402 as 
did Professor Tribe in 1988.403 In short, Massachusetts' argument 
394. See Massachusetts Memorandum, supra note 391, at 47-49. 
395. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(2). 
396. Id. art. IV(3), (2)(2.5) n.2. 
397. See NFTC Memorandum, supra note_ 388, at 31-32. 
398. See id. at 27. 
399. Massachusetts Memorandum, supra note 391, at 31 (quoting Reeves v. Stake, 
447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980)). 
400. See id. at 30 (citing Trojan Techs. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 
903, 909-13 (3d Cir. 1990); Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A2d 720, 752 
(Md. 1989); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. New jersey District Water Supply Comm'n, 
381 A2d 774, 784-89 (NJ. 1977). 
401. Matthew Porterfield argues that as market participants, state governments enjoy 
First Amendment protection for both political speech and policy decisions on how the 
state should spend and invest its funds. See Matthew C. Porterfield, The First Amend-
ment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN.]. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1998) (Part IV.B-
Selective Investment and Purchasing Laws as Protected Activity Under the First 
Amendment). 
402. In response to the South Africa boycott upon which the Massachusetts Burma 
law is modeled verbatim, the U.S. justice Department, under Attorney General Edwin 
Meese, concluded that "[t]he role of the state as 'guardian and trustee for its people' in 
spending or investing their funds is as strong when the state's market participation 
affects foreign as when it affects interstate commerce." Constitutionality of South African 
Divestment Statutes Enacted by State and Local Governments, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
49, 54-55 (Apr. 9, 1986). 
403. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-22, which opined: 
[U]nder the Supreme Court's market participant exception to the Commerce 
Clause, a state would be free to pass laws forbidding investment of the state's 
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enjoys wide support. 
The constitutional litigation in Massachusetts helps prove the first sov-
ereignty impact of the MAl version of MFN treatment. This includes 
authorization of an extraterritorial forum, rather than the Supreme Court, 
to decide whether a state government should be able to act as "a guardian 
and trustee of its people"404 when conducting its own business as a market 
participant. 
The second sovereignty impact is that the MAl would deny to states 
any of the sovereignty doctrines that remain standing after the Burma law 
litigation has reached its final destination. These include the Barclays 
interpretation of the "one voice" doctrine, the Exxon interpretation of mar-
ket discrimination, the balancing test for competing federal and state inter-
ests, and the market participation exception. 
The third category involves the status of state governments under 
international law. Those state sovereignty arguments that remain standing 
after NFTC v. Baker, regardless of the fate of this particular statute, are 
vulnerable with respect to the MAl's influence on the balance of state 
power in at least three categories: (l) the scope oflegitimate market partic-
ipation under international agreements; (2) the availability of general 
exceptions under international agreements (which would "balance" against 
strict application of MFN Treatment); and (3) the capacity of the U.S. gov-
ernment to serve as a diplomatic buffer. 
The MAl would reduce the scope of permissible market participation 
compared to existing international agreements. Similar to the MAl version 
of MFN Treatment, both the NAFTA investor protections405 and the 
GATS406 have MFN provisions that reach treatment of activity in non-MAl 
countries. However, neither NAFTA407 nor GATS408 apply MFN treatment 
to government procurement. In effect, NAFTA and GATS have an exception 
for market participation, but the MAl does not. 
The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement covers thirty-seven 
pension funds in companies that do business with South Africa, or rules requir-
ing that purchases of goods and services by and for the state government be 
made only from companies that have divested themselves of South African com-
mercial involvement. 
404. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903). 
405. Apart from the exceptions that include government procurement, MFN under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 is equivalent to the MAl: "Each Party shall accord to investors of 
another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to inves-
tors of any other Party or of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of invest-
ments." NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1103.1. NAFTA's next section requires "invest-
ments of investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in 
like circumstances, to investments of investors of any other Party or of a non-Party .... " 
Id. art. 1103.2. 
406. "[E]ach member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and 
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to 
like services and service suppliers of any other country." GATS, supra note 114, art. ll.l. 
407. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1108.7. 
408. See GATS, supra note 114, arts. Xlll.l & XIV(e). 
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U.S. states409 but no cities. Thus, even if the United States were to lose a 
WTO complaint based on the AGP, it would have no legal bearing on cities. 
In contrast, the MAl covers local, state, and national governments.410 
Finally, the WTO agreement only applies to purchases that exceed 
$500,000 for goods and services and $7 million for construction.411 This 
threshold opens the door to selective purchasing in a state like Massachu-
setts, where a large majority of state contracts fall below the threshold.412 
In effect, the AGP includes two exceptions for market participation that the 
MAl does not: one for jurisdictions that do not accept the AGP and a mini-
mum threshold for all jurisdictions. 
The MAl represents a radical change in the availability of general 
exceptions to MFN Treatment under existing international agreements. 
The AGP provides general exceptions that include "public morals, order 
and safety,"413 the scope of which is yet to be addressed in any GATT or 
WTO dispute. Steve Charnovitz argues persuasively that human rights 
standards for business partners would fall within the scope of public 
morals based on the history of GATT Art. XX( a), several European treaties, 
and multiple human rights conventions.414 
Although recent WTO and GATT decisions have opposed the extrater-
ritorial aims of U.S. trade regulations,415 government procurement repre-
sents a wholly different context. In theory, this context gives the WTO 
room to consider whether discrimination to protect "public morals and 
order" is an appropriate form of market participation for government pro-
curement.416 The lack of general exceptions in the MAl would close the 
409. See AGP, supra note 181, U.S. Annex II. There is considerable controversy on 
whether Massachusetts ever consented to join the AGP; the letter responding to the U.S. 
Trade Representative's request certainly did not say so. See Letter from William Weld, 
Governor of Massachusetts, to Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 3, 1993) 
(on file with author). The other states that joined the AGP did so by letter, with no 
legislative authority to waive or suspend statutes that are not consistent with the AGP. 
410. See OECD DocuMENTS, supra note 58, at 123. 
411. The minimum threshold is 355,000 SDRs (approximately US $500,000) for sup-
plies and services and 5 million SDRs (approximately US $7 million). See AGP, supra 
note 181, U.S. Annex II. 
412. Interview with Harold R Fisher, General Counsel, Operational Services Divi-
sion, Executive Office of Administration and Finance of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts (Mar. 2, 1998) (notes on file with author). 
413. AGP, supra note 181, art. XXIII.!. 
414. See Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA.]. INT't. L. 689, 
710, 713, 728 (1998). 
415. See Shrimp Report, supra note 104, 'I 187; Charnovitz, supra note 414, at 46-48, 
71-77. See also Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the 
Environment, 83 GEo. LJ. 2131, 2194 (1995) (discussing the territorial principle). 
416. See Charnovitz, supra note 414, at 729. See also Christopher McCrudden, Inter-
national Economic Law and Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of 
"Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 2]. INT't 
EcoN. L. (forthcoming 1999). Additional scholarship on the public morals exceptions 
includes Christoph T. Feddersen, Focussing on Substantive Law in International Economic 
Relations: The Public Morals of GATT's Article XX( a) and "Conventional" Rules of Inter-
pretation, 7 MINN.]. GLOBAL TRADE 75 (1988). 
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door to that room.417 
Finally, the MAl would change the balance of state power in terms of 
the role of the U.S. federal government. In WTO disputes that have 
involved U.S. states, the parties have used diplomatic channels for an 
extended period during which state and local policy created significant 
leverage on the principal actors.418 In this process, the objective is not to 
"win," but to reach "an equitable resolution on all of the issues."419 
A crucial element of sovereignty protection, surfacing in the debate 
prior to the adoption of the Uruguay Round, involves this capacity of the 
federal government to serve as a buffer on behalf of U.S. states.420 Under 
the MAl, the private companies that could bring complaints for monetary 
damages would have much less interest in seeking a diplomatic resolution 
that meets public policy objectives. The first NAFTA case brought by the 
Ethyl Corporation against Canada is a case in point.421 The Ethyl Corpora-
tion had a capital investment to protect, which justified a further invest-
ment in legal fees based on the legal merits of the case. The U.S. 
government declined the opportunity to bring a state-to-state case on 
Ethyl's behalf. The government would have gained no immediate return 
and would have risked considerable political capital by making the first 
NAFTA investment case a state-to-state challenge against Canadian environ-
mental law. 
417. Like the general exception of GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(a), n.S, the MAl 
defines its general exception for public order very narrowly to consist of only a "genuine 
and serious threat" to "one of the fundamental interests of society." MAI Negotiating 
Text, supra note 7, art VI( General Exceptions)(3). Unlike the MAl, however, GATS has a 
carve-out for government procurement. GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV( e). Christopher 
McCrudden explains how the textually unrestricted meaning of "ordre public" or "public 
policy" in the Treaty of Rome has been interpreted in a comparably narrow way by the 
European Court of Justice. See McCrudden, supra note 416, at 39. Nonetheless, the 
AGP's general exception for "public morality and order" is not restricted by a textual 
amendment as seen in the GATS or MAl exceptions. Thus, the WTO has an explicit 
basis for recognizing a broader scope of sovereignty in public procurement, which com-
ports with U.S. constitutional law on market participation by states. If adopted, the MAl 
language gives dispute panels an easy way to ratchet up "public morals and order" to a 
burden of proof that U.S. states could not meet unless their internal security was 
threatened. 
418. Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat criticized the city and state treasurers' 
initiative as a "counterproductive" intrusion into the Swiss bank negotiations. California 
State Treasurer Matt Fong responded that "our aggressiveness brought the banks to the 
table." Weinstein&: Goldman, supra note 375, at Al. After the state initiative brought 
the banks to a settlement, the pragmatic Undersecretary of State hailed the outcome as a 
"historic agreement," which "carried the moral weight of the growing international con-
sensus .... " Id. He acknowledged the direct interest of U.S. citizens as evidenced by 
state-level legislation, and he commended state insurance commissioners for organizing 
their response to the controversy as advocates for their constituents. See Stuart Eizen-
stat, Justice After the Holocaust, WASH. PosT, Sept. 23, 1998, at AS. 
419. John Zarocostas, Bern Withdraws Threat over Holocaust Claims,]. CoM., July 8, 
1998, at 3A. 
420. The U.S. Senate debated several times on the Uruguay Round. See 140 CoNG. 
REc. S8847, S8853, S8855, S8862-64 Quly 13, 1994). See also Letter from Michael Kan-
tor, U.S. Ambassador, to Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, Attachment 'I 
2 Quly 1994), reprinted in Special Report, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 22, 1994, at 5-3. 
421. See SFoRZA&: VALLIANATOS, supra note 79, at l. 
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In sum, MFN provisions under the MAl could have three significant 
effects on the power of U.S. states: (1) a substantial reduction in the scope 
of legitimate market participation; (2) a virtual elimination of general 
exceptions that are available under existing agreements; and (3) a short-
circuit on the role the federal government plays as a buffer and diplomatic 
problem-solver on behalf of U.S. states. 
The political effects of this altered balance of power could prove signif-
icant. For example, cities and states would no longer act as catalysts 
within the U.S. federal system on issues of human rights, as they did in the 
campaign against apartheid in South Africa. Nor would they continue to 
experiment with consumer choice standards for doing business in a global 
economy as they have with application of Sullivan or MacBride principles. 
Nor would they offer hope to advocates for human rights and democracy 
through a process of bottom-up policymaking when national governments 
have other priorities. 
4. Significance of Proposed MAl Revisions 
The Chairman's proposals on labor and the environment include a pream-
ble and a slightly altered text for MFN Treatment. The relevant preamble 
paragraph states that the MAl Contracting Parties would renew 
their commitment to the Copenhagen Declaration of the World Summit on 
Social Development and the observance of internationally recognised core 
labour standards, i.e., freedom of association, the right to organise and bar-
gain collectively, prohibition of forced labour, the elimination of exploitative 
forms of child labour, and non-discrimination in employment, and [the Con-
tracting Parties note] that the International Labour Organisation is the com-
petent body to set and deal with core labour standards world-wide.42 2 
The change in the MFN text would make permanent the bracketed phrase 
that requires Contracting Parties to provide "treatment no less favourable 
[than] the treatment it accords in like circumstances to its own investors and 
their investments .... "423 This change in language would likely permit 
only those differences that do not affect competition, not the kind of 
explicit discrimination based on human rights standards. The preamble 
suggests the need for general exceptions in the MAl concerning core labor 
standards, but since the preamble is not part of the MAl text, it contains 
only interpretive value. 
The example in the text is limited in application to general domestic 
standards of foreign investors. It is too limited to address the fundamental 
question of whether MFN treatments permit a government to discriminate 
based on behavior in a third country. Policymakers and courts will likely 
read the Chairman's language as limiting the application of the preamble to 
only de facto enforcement measures. In this context, the preamble is some-
thing of a tautology; it states that Contracting Parties may adapt their 
domestic policies to comply with International Labor Organization (ILO) 
422. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(1) (Preamble). 
423. Id. 
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agreements, which is already the case. It does not authorize member 
nations to enforce ILO agreements by choosing not to do business with 
investors or nations that violate ILO agreements. With respect to MFN 
treatment, the Chairman's proposal represents a pragmatic technical cor-
rection, not a response to sovereignty concerns. 
C. Absolute Investor Protections 
The MAl provides a number of "absolute" investor protections, so called 
because they apply even when there is equal relative treatment (National 
Treatment or Most Favoured Nation Treatment) when foreign investors are 
compared to domestic investors. Apart from the MAl articles on financial 
services and taxation, there are at least twelve absolute MAl provisions.424 
The scope of this article permits only a summary of three absolutions that 
could pose the greatest limits on state lawmaking authority: the limits on 
performance requirements, provisions on compensation for expropriation, 
and general treatment. 
1. Limits on Performance Requirements 
The MAl prohibits twelve specific types of performance requirements or 
mandates that governments might impose on an investment in its terri-
tory.425 The first five prohibited requirements parallel those of the WTO 
424. The absolute provisions include, id. arts. III(Transparency, Temporary Entry, 
Nationality Requirements, Employment Requirements, Performance Requirements and 
Monopolies/State Enterprises), and IV(General Treatment, Expropriation, Protection 
from Strife, Transfers, Information Transfer and Data Processing, and Subrogation). 
425. See id. art. Ill(Performance Requirements)(!). The full text is: 
A Contracting Party shall not, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, sale or other 
disposition of an investment in its territory of an investor of a Contracting Party 
or of a non-Contracting Party, impose, enforce or maintain any of the following 
requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking: 
(a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services; 
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; 
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services pro-
vided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its 
territory; 
(d) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of 
exports or to the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such 
investment; 
(e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment 
produces or provides by relating such sales to the volume or value of its 
exports or foreign exchange earnings; . 
(f) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge 
to a natural or legal person in its territory, except when the requirement 
- is imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by a court, 
administrative tribunal or competition authority to remedy an alleged viola-
tion of competition laws, or 
- concerns the transfer of intellectual property and is undertaken in a man-
ner not inconsistent with the TRIPS agreement [referring to the WTO Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights]; 
(g) to locate its headquarters for a specific region or the world market in the 
territory of that Contracting Party; 
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Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).426 The MAl 
prohibits any requirement to export goods or services, achieve a given level 
of domestic content, purchase domestic goods or services, or restrict 
domestic sales to the volume of exports.427 The other seven prohibitions 
do not apply if a MAl country links the requirement to an "advantage" such 
as a subsidy or tax benefit.428 Without such a link, the MAl prohibits any 
requirements to transfer technology or proprietary knowledge, locate a 
regional headquarters, conduct research and development, hire local per-
sonnel, establish a joint venture, or achieve a minimum level of local equity 
participation.429 
The MAl provisions on performance requirements expand considera-
bly upon the limits that are already imposed under NAFTA chapter ll. 
I d. 
(h) to supply one or more of the goods that it produces or the services that it 
provides to a specific region or the world market exclusively from the terri-
tory of that Contracting Party; 
(i) to achieve a given level or value of research and development in its territory; 
G) to hire a given level of nationals; 
(k) to establish a joint venture with domestic participation; or 
(l) to achieve a minimum level of domestic equity participation other than nom-
inal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators of corporations. 
426. See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-
A1A-7, Annex (Illustrative List) (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TRIMS]. 
427. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(Performance Requirements)(1)(a)-
(e). 
428. The exact language is: 
A Contracting party is not precluded by paragraph 1 from conditioning the 
receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, in connection with an investment 
in its territory of a Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, on compli-
ance with any of the requirements, commitments or undertakings set forth in 
paragraphs 1(£) through 1(l). 
Id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(2). 
429. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1)(f)-(l). Apart from the subsidy link, 
there are two proposals for exceptions that could limit the negative impact of these MAl 
provisions on state sovereignty. The first is a proposal to create an exception to the 
prohibitions on requirements for using domestic content or purchasing domestic goods 
or services. The exception would cover requirements designed to conserve resources 
and perhaps those that protect human or animal life or health. 
A majority of delegations do not see a need for these exceptions. If added, some 
would support an interpretative note similar to the following: 
Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable 
manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on investment, nothing in 
paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) shall be construed to prevent any Contracting Party 
from adopting or maintaining measures necessary to secure compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations [that are nof otherwise inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement and] that are necessary for the conservation of 
living or non-living resources, [or that are necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health.] 
I d. art. III(Performance Requirements)( 4) n.30 (brackets in original). Paragraph 1 (b) 
prohibits domestic content requirements, and paragraph 1(c) prohibits preferences for 
domestic goods or services. 
Another proposal is to create an exception for government procurement from the 
prohibitions on requirements for using domestic content, purchasing domestic goods 
and services, transferring technology, or supplying goods or services to a specific 
region. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(S)(b). 
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First, the MAl would extend the provisions to cover existing local law, 
which NAFTA does not.430 Second, NAFTA provides two significant excep-
tions, which the MAl does not. 
The first NAFTA exception allows governments to promote economic 
development by linking subsidies with trade-related performance require-
ments.431 The MAl does not allow any of these requirements, even when a 
subsidy is attached.432 Both NAFTA and the MAl prohibit state and local 
economic development powers to the extent that they link program benefits 
with export performance. The MAl, however, would extend the prohibition 
to local government programs and expand the prohibition to cover domes-
tic content and purchasing preferences.433 Under the dormant commerce 
clause, these state programs are secure from constitutional challenge 
because of the exceptions for market participation434 and subsidies.435 
Another area where the MAl could constrain domestic lawmaking is 
community lending policy. The federal government and many states 
require a bank owner to demonstrate that it meets community credit needs 
under a federal or state Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). New 
York,436 Washington,437 Connecticut,438 Massachusetts,439 West Vir-
ginia,440 Ohio,441 and Iowa442 are among the states that enforce CRA 
requirements most rigorously when a bank owner applies to purchase, 
expand, or move a banking business. A bank owner can demonstrate its 
community lending performance through making specific kinds of loans, 
undertaking joint ventures or contracts with nonprofit developers or public 
agencies, or hiring and training community residents.443 These perform-
ance measures would violate several MAl limits on performance require-
430. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1108.1-.2. 
431. The NAFTA exception provides: 
Nothing in paragraph 3 [which is parallel to MAl prohibitions (b) through (e)] 
shall be construed to prevent a Party from conditioning the receipt or continued 
receipt of an advantage, in connection with an investment in its territory of an 
investor of a Party or of a non-Party, on compliance with a requirement to locate 
production, provide a service, train or employ workers, construct or expand 
facilities, or carry out research and development in its territory. 
Id. art. 1106.4. 
432. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. lll(Performance Requirements)(2). 
433. See supra notes 167-69 (examples of state domestic purchasing preferences). 
434. See discussion supra Part Il.A.3.e (Market Participation) and notes 323-39. 
435. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.d (Subsidies) and notes 303-22. 
436. See N.Y. BANKING LAw § 28-b (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1987). 
437. See WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 30.04.010, 30.04.212 (West Supp. 1986). 
438. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-32 (1996) (state-supervised banks); CoNN. GEN. 
STAT. § 36a-412 (1996) (interstate acquisition). 
439. See MASs. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 167, § 14 (West 1984). 
440. See W.VA. CciDE § 31A-8B-1 (1982 & Supp. 1987). 
441. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1111 (Banks-Baldwin 1978 & Supp. 1987). 
442. See IowA CoDE ANN. § 524.1090 (West 1996). 
443. Most state bank supervisors follow the lead of federal bank examiners in the 
area of CRA performance standards. See generally l2 C.F.R. 25.21-25 and 25.21.29 
(1998); l2 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1997); Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries of 
the Community Reinvestment ACt and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based 
Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 710 
(1996). 
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ments since no subsidies are involved. In addition, the MAl article on 
financial services limits regulation to prudential measures, which includes 
"safety and soundness" regulations, but not community lending 
requirements. 444 
2. Expropriation 
The MAl provides that Contracting Parties 
shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or indirectly an investment in its 
territory . . . or take any measure or measures having equivalent 
effect ... except: a) for a purpose which is in the public interest, b) on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, c) in accordance with due process of law, and d) 
accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion ... 445 Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment ... 446 
Apart from the MAl commentary, which explains that "measures having 
equivalent effect" include "creeping" expropriation, there is no definition 
of expropriation.447 
The MAl legislative history includes a Working Group report explain-
ing that measures having an "equivalent effect" to expropriation include 
"confiscations, seizure, interventions, temporary takings, modalities on the 
use and disposal of the investment, interference, government administra-
tion, even if it does not affect the title or ownership of the investment, and 
forced sales .... A broad definition would be a safeguard against new forms 
of expropriations in the future."448 
With somewhat poetic timing, news of the MAl's expropriation provi-
sions reached the U.S. environmental advocates shortly after they thought 
they had turned back a series of congressional "property rights" initia-
tives.449 Environmentalists had persuaded President Clinton to threaten a 
veto,450 because the bills would have relaxed the threshold for defining a 
444. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VII(Prudential Measures)(!). 
445. ld. art. IV(2)(2.1). 
446. ld. art. IV(2)(2.3). 
447. MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. IV(2)(5). 
448. Working Group A, Existing Legislation, in OECD DocuMENTS, supra note 58, at 
118. 
449. See Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995); the 
Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995). See also S. REP. No. 
104-239 at 12 (1996); the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1996, S. 1954, 104th Cong. 
(1996); the Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997, H.R. 1534, 105th 
Cong. (1997). For environmental perspectives on the legislative history, see Glenn P. 
Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private Property, People and the Environment, 8 FORDHAM 
ENVIl.. LJ. 521, 525-50 (1997); john D. Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights, 50 
OKIA L. REv. 351 (1997). 
450. President Clinton wrote the Senate judiciary Committee stating that "S. 605 
does not protect legitimate private property rights. The bill instead creates a system of 
rewards for the least responsible and potentially most dangerous uses of property. It 
would effectively block implementation and enforcement of existing laws protecting 
public health, safety, and the environment." Letter from William Clinton, President of 
the United States, to Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec. 
13, 1995), quoted in S. REP. No. 104-239, at 55 (1996). 
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"taking" as a partial percentage diminution of value of any part of an inves-
tor's property.451 
Environmental advocates read the MAl as a parallel strategy for gain-
ing a friendlier forum for investors, a more relaxed threshold for finding a 
compensable taking, and a fiscal incentive for environmental deregula-
tion.452 Twenty organizations wrote President Clinton to suggest the con-
tradiction between his proposed veto of the property rights bills and his 
support for the MAl and its expropriation provision.453 Their concern is a 
reflection of the timing of the MAl proposal, its indeterminate coverage of 
indirect and direct expropriation or measures "having equivalent effect," 
and the interpretive latitude of dispute panels that are unfettered by U.S. 
constitutionallaw.454 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires the govern-
ment to compensate investors when the government "takes" their prop-
erty.455 Until the twentieth century, the Supreme Court applied the 
takings clause only to direct appropriation of property or the "practical 
ouster of [the owner's] possession."456 In 1922, the Court recognized that 
government regulation could effect a taking if -it goes too far,457 but gener-
ally, courts find that a government regulation results in a taking only when 
451. For example, S. 605 would have required compensation for any regulatory action 
that reduced by 33% or more of the value of any affected portion of real, personal, or 
intangible property. The Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. 
§ 204(a) (1995). S. 1954 expanded the scope of takings to include a temporary loss of 
the value of any part of affected property. See The Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1996, 
S. 1954, 104th Cong. § 204(a)(2)(c) (1996). 
452. See Sugameli, supra note 449, at 567-70. 
453. See Letter from the American Oceans Campaign, Center for Marine Conserva-
tion, Defenders of Wildlife, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Environmental Defense 
Fund, Friends of the Earth, lszzk Walton League, League of Conservation Voters, 
National Audubon Society, National Environmental Trust, National Parks and Conserva-
tion Association, National Trust for Historic Preservation, National Wildlife Federation, 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Rails to Trails 
Conservancy, Scenic America, Sierra Club, United States Public Interest Research 
Group, and the Wilderness Society to the President of the United States (Feb, 10, 1998) 
(on file \vith author) [hereinafter NGO Letter]. The reply to this letter sought to 
assure you that we will oppose any international agreements that are inconsis-
tent with or that undermine our domestic takings law. To that end, we made 
good progress on this issue over the past spring. We were also pleased that the 
Ministerial Statement reflects a consensus that normal regulatory action, even 
when it affects the value of investments, should not be considered an expropria-
tion or "taking" requiring compensation. 
Letter from Susan Esserman, General Counsel, Executive Office of the President, to 
Mark Van Putten, President and Chief Executive Officer of National Wildlife Federation 
(undated, received I Oct. 1998) (copy on file with author) (emphasis added). The 
response also acknowledged that "difficult issues remain." Id. 
454. NGO Letter, supra note 453. See also MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 
IV(2)(2.1){2.2) .. 
455. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation."). The Fifth Amendment applies to states under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
456. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). 
457. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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it eliminates all or substantially all of a property's value.458 Consistent 
with this rule, the Supreme Court recently affirmed that "our cases have 
long established that mere diminution in the value of property, however 
serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking."459 
The open-ended meaning of direct or indirect expropriation, "meas-
ures having equivalent effect" and "creeping expropriation" would create 
considerable latitude for MAl dispute panels to ignore or alter at least one 
or more of the analytic tests that U.S. courts have developed over the years 
to determine when a complete taking or elimination of economic value 
occurs. These tests include: 
Elimination of economic value- Courts presume that a regulation is not a 
taking of real estate unless the regulation has a severe economic impact 
and interferes with investment-backed expectations.46° Courts will not 
find a taking if the investor could have reasonably foreseen a change in 
policy.461 In cases involving non-real estate (such as equipment, con-
tracts or patents), courts usually presume that government action is 
foreseeable and that even the complete loss of value of business prop-
erty is not a taking.462 A federal court has explictly ruled this way in a 
case involving termination of foreign investor claims in an arbitration 
forum.463 
Voluntary participation- Courts presume that heavy regulation of a sub-
sidized industry (such as health care) is not a taking as long as provid-
er~ are voluntarily participating in the regulated field.464 Courts refrain 
from inquiring into the profitability of government regulations unless 
the government regulates the entire industry as a public utility. 465 
458. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.S (1992) 
("It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, 
while the landowner with total loss will recover in full."); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (holding that 75% diminution in value is not a taking). See 
also Zealyv. City ofWaukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528,531 (Wis. 1996) ("(t]he rule emerging 
from opinions of our state courts and the United States Supreme Court is that a regula-
tion must deny the land owner all or substantially all practical uses of a property in 
order to be considered a taking for which compensation is required."). 
459. Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. 
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993). 
460. See Pennsylvania Coal. Co., 260 U.S. at 413. 
461. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645. 
462. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. 
463. See Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the expectations of foreign investors should include the changing diplomatic climate 
between nations, which affects or extinguishes property rights just as the common law 
of nuisance affects the uses and value of land). 
464. See Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1986), (doctors claimed that a 
freeze on Medicare Tees amounted to a taking because it denied a reasonable profit; held 
not a taking because doctors were not required to treat Medicare patients, even though 
Medicare patients comprised a substantial percentage of the doctors' practice). 
465. See Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of Pub. 
Welfare, 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984) (mandating Medicare rates that do not permit a 
reasonable return on investment are not a taking because participation in the industry is 
voluntary). 
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- Law enforcement - Courts presume that complete forfeiture 'of property 
as a sanction for violating criminal law or civil regulations is not a tak-
ing.466 The MAl apparendy does not apply to seizures of property as a 
penalty for violation of criminallaw.467 Since civil penalties are not 
mentioned, the inference is that the MAl expropriation provisions would 
apply in the case of civil law enforcement. U.S. courts have rejected 
takings claims brought against civil law mandates after the government 
imposed a fine or tax for failure to comply with the mandate.46S 
- Military and public health - The MAl does not provide a general excep-
tion from expropriation in cases of military action to protect essential 
security interests.469 Nor does it provide an explicit exception for 
destruction of property when necessary to control a threat to public 
health.470 The MAl general exception for preservation of public order 
could conceivably apply to public health emergencies as a "serious 
threat ... posed to one of the fundamental interests of society."471 If so, 
the government would have to prove that the destruction of property 
was "necessary,"472 which GATT and WTO dispute panels have con-
strued to mean least-restrictive.473 
Most state and local governments mandate that land developers miti-
gate some or all costs of the environmental, aesthetic, or infrastructure 
impact they have on the local community. A typical example is a local 
zoning mandate that developers build streets, sewers and other utilities, 
and dedicate land for schools and parks.474 Many jurisdictions go beyond 
the norm. For example, most western states require reclamation of surface-
mined areas with requirements that exceed or differ from minimum federal 
standards.475 Washington,476 California,477 and the Chesapeake Bay 
states478 lead the majority of states that protect estuaries, tidal wedands, 
466. Examples include forfeiting a car or a boat used in drug trafficking or goods that 
were fraudulently advertised. 
467. This provision is provided in the MAl commentary, not the MAl negotiating text. 
It reads: "The Drafting Group understands that the violation of criminal laws could 
result in the loss of an investment (or part thereof) which would not be deemed expro-
priation, provided those laws and their application are non-discriminatory and other-
wise consistent with the standards of this agreement." MAI Commentary, supra note 
101, art. IV(2)(2). 
468. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension 
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (mandating ERISA fees for withdrawal from pen-
sion plan is not equivalent to government occupation of property). 
469. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(!). 
470. Id. art. VI. 
471. Id. art. Vl(General Exceptions)(3) n.2. 
472. Id. art. Vl(General Exceptions)(3). 
473. See GATT Panel Report on Thailand- Restrictions on Importation of and Inter-
nal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990). 
474. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exception)(3) n.2. 
475. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1230-65 (1966). 
476. See generalry WASH. REv. CoDE§ 35.63 (1998) (Planning Commissions). 
477. See California Coastal Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CoDE§§ 30240, 30241, 20350 (West 
1996). 
4 78. See CHESAPEAKE BAY FouNDATION, WETLANDs PERMLTIING PROGRAMS IN THE CHESA-
PEAKE BAY AREA app. C (Oct. 1994); MD. CoDE ANN., ENVIR. § 5-901 (1996). 
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and coastal areas by regulating the alteration of topography, mineral 
extraction, timber harvest, conversion of agricultural land, and location of 
construction. These laws can impose substantial design, mitigation, or 
infrastructure burdens on developers, or alternatively, reduce the value of 
land. 
The environmentalists fear that under MAl expropriation, investors 
will be able to argue that a portion of their property has been effectively or 
temporarily taken by government action or regulation, an argument that 
investors cannot make under takings law.479 There are many areas besides 
land use where investors have litigated takings claims that U.S. courts have 
rejected. These too could receive different treatment under the MAl. A 
sampling of failed taking claims, which could receive different treatment 
under the MAl, includes: 
Reduction of mining operations.480 
Alteration of wetlands.4BI 
Employment benefits.482 
Employer mandates under civil rights laws.4B3 
Health care reimbursement. 484 
Housing fees and regulations.485 
479. See NGO letter, supra note 453. Professor Carl Rose argues that "(o)nce land can 
be apportioned into 'relevant' portions, any diminution can be manipulated to become a 
100% diminution ... [v)irtually any regulation with any adverse impact on an owner's 
parcel could become an occasion for compensation, without regard to the owner's 
expectations and whether they were reasonable." S. REP. No. 104-239, at 258 (1996) 
(minority views). 
480. See Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 
1000 (Ind. 1989) (holding that historic designation of land to protect artifacts was not a 
taking even though it curtailed access to a portion of coal reserves); M &] Coal Co. v. 
United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 360 (1994) (reducing coal mining operation to avoid damage 
to homes and highway is not a taking). 
481. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81 (1997) (denying dredging permit 
which significantly impaired commercial value of property because owner should have 
known that wetlands were subject to strict regulation; therefore, investor expectations 
were not reasonable). The environmental risk of investing in wetlands development 
takes on a double meaning in the booming market for floating casino resorts. See ]oby 
Warrick, Lott Backs Casinos Planned for Undeveloped Coastal Bays, WASH. PosT, Oct. 18, 
1998, at AS. 
482. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension 
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (mandating that ERISA fees do not amount to 
government occupation of property interests). 
483. See, e.g., Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 
574 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that ADA mandates for wheelchair access, which required 
expenditures and loss of space, are not a taking); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (requiring renting rooms to people of color, which results in lost 
profits, is not a taking). 
484. See, e.g., Minn. Ass'n of Health Care v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 
442 (8th Cir. 1984) (mandating Medicare rates that do not permit a reasonable return 
on investment are not a taking because industry participation is voluntary). 
485., See, e.g., Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that fee on commercial development to pay for low-income 
housing has a sufficient nexus to be a rational burden and therefore is not a taking). 
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- Drinking on premises or in public.486 
- Entertainment licenses.487 
The Chairman's proposal to change the MAl text on expropriation 
reads as follows: "A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise 
an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or 
take any measure tantamount to expropriation or nationalization except: 
... "488 It drops the reference to expropriating "direcdy or indirecdy," and 
the reference to "any measure tantamount to expropriation" replaces the 
reference to "measures having equivalent effect."489 These changes are 
eh'Plained by insertion of an interpretative note, which reads in pertinent 
part: 
Articles - on General Treaunent, and - on Expropriation and Compensa-
tion, are intended to incorporate into the MAl existing international legal 
norms. The reference in Article N.2.1 to expropriation or nationalisation 
and "measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation" reflects the 
fact that international law requires compensation for an expropriatory tak-
ing without regard to the label applied to it, even if title to the property is not 
taken. It does not establish a new requirement that Parties pay compensa-
tion for losses which an investor or invesunent may incur through regula-
tion, revenue raising and other normal activity in the public interest 
undertaken by governments. Nor would such normal and !?-On-discrimina-
tory government activity contravene the standards in Article - 1 (General 
Treaunent)."490 
The Chairman's proposal is significant to the extent that it assures 
that the MAl is not creating new rights in international law that do not 
already exist under the doctrine of compensation for expropriation. The 
concern, however, is not only that the MAl could create new international 
norms, but that it would substitute the existing international norms by 
which foreign investors can seek to overcome the existing constitutional 
norms of takings law. 
The points of comparison are fundamental. First, any MAl dispute 
panel reviewing an expropriation claim would be freed from the well-devel-
oped precedents of U.S. constitutional law. Second, the analytic frame-
work within international expropriation law is not finely tuned.491 The 
486. See Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1992) (reducing 
drinking on premises furthers public goal of protecting against drunk drivers); Glasheen 
v. City of Austin, 840 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (restricting consumption of alcohol 
"in or on" public streets and sidewalks is not a taking because the law was properly 
related to its goal). 
487. See Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(denying license for night club supports a valid public interest). 
488. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(5)(2). 
489. Id. art. IV(2)(2.1). 
490. Id. 
491. See generalo/ PAUL CoMEAUX & STEPHEN N. KINSELLA, PROTECTING FoREIGN INVEST-
MENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (1997); C. G. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Prop-
erty under International Law, 38 BruT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307 (1964); Vance R Koven, 
Expropriation and the jurisprudence of OPIC, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 269 (1981 ); Patrick M. 
Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International 
Law of Expropriation, 85 AM.]. INT'L L. 474 (1991). 
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U.S. cases involve garden-variety regulations that are close to a "taking." 
The international cases, by comparison, tend to be more exotic. Many of 
them involve noncomparable situations of civil unrest.492 The concept of 
"public purpose" is not well defined,493 and the breadth of cultural and 
governmental differences greatly complicate the comparison of cases. 
Some international tribunals have awarded damages for "deprivation of 
use," which could open the door to a flexible standard when a government 
action is "tantamount" to expropriation. As noted below, General Treat-
ment protects investors from "impairment" of use. The ultimate problem is 
the essential indeterminancy of these terms. A slight change in the defini-
tion could produce different results than U.S. takings law. 
3. General Treatment 
The MAl would protect investors with "General Treatment" under interna-
tional law with two provisions that dramatically expand the scope of the 
agreement. The first requires Contracting Parties to give investors "fair and 
equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security. In no 
case shall a Contracting Party accord treatment less favorable than that 
required by internationallaw."494 This language is similar to general treat-
ment under NAFTA, 495 the model that the United States currently uses for 
negotiating bilateral investment treaties (BITs).496 
Without this language, MAl panels could interpret MAl terms "in 
accordance with the applicable rules of internationallaw."497 With this 
language, the MAl goes further to give investors a dispute forum where they 
can claim that a nation has failed to comply with an international trade 
agreement498 to buttress a claim under the MAl that a measure adversely 
492. See generally ADEoYE A AKINSAYE, THE ExPROPRIATION OF MuLTINATIONAL PROPERTY 
IN THE THIRD WORLD (1980). 
493. See, e.g., Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 189 (1987). 
494. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(1). The commentary explains that the 
reference to international law is "worded in the most simple manner," which makes it 
broadly inclusive. MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. IV(1)(3). 
495. The comparable NAFTA provision reads: "Each Party shall accord to invest-
ments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." NAFTA, supra 
note 116, art. 1105.1. 
496. See TREATI AFFAIRS OFFicE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES: 1994 MODEL 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (1994) [hereinafter U.S. MoDEL BIT]; Treaty on the Recip-
rocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Oct. 22, 1992, U.S.-Czech Rep.-
Slovk., art. II, S. TREATI Doc. No. 31 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Czech and Slovak Invest-
ment Treaty); Treaty on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., art. II, S. TREATI Doc. No.2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina 
Investment Treaty]. 
497. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(D)(14)(a). 
498. The standard of no less favorable treatment than "that required by international 
law" appears to create an investor cause of action independent of other MAl investor 
protections. Those protections are so broad, however, that the most likely scenario is 
that an investor would use the non-MAl international law standard in conjunction with 
an explicit MAl provision. As noted above in Part l.E.1, this is the area of law where 
trade and investment agreements have overlapping jurisdiction. This overlap was antici-
pated by the OECD working group on investment protection, which acknowledged that 
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affects an investment or investment opportunity.499 
All MAl nations participate in several WTO agreements that could 
amplify investor protection beyond the terms of the MAl. For example, the 
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) requires that "tech-
nical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill 
a legitimate objective."500 In similar fashion, the Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) requires that a measure "is applied only 
to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
... "501 As noted in Part II.A.l, GATT, WTO, and other dispute panels have 
interpreted a "necessary" measure to mean one that is least-trade restric-
tive.502 This test is considerably more stringent than the standard applied 
by modern U.S. courts, which require only that a law have a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate government purpose.503 
There are many other standards of international law that could be 
used to amplify investor protection under the MAl. These include the 
requirements for national uniformity and performance characteristics in 
standard-setting under the TBT,504 the requirement for risk assessment 
under the SPS,5°5 the standards for prohibited and actionable subsidies 
under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,506 
and the standards for technical specifications and qualified suppliers 
under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, 507 to name just a 
few. 
the overlap between trade and investment "may have the consequence that the MAl dis-
pute settlement mechanism would be available with regard to such rights irrespective of 
whether these other treaties provide for arbitration or not" Working Group C, Invest-
ment Protection, in OECD DocuMENTs, supra note 58, at 134. 
499. The crucial difference between a trade agreement dispute and an investor dispute 
under the MAl is that the MAl requires that 
an alleged breach of the MAl must be causally linked to loss or damage to the 
investor or investment ... but the damage, while imminent, would not need to 
have been incurred before the dispute is ripe for arbitration. Further [,] a lost 
opportunity to profit from a planned investment would be a type of loss suffi-
cient to give an investor standing to bring an establishment dispute under this 
article .... 
MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. V(Invester-to-State Procedures)(D)(1)(a)(1). 
500. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A·6, art 2.2 
(Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TBT]. 
SOL Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, GATT 
Doc. MTN/FA ll-A1A-4, art. 2.2 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter SPS]. 
502. See, e.g., Panel Report on Thailand, supra note 473, at 23. See also Panel Report 
on Lobsters from Canada, USA·89-1807-01, 1990 WL 299945 (U.S. Can. F.T.A. Binat. 
Panel) (May 25, 1990). 
503. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (regarding price controls on milk); 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (concerning minimum wage for 
women); see also Beatie v. City of New York, 123 F.3d 707 (2d Cir. 1997) (regarding anti-
smoking ordinance). 
504. See TBT, supra note 500, art. 4.1, Annex 3, '1'1 H (uniformity), I (performance 
characteristics). 
505. See SPS, supra note 501, art 5.1-3. 
506. See SCM, supra note 188, arts. 3, 5 and 6. 
507. See AGP, supra note 181, art. VIII. 
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While the MAl's incorporation of international law standards is a 
somewhat subtle expansion of investor protection, the General Treatment 
provision on impairment of use is not. It provides that "[a] Contracting 
Party shall not impair by ... [unreasonable and discriminatory] measures 
the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of 
investments in its territory ... "508 This language has been used in bilateral 
investment treaties509 but was not used in NAFTA.510 
MAl negotiators have yet to decide whether the unreasonable and dis-
criminatory tests of "impairment" would work independently of each other 
or conjunctively. A conjunctive test would require that government must 
not impair an investment in a way that is both unreasonable and discrimi-
natory. An independent test would require that government must not 
impair use of an investment in a way that is either unreasonable or discrim-
inatory. Since the MAl would otherwise protect foreign investors from dis-
crimination under National Treatment and MFN Treatment, the 
independent test for impairment would yield a more stringent test that is 
absolute; meaning, it limits government power even in the absence of any 
discrimination.511 
Prior to the New Deal, U.S. courts provided strikingly similar protec-
tion to investors from "impairment" of "use" or "enjoyment" by legisla-
tion.512 The substantive due process doctrine513 allowed the courts to 
second-guess the legislative purpose behind the law as well as to determine 
whether the means validly effectuated that purpose.514 The Supreme 
Court has since abandoned this approach in favor of greater judicial defer-
508. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treatment)(1)(1.2). 
509. U.S. Mooa BIT, supra note 496, art. II; U.S.-Czech and Slovak Investment Treaty, 
supra note 496, art. II; U.S.-Argentina Investment Treaty, supra note 496, art. II. 
510. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1105. 
511. See MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. IV(General Treatment)(1)(4)-(7). 
512. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (discussing restrictions on 
contract opportunities creating a "substantial impairment of liberty"); Standard Oil Co. 
of La. v. Hall, 24 F.2d 455, 457 (M.D. Tenn. 1927) (citing Fairmont Creamery Co. v. 
Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927)) (a statute that "impaired" the obligation of contracts 
could be strictly scrutinzed); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (regarding a 
liberty interest to "use" and "enjoy" personal investment). 
513. The decision is most widely associated with the substantive due process doc-
trine in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the Court applied a two-pronged 
test: whether the legislative means were "necessary and appropriate" to achieving the 
legislative ends, and whether the legislative ends were "proper, reasonable and fair." ld. 
at 62. 
514. The Supreme Court struck down a range of legislation under the substantive due 
process doctrine. See id. (regarding a 10-hour work day and 60-hour work week for 
bakers); (Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (protecting workers from being fired 
because of membership in a union); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (banning 
"yellow-dog contracts," which conditioned employment upon not being a member of a 
union); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting working hours for women); 
(Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (requiring insurance policies be issued by 
companies registered to do business in the state); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. 
Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (retroactive credit of employee tenure for computing pension 
benefits). 
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ence to legislatures.515 Given the similarity between the MAl's "impair-
ment" provision and the now diminished "substantive due process" 
doctrine, the MAl could reverse sixty years of constitutional law. 
In addition, because the MAl gives investors a remedy for damages, the 
impairment provision could create a basis for applying a lower burden of 
proof when challenging regulatory takings as compared to a case of expro-
priation under internationallaw.Sl6 
A lower burden of proof under the impairment-of-use standard is the 
most obvious impact General Treatment could have on sovereignty. The 
outcome of the failed takings litigation cited above (reduction of mining 
operations, limits on alteration of wetlands, etc.) could produce a different 
result under an impairment doctrine of the MAI.517 The MAl impairment 
doctrine could similarly strike down many other non-taking, non-discrimi-
natory situations that courts had previously upheld. In these cases, the 
courts currently uphold the statutes if they can find a rational relationship 
between the legislative measure and a legitimate public purpose.518 Exam-
ples include: 
- Affordable housing mandates for office developers.519 
- Regulation of restaurants and other public facilities.520 
515. The seminal case in abandoning substantive due process was Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upheld price controls on milk), which, after a gap of several years, 
was followed consistently, beginning with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937) (upheld minimum wage for women). See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Co. 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). 
516, There are at least three possible ways that investors could invoke General Treat-
ment. One way includes invoking constitutional doctrines such as substantive due pro-
cess if the more specific allegations such as expropriation or National Treatment fail. 
See Graham v. Connor, 409 U.S. 386 (1989). Alternatively, investors could advance 
General Treatment as a cause of first resort since it could reach measures that are 
beyond the reach of discrimination arguments and the impermissible categories of per-
formance requirements. Like U.S. courts, MAl dispute panels may prefer the judicial 
economy of deciding cases on the more concrete and specific basis of investor protec-
tion. See id. A third function of General Treatment consists of strengthening a pro-
investor interpretation of the other, more specific principles of investor protection. For 
example, General Treatment could support a liberal approach to invoking the TBT as a 
standard for reasonable or necessary use of regulatory power, and "impairment" could 
liberalize the effects test under National Treatment. 
517. See supra Part ll.C.2 and notes 480.87. 
518. The Supreme Court presumes state laws that affect or modify contracts do not 
violate the contracts clause of the Constitution unless the impact is substantial. Even if 
the impact is substantial, the law will survive a challenge if it promotes a legitimate 
purpose and is reasonably tailored to achieve that purpose. See Allied Structural Steel 
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978). The contracts clause reads: "No State 
shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " U.S. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1. 
519. See Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 94·1 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 
1991) (challenging impact fees on commercial development with a takings argument 
that applied a test following the lines of substantive due process doctrine). 
520. See Beatie v. City of New York, 123 F.3d 707 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that anti-
smoking ordinance was rationally related to the government's interest in protecting pub-
lic health as a matter of law). 
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Housing code enforcement.52l 
Mandates to pay insurance benefits.522 
Mandates to pay employee benefits.523 
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The MAl's impairment provision is also likely to provide stricter scru-
tiny than U.S. courts give to nondiscriminatory laws that impose burdens 
on foreign commerce. For example, oil tanker companies recently failed in 
an attempt to argue that a Washington state law created an impermissible 
burden under the foreign commerce clause.524 The Washington law goes 
into great detail in regulating the operation, management, and use of oil 
tankers and crews,525 which is essentially the test of MAl General Treat-
ment when combined with the causal link required under investor-to-state 
dispute resolution.526 By adopting the first law that seeks to prevent rather 
than react to oil spill disasters, the state was acting as a laboratory for the 
thirty-four states with coastlines to protect. However, given the stricter 
standards under the MAl's impairment doctrine, the result under General 
Treatment could prove different from a result under U.S. constitutional law. 
In terms of legislative process, General Treatment would impose 
higher standards on legislatures for developing a factual record, identifying 
multiple alternatives, and then justifying the alternative chosen. In addi-
tion to the thirteen specific rules for treatment of investors, General Treat-
ment (l) imports a least-trade-restrictive standard from several potential 
sources of international law, and (2) provides an impairment rationale for 
second-guessing the reasonableness of legislative objectives. General Treat-
ment would shift presumptions about the validity of legislative com-
promises. By shifting legislative choices to one end of the spectrum, the 
MAl could accomplish a political power shift in the legislative process that 
U.S. courts have resisted ever since the Great Depression. 
The Chairman's proposal to change the MAl text on General Treat-
ment acknowledges the severity of the MAl's impairment provision by 
deleting the entire paragraph from the MAI.527 Of all the Chairman's pro-
521. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing over· 
enforcement of housing code to relocate criminals). 
522. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Minnesota Life and Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 86 F.3d 766 
(8th Cir. 1996) (involving retroactive limitation on payments to state residents). 
523. See Chateaugay Corp. v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995) (mandating contri· 
butions to health and benefit plan for retired coal miners). 
524. Although the Plaintiffs were successful on appeal in part of their claim, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling that the burdens created by the law do 
not violate the foreign commerce clause. See International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Own-
ers (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996), rev'd in part,148 F.3d 
1053 (9th Cir. 1998). 
525. See WASH. REv. CODE§ 88.46.010 (1996). 
526. See MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. V(Investor-to-State 
Procedures)(D)(1)(a)(1). 
527. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(5)(1). There is no explanation 
for why the second paragraph of General Treatment is deleted; it is simply not there. If 
the absence of the impairment provision from the Chairman's proposal is not intended 
to communicate its deletion, then the proposal would do nothing to alleviate the severity 
of an impairment standard within General Treatment. Considering the legal signifi-
cance of an impairment standard, the absence of any commentary whatsoever in the 
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posals, this is the one that would clearly fix a problem with the text. 
The Chairman's proposal also includes an interpretative note that 
"normal and non-discriminatory government activity" would not contra-
vene the general standard of treatment that is no less favorable than that 
required by internationallaw.528 Like the other proposals, except the dele-
tion of impairment, this footnote only begs the question. First, what is 
"normal" in the eyes of a dispute panel? The laws of greatest concern 
under the MAl are progressive laws; laws that are innovative and hence not 
"normal." Progressive laws are not always brand new. They may stand at 
the furthest extent of legal evolution when compared to the predominant 
practice of other countries. Second, the discussion in Part II.A.3 shows at 
length how the MAl standards of discrimination differ gready from analo-
gous standards in U.S. constitutional law. For these reasons, the Chair-
man's proposed footnote is better understood as a restatement of, rather 
than as a change in, the MAl text. 
D. Scope of Potential Impact 
The preceding section-by-section analysis of the MAl fails to convey the full 
scope of the MAl's potential impact on state lawmaking powers. As noted 
in Part I, direct preemption is neither the only nor the most immediate 
threat. A change in the role of the federal government as buffer for U.S. 
states and a significant shift of political power within the legislative process 
represents the most immediate threat to state lawmakers. Threats of mone-
tary damages in investor-to-state disputes and retaliation by foreign nations 
in the diplomatic arena of trade negotiations and dispute setdement would 
propel the political shift. 
The scope of the MAl's potential impact is a defining theme for both 
global economic liberalization and domestic federalism. From an interna-
tional perspective, the complexity and commercial burdens created by the 
federal system are already contentious issues. The MAl would increase 
exponentially the opportunities to challenge these burdens with expanded 
investor protections and investor-to-state challenges of state law outside of 
the federal courts. The MAl monetary remedies would also create fiscal 
pressure on Congress and state legislatures to preempt or change state law, 
most likely with the backing of the federal Executive Branch. 
The state-level targets for limiting government power are well known. 
From the perspective of dome?tic federalism, the scope of the MAl rivals 
the central values of diversity and experimentation at the state and local 
level. The threat to federalism posed by the MAl is graphically demon-
strated by mapping the states with laws that stand just inside the boundary 
of constitutional state power under the dormant commerce clause.529 The 
scope of the MAl can also be graphed as a matrix of state and local govern-
ment powers and measures that could be challenged under various MAl 
Chairman's proposal reveals an apparently high degree of political sensitivity within the 
OECD. 
528. See id. art. IV(l)(l.l). 
529. See, e.g., charts infra Part lll.A2. 
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investor protections. The following chart is limited to the state law exam-
ples and MAl provisions previously cited in this article. 
Scope of Potential MAl Impact on State &: Local Law 
State & Local 
Powers I Measures 
Balancmg Test: Ecomomc Regulation 
Land ownership limits 19states 
Fishing fleet restrictions 8states 
Casino/gambling licenses 8states 
Local competition policy 6states 
Commun. reinvest policy 16states 
M A I Investor Protections 
National I General I Comp.!or I Limits on I MFN 
Treatment Treatment Exprop. Perf. Rcq. Treatment 
Balancmg Test: Land Use & EnVIronmental Regulation 
Gen. zoning limits/mandates most states 
Wetlands/coastal zone limits 
Recycled content mandates 13 states 
Packaging requirements 12states 
.. Market Partiopation: Selective Purchasmg and Use of State Land 
Domestic preferences 43 states 
Minority preferences 
Human rights preferences within 19 states 
Environmental preferences 29states 
Limits on use of state land 9states 
Subsidies: Economic Development 
Export finance programs 
Tmgeted job training 44states 
Business recruitment/retention criteria 
The thirty-seven marked cells in this chart are only theoretical targets. 
As the Beer II case illustrates, 530 the real potential for conflict between the 
MAl and state powers depends on the specifics of the statutes and their 
effect on foreign commerce. The chart illustrates the difficulty of using 
country-specific exceptions to assure state and local governments that the 
MAl poses no threat to sovereignty. 
III. The Viability of Country-Specific Exceptions 
U.S. negotiators support MAl provisions that diminish sovereign regulatory 
and market participation powers of state and local governments. At the 
same time, they "are not going to reach agreements [in the MAl] that take 
away [their] sovereign power in any regard."531 Their strategy for balanc-
ing this seemingly contradictory provision is to create a legal equation: 
[MAl limits on state sovereignty] minus [U.S. exceptions from those MAl 
530. Canada's National Treatment complaint targeted approximately 210 state and 
local statutes; it prevailed on about 60. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, GATT Decision on Beer /Wine Threatens State Sovereignty, in INFORMATION ALERT 
(1993); Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, 'I'I 2.10-2.32 (targets in complaint), 
6.1 (findings of the panel). 
531. McGINTY, supra note 10, at 8. 
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limits] equals [no change in sovereign power of state and local govern-
ment]. In other words, two negatives make a positive. 
Drafting exceptions to exceptions (double negatives) is a common 
technique for avoiding direct conflict, but the resulting ambiguity can gen-
erate distrust, disbelief, and ultimately litigation.532 This article, however, 
accepts the double-negative strategy at face value. Legally, the double-neg-
ative strategy might work, but only to the degree that the exceptions corre-
late with the MAl limits that they are supposed to neutralize. The following 
analysis shows that the correlation does not yet exist and that the legal 
scope of sovereignty protection falls short of the federal government's 
assertions. 
There are two complementary approaches to striking a balance with 
double negatives. One is to change the multilateral structure of the MAl 
itself - for example, by expanding the general exceptions or limiting the 
right of investors to sue governments for damages. MAl negotiators have 
avoided this approach533 in favor of unilateral options, i.e. through coun-
try-specific exceptions. In the last stage of negotiations, all OECD coun-
tries will propose and negotiate lists of laws to which the MAl will not 
apply in that country alone. 534 The United States initially proposed 275 
draft exceptions, 535 which explains the complexity involved in the MAl 
532. An exchange between Ambassador Jeffrey Lang and national talk-show host Der-
rick McGinty conveys the sense of the debate: 
Lang: [W]e need to recognize that [MAl negotiations are] going to be 
a two-way street. Now, in no case, no matter what we come up 
with, are we going to limit our sovereign ability of our states or 
our federal government to impose necessary regulatory restric-
tions? In some cases - and this is the next phase in the 
negotiation, in fact, we are going to ask that whole sectors be 
completely exempt from the rules of the MAl. And that is 
going to be true for other countries . 
. . . But even in those sectors that are subject to investor-to-state 
dispute settlement, we are not going to obligate ourselves except 
in international law. Under domestic law, we are going to retain 
our freedom to do things that are -
McGinty: ... now wait a minute, Mr. Ambassador ... it seems to me if you 
have that, every country can say that, and that means the treaty 
is no good. I mean ... either you obey it or you don't .... 
Lang: Well, that's true .... And we hope that what we can get is an 
agreement that we will be able to live with . . . We're not going to 
agree to something that doesn't let us do the necessary kind of 
domestic regulation we need to do. 
Id. at 9. 
533. The MAl article on taxation is an exception that partially carves out taxation 
from MAl coverage other than expropriation. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 
VIII. 
534. See id. art. IX. Since the practice of listing country-specific "reservations" has a 
reciprocal effect under treaty law, MAl drafters chose to use the term "exceptions" to 
avoid any reciprocal effect. However, the norm oflisting exceptions rather than reserva-
tions does not preclude listing a measure that has a reciprocity requirement. Id. art. 
IX(A) n.l. 
535. See Foreign Investment: Environmental Discussions Top Agenda of OECD Invest-
ment Treaty Negotiations, lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1918 (Nov. 5, 1997) [hereinafter BNA, 
Treaty Negotiations]. 
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negotiations. 
This last stage represents the "greatest disharmony among MAl negoti-
ators,"536 when trade-offs on major sovereignty concerns are necessary 
before the MAl's completion. The EU nations continue to press for deletion 
of U.S. state-specific exceptions, while the United States continues to press 
for deletion of the EU investment preferences537 and protection of subsi-
dies for cultural industries. 538 The country-specific exceptions serve two 
purposes: first, as priorities for sovereignty protection, and second, as bar-
gaining chips to attain greater market access.539 
The United States seeks two kinds of exceptions. The first consists of 
a blanket exception for all existing, nonconforming state and local meas-
ures. The second acts as a "carve out" for broad categories of laws that 
would continue into the future.540 
A. Grandfathering of Existing Nonconforming Laws 
1. Limits on Grandfathering 
The most significant limit of the "grandfathering" strategy is that it only 
covers existing law. The MAl would constrain future lawmaking on the 
topics with standstill requirements, 541 forbidding additional non-con-
forming measures and limiting amendments to those that do "not decrease 
the conformity of the measure."542 In other words, other states may not 
replicate a listed measure, and states may not substantially reform existing 
laws except to increase compliance with the MAl. 
536. Id. at 1919. 
537. See id. 
538. See European Information Service, European Parliament Weighs into Stalled 
Investment Pact§ 2299 (Mar. 14, 1998). 
539. The United States acknowledges its strategy for binding states in exchange for 
market access: 
Many OECD countries want to bind state and local jurisdictions to the same 
obligations as those undertaken at the federal level. If we succeed in negotiating 
a strong and balanced agreement that provides the U.S. with access to substan-
tial new markets, we are prepared to bind the states and their subdivisions, sub-
ject to Congressional approval. 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAl) 3 (1997). 
540. "Our approach has been, as it was in the case of NAFTA, to grandfather all 
existing non-conforming measures at the state and local level, first of all." Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?, supra note 9 (statement of 
Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State). 
541. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(Country Specification)(A) n.3; MAl 
Commentary, supra note 101, art. IX(Standstill and the Listing of Country Specific Reser-
vations)(!), which states: 
Standstill would result from the prohibition of new or more restrictive excep-
tions to this minimum standard of treatment. From this perspective, a violation 
of standstill would be a violation of the underlying MAl obligations (e.g. of 
National Treatment and MFN), and the dispute settlement provisions would 
apply to such breaches of the MAl obligations. 
542. MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. IX(Standstill and the Listing of Country 
Specific Reservations)(3)(c), (d). 
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Another limit of the grandfathering proposal is that it does not include 
tribal law except for corporations organized under the Alaska Native 
Claims Act.543 One version of the proposal covered "all existing noncon-
forming measures of all states, localities, the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico."544 Tribal law is not included even though the United States 
Trade Representative defines tribal governments as "subfederal jurisdic-
tions" for purposes of compliance with international agreements.s4s 
There are 500 federally recognized reservations and Indian communi-
ties.546 Tribal governments consider themselves sovereign nations within a 
nation. Their lands and affairs are often managed in trust by the federal 
government under laws that defer to tribal sovereignty and treaty rights.547 
In the context of the MAl, tribal sovereignty interests are even greater than 
those of cities and states because of discrimination in favor of tribal resi-
dents, particularly in laws governing the role of private investors in eco-
nomic development,548 economic regulation,549 environmental 
protection,550 resource conservation and land use.551 Tribal governments 
543. See Partial Draft of Country-Specific Exceptions Proposed by the United States, 
item 10 (Apr. 22, 1998) (on file at the reading room of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC). 
544. Id. item 22. 
545. Id. item 10. 
546. See id. 
547. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1996) (Indian self-determination); 25 U.S.C. § 3101 
(1996) (Indian forest lands); and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9, 2101-08 (1996) (Indian mineral 
resources). "Among the attributes of tribal sovereignty [are] the power to manage and 
control water and land resources, associated natural resources and environmental pro-
tection .... Federal recognition of these powers, whether arising from statute, executive 
order, or treaty, is the supreme law of this land .... " U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, TRIBAL 
SELF DETERMINATION (1994). 
548. For example, as a condition for granting service or construction contracts, min-
eral leases, or extraction permits, the Navajo Nation imposes explicit performance 
requirements on private companies to create new jobs, hire and train Navajo residents, 
and pay prevailing wages. See 3 NAVAJO TRIBAL CoDE tit. 16, § 601 (1978) (dealing with 
land use); 4 NAVAJO TRIBAL CoDE tit. 18, § 1006 (1978) (dealing with extraction per-
mits); 4 NAVAJO TRIBAL CoDE tit. 18, § 1506 (1978) (dealing with oil and gas leases). See 
also 25 U.S.C. § 450e(b) (1996) (stating a federal procurement preference for Indian 
organizations and Indian-owned enterprises to perform contracts or grants that benefit 
Indian people). 
549. For example, regarding intellectual property rights, the Indian Treaty Rights 
Committee claims that multinational corporations have secured patents or trademarks 
over indigenous symbols and traditional Indian seed crop genetics and horticultural 
processes. By failing to involve tribal governments in negotiations and by acquiescing in 
agreements that enable non-Indian investors to enforce these property rights, the Com-
mittee alleges that the federal government is not meeting its trust responsibilities. See 
INDtAN TREATY RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GATT AND NAFTA AND INDIANS 2 (1994). 
550. Over 300 reservations are threatened by severe environmental hazards that tribal 
governments are responding to with reversals of traditionally lax conservation policies, 
both federal practices and their own. The changes that Indian tribes either implement 
or advocate involve limits on clear cutting and mining permits, mining and forest recla-
mation, dam sites and fish ladder construction, and other practices. These policies 
could have adverse effects on foreign businesses compared to native Indian enterprise or 
the MAl might consider them performance requirements or regulatory takings. See 
Winona LaDuke, Like Tributaries to a River, The Growing Strength of Native Environ-
mentalism, 81 SIERRA 41 (1996) (citing a study by the World Watch Institute). 
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are the second-largest land owners in the United States and own one-third 
of all western low-sulfur coal and vast mineral and timber reserves. 552 
The United States has not publicly disclosed exactly what it will 
include in its list of grandfathered state and local laws. According to 
OECD officials, the United States listed approximately five measures per 
state, which follows the precedent of state-level reservations listed for 
NAFTA.553 After the NAFTA process, however, some state attorneys gen-
eral complained that the federal government failed to include many state 
measures that the states identified as nonconforming with state law.554 
Ultimately, the U.S. federal government informed state officials that 
NAFTA reserved all pre-existing nonconforming state laws.555 A general 
reservation of all existing nonconforming measures, however, "was not 
contemplated by the wording of NAFTA and was incorporated only through 
an exchange of letters among the three NAFTA parties. It is unclear 
whether parties to the MAl would be prepared to accept general reserva-
tions of subnational measures."556 
2. Technical Specifications 
Although U.S. negotiators proposed to grandfather all existing state and 
local law, the MAl has more specific listing requirements than NAFTA. The 
MAl would require each nation to classify exceptions to the respective arti-
cles that they violate (e.g., National Treatment, MFN Treatment, etc.), and 
then for each measure listed, add six other technical descriptions557 "in the 
551. Navajo law states that use of Navajo land by non-Navajo individuals or organiza-
tions should be kept to a minimum. See 3 NAVAJO TRIBAL ConE tit. 16, § 601 (1978). 
552. LaDuke, supra note 550, at 41. 
553. See BNA, Treaty Negotiations, supra note 535, at 1919. It is significant that the 
NAFTA reservations were listed in the two years after the NAFTA text had been formally 
adopted, whereas the MAl country-specific exceptions are part of the negotiations pro-
cess. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1108.2. 
554. "Unfortunately, we do not understand why your office proposes to delete most 
of our reservations." Letter from Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General of Oregon, 
to Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative 1 {Dec. 15, 1995) (on file with 
author). 
555. See Letter from Phyllis Shearer jones, NAFTA Coordinator for State Matters and 
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Liaison, 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, to Enrique Martinez-Vidal, Department 
of Legislative Reference, State of Maryland (May 1, 1996) (on file with author). 
556. Testimony of Ian Waddell, Minister of the Legislative Assembly, and Noel 
Schacter, Director of the International Branch of the Ministry of Employment and Invest-
ment, Government of British Columbia, Regarding the Proposed Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, House of Commons Standing Comm. on Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade 10 
(Nov. 26, 1997) [hereinafter British Columbia, Testimony Regarding the MAl]. 
557. Each exception sets out the following elements: 
(a) Sector refers to the general sector in which the exception is taken; 
(b) Sub-Sector refers to the specific sector in which the exception is taken; 
(c) Obligation spedfies the MAI provision referred to in paragraph 1 for which an 
exception is taken; 
(d) Level of Government indicates the level of government maintaining the measure 
for which an exception is taken; 
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most precise terms possible."558 This level of precision is designed to limit 
the scope of exceptions by creating a matrix of factors for narrow 
interpretation. 
Matrix for Grandfathering (or Challenging) 
Country-Specific Exceptions to the MAl 
MAl Obligations 
Technical from Which 
Specification the Country Takes an Exception 
of Measures A B c D E 
1. Measure #1 
2. Measure #2 
3. Measure #3 
Etc. 
F 
An investor could challenge a nonconforming measure on either side 
of the matrix: 
- Obligations: First, the MAl text may not allow countries to take excep-
tions from all MAl obligations.559 For example, the MAl general excep-
tion for "essential security interests" does not apply to expropriation,s6o 
and the United States does not apply its country-specific exceptions to 
expropriation.561 The draft MAl article on country-specific exceptions 
lists only National Treatment and MFN Treatment; it leaves the others 
for later determination in the negotiating process.562 MAl exceptions 
(e) Legal source or authority of the measure identifies the specific legal source of the 
exception, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, decision, or any other 
form; 
(f) Sucdnct Description of the Measure sets out [the] non-conforming aspects of the 
existing measures for which the exception is taken, together with any commitment 
to eliminate or reduce the non-conformity of the measure; [and 
(g) Motivation or purpose describes the rationale for a given measure]. 
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(Lodging of Country Specific Exceptions)(2) 
(brackets in original). 
558. MAl Commentary, supra note 101, art. IX(Standstill and the Listing of Country 
Specific Reservations)(3)(b). 
559. "While some [OECD delegations] favoured an open list, others argued for a lim-
ited closed list of disciplines comprising National Treatment, MFN and new disciplines 
(special topics)." Id. art. IX(Lodging of Country Specific Exceptions)(3). 
560. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(!). 
561. See Partial Draft of Country-Specific Exceptions Proposed by the United States, 
supra note 543, at 19-21. 
562. It is agreed that the disciplines listed in the chapeau text of parts A and B of 
the draft Article should remain incomplete for the time being pending political 
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may number as few as two or as many as fourteen. Furthermore, if the 
MAl text does not preclude country-specific exceptions from applying to 
a certain MAl article, the countries themselves may limit their excep-
tions as a result of trade-offs in the negotiations. For example, EU coun-
tries might agree to take an exception for their Regional Economic 
Integration Organization from most MAl articles, but not from privatiza-
tion, monopolies, employment, or performance requirements. In 
exchange, the United States might agree to take an exception from 
National Treatment for government procurement, but not from MFN 
Treatment. 
Technical specification. A measure is only excepted to the extent that it is 
defined as an exception. 563 For example, an investor could challenge a 
government procurement measure by claiming: (1) the sector in which 
the investor operates, such as banking, was not stated in the specifica-
tions, (2) the authorities cited covered, for example, central purchasing 
agencies, but not airport authorities where the investor operates, or (3) 
the motivations listed covered local labor and economic development 
objectives, but not the human rights record of the company in a third 
country that is not party to the MAl. 
Some advocates argue that the acrimonious history of disputes 
between the United States and Canada over softwood lumber subsidies is 
grounds for concern that investors would challenge country-specific excep-
tions using all available arguments. 564 
In addition to promoting a narrow interpretation of country-specific 
exceptions, the technical detail required by the MAl fosters the trans-
parency necessary for achieving a long-term "ratcheting effect" or an even-
tual phase-out of country-specific exceptions.565 "Ratcheting" is also 
described as a "rollback" process, achieved through: (1) commitments by 
MAl countries in their technical specifications for country-specific excep-
decisions by the Negotiating Group. The text could also be reviewed after nego-
tiators have decided how measures by sub-national entities and regional eco-
nomic integration organisations should be treated across the MAl. 
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(A) n.4. 
563. See id. art. IX(2)(a)-(f). 
In the interpretation of an exception, elements (a) to (f) shall be considered. In 
the event of a discrepancy between the non-conformity of the measure as set out 
in the legal source or authority identified and the non-conformity as set out in 
the other elements in their totality, the exception shall be deemed to apply to the 
non-conformity of the measure as set out in the legal source or authority. 
Id. art. IX(3). In other words, if the citation of legal authority in the MAl is narrower 
than non-conforming laws in state or local codes, then it is the narrower MAl citation 
that controls. 
564. See Loru WALLACH, THE NGO PocKET TRADE LAWYER FOR THE MuLTILATERAL 
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 5 (1998). 
565. In order to clarify the automatic ratchet effect of List A [grandfathered] 
measures, the Chairman proposed the addition of the following phrase at the 
end of paragraph (e)[which requires specification of the "legal source or author-
ity ... of the exception whether in the form of a law regulation, rule, decision or 
any other form;"]: "as of the date of entry into force of the Agreement, or as 
continued, renewed or amended after that date." 
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tions (e.g., "liberalisation commitments," phase-out schedules or sunset 
clauses); or (2) "obligations" that this or subsequent rounds might impose 
on MAl countries to adjust their exceptions.566 MAl negotiators may 
accomplish the latter by drafting the introductory clause to limit the scope 
of country-specific exceptions. 567 
B. Exceptions for Future Nonconforming Measures 
If the United States proposes a grandfathering list that averages only five 
measures per state, it is not clear how U.S. negotiators can credibly adver-
tise sovereignty protection for "all nonconforming measures," and still 
meet the MAl standard for technical specificity necessary for effectively 
taking an exception. The only conceivable way is to "carve out" exceptions 
for future lawmaking within fairly broad categories of federal, state and 
local law, which include: 
- Minority affairs: "[M]easures according rights or preferences to socially 
or economically disadvantaged minorities, including corporations 
organized under the laws of the state of Alaska in accord with the 
Alaska Native Claims Act."56B 
- Social services: Social services includes public law enforcement, correc-
tions, income security or insurance, social security, social welfare, pub-
lic education, public training, and health care.569 The Canadian 
government made a similar country-specific reservation to NAFTA for 
health services, but provincial officials "remain deeply concerned that 
the integrity of Canada's existing health care system and social services 
will not be adequately protected by means ofreservations."570 The U.S. 
government has a different view about the meaning of the reservation, 
which could lead to a narrow interpretation of Canada's health reserva-
tion by a NAFTA dispute paneJ.571 
Subsidies: "[A]ny measures relating to subsidies and grants including 
government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance."572 The draft 
MAl includes a "compromise" section that would create a built-in 
agenda for negotiating the standstill and rollback of country-specific 
exceptions for subsidies. 573 
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art IX(2)(e) n.15; id. art IX(2)(a)-(f). 
566. See MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. IX(Rollback)(1)-(4). 
567. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(A). 
568. Partial Draft of Country-Specific Exceptions Proposed by the United States, 
supra note 543, item 10. 
569. See id. item 13. 
570. British Columbia, Testimony Regarding the MAI, supra note 556, at 11. 
571. See NAFTA, supra note 116, Annex II-C-9; see also British Columbia, Testimony 
Regarding the MAI, supra note 556, at 11. 
572. Partial Draft of Country-Specific Exceptions Proposed by the United States, 
supra note 543, item 23. 
573. This section, which has not reached consensus, states that "[even if applied on a 
non·discriminatory basis, investment incentives may have distorting effects on the flow 
of capital and investment decisions.]" MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art 
Ill(Investment Incentives), (2.2). The agenda for negotiations would address "[the issue 
of positive discrimination, [transparency], standstill and rollback.]" Id. art. Il(3). 
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These categories do not cover the general exceptions in GATT Article 
XX (such as laws that protect public morals, human and animal health, and 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources), the General Agreement for 
Trade in Services (GATS), NAFTA Chapter 11, or the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement. They are generic categories of government 
activity rather than types of legitimate purposes for nonconforming 
measures. 
"Carve-outs" for future lawmaking are opposed by some OECD delega-
tions as undermining the MAl disciplines to which they are applied.574 
Consequently, the MAl text is bracketed to show that there is not agree-
ment on whether the categorical exceptions function as "carve-outs" or 
grandfather existing measures within the listed categories.s7s This is obvi-
ously a major tension in the negotiation process because the United States 
has committed itself domestically to retain the carve-outs.S76 
Thus, the carve-out categories may be treated more like existing non-
conforming laws on the grandfathered list. This would mean that: (1) they 
could be more narrowly negotiated within a matrix of obligations and tech-
nical specifications; and (2) the listing process could create the agenda for 
future application of standstill and rollback requirements. 
The strategy of turning the current round of country-specific excep-
tions into the agenda for future MAl negotiations is mentioned in draft MAl 
provisions for developing countries. Developing countries would be 
allowed to lodge exception lists that are "longer than ones lodged by devel-
oped countries. Their [exceptions] are, however, subject to the roll-back 
process, as will be introduced for existing contracting parties."577 This 
strategy reflects the bias against 'carve-out exceptions to the MAl expressed 
by the OECD in 1995.s7s 
C. Interpretation by Dispute Panels 
A final limitation of country-specific exceptions is that MAl dispute panels 
could interpret an exception to restrict measures that it proports to cover. 
Dispute panels narrowly interpreted general exceptions under GATT Arti-
574. See id. art. IX(B) n.9. 
575. The text of this provision reads: "(B. Articles X; Y, [Article Z, ... , and Article 
... ] do not apply to any measure that a Contracting Party [adopts] or [maintains] with 
respect to sectors, subsectors or activities, as set out in its Schedule to Annex B of the 
Agreement.]" Id. art. IX(B) (brackets in original). 
576. See McGINTY, supra note 10, at 9. 
577. OECD, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING CouNTRIES II, Spe-
cific Points n.7 DAFFE/MAI/RD(97)56 (1997). 
578. "The MAl would aim to raise the level of existing liberalization based on a "top-
down" approach under which the only exceptions permitted are those listed when 
adhering to the agreement and which are subject to progressive liberalization." Commit-
tee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and the Commit-
tee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT), A Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment, OECD DocUMENTS, supra note 58, at 11. See also Working Group A, 
Existing Liberalization, OECD DocuMENTS, supra note 58, at 119, which defines the 
future liberalization process as a "'ratchet' mechanism [with] future rounds of 
negotiation." 
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de XX so that the exception did not apply to the challenged measure. 
These decisions are relevant to the viability of country-specific exceptions 
under the MAl to the extent that the decisions are based upon principles of 
international law that would apply to any multilateral agreement. 
Before the WTO was created, two GATT panels ruled against U.S. 
measures that limited tuna imports on grounds that the tuna-catching 
methods unnecessarily killed dolphins. The Tuna I panel read into Article 
XX a non-textual limit on U.S. jurisdiction to impose its dolphin conserva-
tion standards in a way that affected fishing practices outside of U.S. terri-
torial jurisdiction. 579 The Tuna II panel used a more flexible approach, but 
still found limits on the legal jurisdiction of the United States, which 
extends beyond territorial waters only to U.S. nationals and U.S.-chartered 
vessels.580 In short, both panels found jurisdictional limits on U.S. sover-
eignty that were not based on the text of Article XX. If jurisdictional limits 
preclude the United States from limiting access to its own market under a 
GATT general exception, then jurisdictional limits could preclude the use 
of a country-specific exception. 
Subsequendy, the WTO Appellate Body analyzed the general excep-
tions of GATT Article XX in the broad context of rights and obligations that 
are created by the agreement as a whole.581 Before listing the general 
exceptions, Article XX articulates two tests designed to prevent the abuse of 
general exceptions. The first test guards against measures that would con-
stitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination," and the second test 
guards against creating "a disguised restriction on international trade."582 
In its Gasoline opinion, the Appellate Body stated: 
[t]he chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Arti-
cle XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be applied 
so as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right 
under the substantive rules of the General Agreement.583 
In the context of the MAl, the question becomes whether the legal right to 
exercise a country-specific exception should be limited by or balanced 
against the substantive obligations of the MAl in the absence of the lan-
guage in the Article XX chapeau that guards against abuse of the 
exceptions. 
579. See GATT Panel Report on United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 
3, 1991, GATT B.l.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991) (circulated but not adopted) [herein-
after Tuna I]. 
580. See GATT Panel Report on United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, june 
16, 1994, DS29/R 33 l.L.M. 839 [hereinafter Tuna II]. See also GATT Panel Report of 
Thailand, supra note 473; GATT Panel Report on Canada- Measures Affecting Export of 
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT B.l.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (adopted Mar. 22, 
1988); GATT Panel R!!port on United States- Restrictions on Imports oflmports of Tuna 
and Tuna Products of Canada, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (adopted Feb. 22, 
1982). 
581. See WiO Appellate Body Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, Apr. 24, 1996, 1996 WL 227476 (W.T.O.), WT/DS2/R 
[hereinafter Gasoline]. 
582. GATT, supra note 111, art. XX. 
583. Gasoline, supra note 581, at 15 (emphasis added). 
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Is it conceivable that by omitting both the Article XX exceptions and 
chapeau language, the MAl would afford greater sovereignty protection 
than the GATT, simply through the device of country-specific exceptions? 
One answer to this question would be "yes," based upon the assurances 
that U.S. negotiators have given state government officials. Another 
answer, however, appears to be "no," based upon the most recent Appellate 
Body decision in the Shrimp/Turtle case before the WTQ.5B4 
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body explained what it meant 
in the Gasoline decision when it said that the Article XX chapeau "is 
animated by" the principle that the right to invoke exceptions should not 
frustrate obligations to comply with the agreement.585 The chapeau of 
Article XX is: 
... but one expression of the principle of good faith. This principle, at once 
a general principle of law and a general principle of international law, con-
trols the exercise of rights by states. One application of this general princi-
ple, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits 
the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the asser-
tion of a right "impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must 
be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably."586 
In Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body concludes that the application of 
international law principles to the Article XX chapeau results in a delicate 
task of 
marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke 
an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under 
varying substantive provisions . . . so that neither of the competing rights 
will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the bal-
ance of rights and obligations .. _587 
In short, the Appellate Body recognizes a balancing test derived from gen-
584. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, 1998 WL 720123 (W.T.O.), WT/ 
DS58/AB/R [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle]. The Shrimp/Turtle case involved a complaint 
by India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia against a federal law that bans shrimp 
imports from any country that the United States has not certified as meeting U.S. goals 
for protecting sea turtles that are drowned in the process of harvesting shrimp. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1537, amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973; 16 U.S.C. § 1531; Depart-
ment of Commerce, justice, and State, the judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act, Pub. L. 101-162, § 609 (1989); Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining 
Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing 
Operations, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996). 
585. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, 'I'I 151, 156-60. 
586. Id. '1158, quoting BoM CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAw AS APPLIED BY INTERNA· 
TIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1953), which elaborates that, 
I d. 
[a] reasonable exercise of the right [to invoke an exception to an agreement] is 
regarded as compatible with the obligation. But the exercise of the right in such 
a manner as to prejudice the interests of the other contracting party arising out 
of the treaty is unreasonable and is considered as inconsistent with the bona 
fide execution of the treaty obligation, and a breach of the treaty. 
587. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, 'I 159. 
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eral principles of international law and the framework of the agreement. 588 
The test is based on principles of international law, not merely the lan-
guage of the Article XX chapeau. The chapeau is itself a reflection of the 
underlying principles, which would also apply to interpretation of country-
specific exceptions under the MAl. 
The Appellate Body further found that even though the purpose of the 
U.S. shrimp conservation program fit within the scope of Article XX(g), it 
was applied in a manner that resulted in "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim-
ination" between countries where the same conditions prevail.589 In so 
doing, the Appellate Body stressed that "the most conspicuous flaw in this 
measure's application relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on 
the specific policy decisions made by foreign governments ... "59° It then 
cited the failure of the United States to engage shrimp exporting nations in 
"serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding 
bilateral or multilateral agreements ... before enforcing the import prohibi-
tion ... "591 
The Appellate Body concluded that the lower dispute panel erred 
because it focused on the design of the U.S. measure as it was written, 
rather than as it was applied,592 and because the panel went beyond the 
purpose of the Article XX chapeau, which is to prevent abuse of the specific 
general exceptions.593 The erroneous result was the lower panel's overly 
broad test of whether a measure would "undermine the WTO multilateral 
trading system."594 By comparison, the Appellate Body's standard is 
588. This balancing test weighs treaty rights and obligations, unlike the U.S. constitu-
tional balancing test under the dormant commerce clause, which balances legitimate 
local needs ,flgainst the burden that the method chosen places on interstate or interna-
tional commerce. See supra Part II.A3.b. 
589. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, '1'1 161-86. 
590. Id. 'I 161. The Appellate Body held that the standard under the U.S. measure 
required other countries to adopt comparable regulatory programs, es~entially identical 
programs of using turtle excluder devices (TEDs) rather than comparable programs. See 
id. 'I 163. The Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle did not address the Tuna I panel's 
approach to limiting "coercive" measures through a territorial limit on U.S. jurisdiction. 
The lower dispute panel in Shrimp/Turtle took pains to distance itself from the Tuna I 
jurisdictional analysis: "[w]e are not basing our finding on an extra-jurisdictional appli-
cation of U.S. law. Many domestic governmental measure can have an effect outside the 
jurisdiction of the government which takes them." GATT Panel Report, United States-
Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 
1998 not adopted) 'I 3.157, at 76 (Legal Arguments), 'I 3.207, at 97 (Legal Arguments) 
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Panel]. 
591. Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, 'I 166. 
592. See id. 'I ll5. 
593. See id. 'I ll6. In the words of the Appellate Body, 
I d. 
[t]hus, the Panel arrived at the very broad formulation that measures which 
'undermine the WTO multilateral trading system' must be regarded as 'not 
within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX.' Main-
taining, rather than undermining, the multilateral trading system is necessarily 
a fundamental and pervasive premise underlying the WTO Agreement; but it is 
not a right or an obligation, nor is it an interpretative rule which can be 
employed in the appraisal of a given measure under the chapeau of Article XX. 
594. Id. 'I ll6. 
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whether a measure as applied "reduces the treaty obligation to a merely 
facultative one and dissolves its juridicial character, and, in so doing, 
negates altogether the treaty rights of other members."595 By focusing on 
specific exceptions under Article XX, the Appellate Body was able to write a 
much more conservative option, yet still reach the same result. Yet notwith-
standing its criticism of the panel's reasoning, the Appellate Body and the 
lower panel both share the premise that GATT's general exceptions are lim-
ited by principles that are drawn from beyond the text of Article XX. 
Whereas the panel cited the overarching purpose of the WTO multilateral 
trading system,596 the Appellate Body cited established principles of inter-
national law that are synonymous with the text of the Article XX chapeau. 
The MAl distinguishes itself from GATT in the way that it provides for 
sovereignty protection through country-specific exceptions rather than gen-
eral multilateral exceptions.597 The MAl article on country-specific excep-
tions has no provision comparable to the chapeau of GATT Article XX. 598 
If MAl countries were to defend their laws by invoking country-specific 
"carve-out" exceptions, then MAl dispute panels could theoretically accept 
that defense as absolute because of the absence of GATT-style provisions in 
the text that guard against abuse. However, it is more likely that MAl 
panels would follow the reasoning of the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body. 
That would mean invoking international law to interpret the exception as 
"limited and conditional" and subject to a test of whether use of the excep-
tion unreasonably impinges on a treaty obligation.599 Such a reasonable-
ness test could include whether the measure being defended is "necessary" 
(i.e., the least-trade or least-investment-restrictive alternative), whether it is 
calculated to gain an unfair advantage, or whether it could otherwise be 
more compatible with the obligation.6oo 
It is also possible that MAl panels could follow the broader reasoning 
of the Shrimp/Turtle panel report. While the WTO Appellate Body rejected 
that reasoning, it did so because the reasoning was not consistent with the 
textual formula of the Article XX exceptions and chapeau provisions 
against abuse of the exceptions. The MAl, however, has neither the GATT-
style general exceptions nor provisions against the abuse of exceptions, 
595. Id. 'I 156. 
596. See Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, 'I 7.44. 
597. The MAl limits general exceptions (apart from expropriation, compensation, 
and protection from strife) to "essential security interests" and "public order," defined 
as protecting a fundamental interest of society. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 
VI(General Exceptions)(1)-(3). 
598. See generally id. art. IX. 
599. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, 'I 158. In this regard, the argument of the 
Shrimp/Turtle plaintiffs could be used by MAl panels to reject any country-specific carve-
out exception that results in "a fundamental redistribution of rights and obliga-
tions ... one that handed nations with large markets the means to coerce other states to 
conform their environmental laws, conservation and health policies with those of the 
importing party as a condition of exercising rights that were otherwise guaranteed by 
[the agreement]." Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, 'I 3.207, at 97 (Legal 
Arguments). 
600. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, 'I 158. 
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which the Appellate Body cited as the basis of error by the lower panel. 
Thus, there are no textual reasons why MAl panels could not follow the 
lead of the Shrimp/Turtle panel and invalidate any country-specific carve-
out that is used to defend measures that limit market access based on uni-
lateral criteria. The panel reasoned that, "[m]arket access for goods could 
become subject to an increasing number of conflicting policy requirements 
for the same product and this would rapidly lead to the end of the WTO 
multilateral trading system."601 The panel found that a single law need not 
threaten the global trading system by itself to be threatening. Rather, the 
risk comes from the potential that other nations could adopt the same type 
of law.602 
The rules of the Vienna Convention could also limit the viability of 
U.S. "carve-out" exceptions, even if MAl panels do not adopt the reasoning 
of GATT or WTO cases. 6°3 Another MAl country could ask a dispute 
panel to invalidate a U.S. exception because it violates either of two provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention. These provisions provide that countries 
may enter an exception unless (1) the agreement allows only specified 
exceptions not including the one being challenged,604 and (2) the excep-
tion is incompatible with the object and purpose of the agreement. 6°S 
Article 19 of the Vienna Convention governs "reservations," which the 
Convention defines broadly to include any "unilateral statement, however 
phrased or named, made by a State . . . whereby it purports to exclude or 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica-
tion to that State."606 Thus, the international law of "reservations" would 
cover the MAl's country-specific exceptions. The MAl replaces "reserva-
tions" with "exceptions" in order to avoid the Vienna Convention's rule that 
reservations are reciprocal in nature.607 The MAl exceptions also do not 
follow the Vienna Convention rule that countries may object to reserva-
tions, which suspends the reservation and the applicable treaty provisions 
601. Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, 'I 7.45, at 285 (Findings). 
602. See id. 
603. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN 
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES§ 313 (1987) [hereinafter REsTATEMENT THIRD]. See 
generally Henry]. Bourguignon, The Belilos Case: New Light on Reservations to Multilat-
eral Treaties, 29 VA.]. INT'L L. 347 (1989); Logan Piper, Reservations to Multilateral Trea-
ties: The Goal of Universality, 71 IowA L. REv. 295 (1985); Michael F. Glennon, Treaty 
Process Reform: Saving Constitutionalism Without Destroying Democracy, 52 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 84 (1983); jean Kyongun Koh, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How Interna-
tional Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23 HAR.v. INT'L LJ. 71 (1982); IAN SINCLAIR, 
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1984); D.W. Bowett, Reserva-
tions to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67 (1976-77). 
604. See Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 19(b); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra 
note 603, § 313(1)(b). 
605. See Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 19(c); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra 
note 603, § 313(1)(c). 
606. Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 2(1)(d). See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra 
note 603, § 313 cmt. a. 
607. See MAI Negotiating Tt:xt, supra note 7, art. IX(A) n.l. 
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between the excepting and the objecting countries.608 The Vienna Conven-
tion clearly defers to such internal treaty interpretation rules.609 Without 
more than a reference in one oblique footnote, however, it is unclear how 
the MAl drafters intend to free the MAl from the option that the Vienna 
Convention gives to participating countries to object to a reservation 
within twelve months of its entry into force.610 
The second constraint of the Vienna Convention is that the application 
of country-specific exceptions must prove compatible with the object and 
purpose of the MAl. This constraint is consistent with the reasoning of the 
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body opinion, which sought to balance the rights 
and obligations ofWTO members based on the Article XX exceptions and 
good faith principles of internationallaw.611 
From the perspective of compatibility with the object and purpose of 
the MAl, the grandfathering exceptions are the least objectionable. The 
"list A" exceptions of the MAI612 (grandfathered measures) are country-
specific. They are also highly specific as to scope, subject to standstill, and 
constitute the agenda for future negotiations on rollback. Since this closed 
list of existing measures would be the result of bargaining, at least among 
the original parties to the MAl, it is arguably a fair and noncoercive part of 
the MAl framework. A challenge to a "list A" exception is most likely to 
come under the MAl's internal scope and specificity requirements, as 
explicitly provided under the Vienna Convention.613 
The "list B" exceptions of the MAl, which would cover the U.S. "carve-
out" exceptions, are a different matter. They are opposed by some OECD 
countries because they are open categories of future lawmaking power and, 
as proposed by the United States, are general categories that include large 
segments of the economy. To the extent that the United States would 
608. Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 21(3); REsTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 
603, § 321(3). 
609. Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 20(5). The current rule also provides 
that acquiescence for 12 months in the face of the a reservation amounts to acceptance 
of the reservation. See REsTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 603, § 313 n.1 &: cmt. e. Listing a 
country-specific exception that "carves out" an economic sector or category of law is, in 
effect, a counter-offer to the terms of a multilateral agreement. At one time, the rule was 
that rejection of a country-specific exception (or broadly defined, a reservation) 
amounted to a rejection of the entire agreement as between the reserving and the 
objecting parties. See REsTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 603, § 313 n.l. The current rule is 
that if one country objects to another country's reservation, the original terms of the 
agreement remain in effect, absent the benefits of a reservation for the reserving country 
with respect to the objecting country. This is particularly the case when a multilateral 
agreement has a "legislative" character of providing benefits to private actors (such as 
foreign investors), not just to the participating states themselves. An underlying 
assumption, however, is that the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose 
of the agreement. See REsTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 603, § 313 n.l. See Reservations 
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 
l.CJ. 15 (advisory opinion) [hereinafter Genocide Advisory Opinion]. 
610. Id. See also Piper, supra note 603, at 320. 
611. See WALLACH, supra note 564. 
612. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(Introduction to Annex A of the 
Agreement listing country-specific exceptions). 
613. See supra note 609. 
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defend a measure that has extra-territorial effect or "coercive" influence on 
the policy of other nations, the exceptions run counter to the principles of 
the Shrimp/Turtle ruling. 
The argument for challenging country-specific "carve-out" exceptions 
as a distortion of the balance of MAl rights and obligations would be 
strongest if brought by a developing country that later accedes to the MAl. 
The argument would sound much like the complaint of India, Pakistan, 
Thailand, and Malaysia in the Shrimp/Turtle case, which was that the 
nation with the largest import market was using the general exceptions to 
protect lawmaking authority that was applied to coerce them into expensive 
compliance measures to meet unilateral U.S. standards.614 These nations 
are not part of the original bargaining process over country-specific excep-
tions, and they would not enjoy reciprocal use of exceptions taken by 
OECD members.615 
While the Shrimp/Turtle decision and the Vienna Convention provide 
broad arguments for a dispute panel to invalidate a country-specific excep-
tion, they provide litde guidance on the exact scope exceptions that would 
effect a "redistribution of rights and obligations" or violate the "purposes 
and objectives" of the MAl. One clue lying on the surface of the Shrimp/ 
Turtle decision is the argument that the United States should not be able to 
use its economic power (denial of access to its own market) to get around 
the WTO's rule-based system.616 Professor jackson describes treaty rights 
and obligations in terms of a legal spectrum spanning between power and 
rule, with most agreements falling somewhere in the middle. A power-
based agreement is one that enables countries to negotiate disputes by 
utilizing their political and economic clout. A rule-based agreement is one 
that requires countries to setde disputes by resort to the disciplines of the 
agreement only. 617 
The degree of power orientation of a country-specific exception could 
serve as a guide to the likelihood that the exception could be invalidated by 
a dispute panel. The closer the exception comes to exercising economic or 
political power of a large-market country (or state), the closer it comes to 
"coercion" as deftned in Shrimp/Turtle. The use of a power curve analysis 
to challenge country-specific exceptions would look behind the form of the 
exception, such as the broad exceptions for subsidies or procurement, to 
the way that the exception is applied to protect laws that use economic 
leverage to the disadvantage of foreign investors. 
While the Shrimp/Turtle case focused on a law with explicit extraterri-
torial purposes, a power curve analysis of exceptions based on MAl objec-
tives would look for effects on foreign competition, not just explicit 
614. See Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, 'I 3.207, at 97 (Legal Arguments). 
615. Accession of non-OECD countries to the MAl would require approval by a 
supermajority of OECD countries if the decision cannot be made by consensus. See 
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. XII(Accession)(2), XII(Parties Group)(7). 
616. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, 'I 3.207, at 97 (Legal Arguments). 
617. See joHN H. jACKSON, THE WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND PoLICY OF lNTERNA· 
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 85-88 (1989); Schaefer, supra note 13, at 622. 
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purposes. In other words, the more effective a state law is at influencing 
the location of investments or the competitiveness of domestic investors to 
the disadvantage of foreign investors, the more likely it is that the law could 
be challenged, regardless of whether it is protected by a country-specific 
exception. For example, a procurement preference for environmental tech-
nology that is easily exported ranks low on the power curve. It would not 
frustrate the objectives of the MAl because foreign investors have effective 
access to that market. A procurement preference for recycled content in 
heavy commodities like newsprint falls in the middle of the power curve. 
It is more likely to place foreign firms at a competitive disadvantage 
because of shipping or reinvesting costs. A procurement preference that 
penalizes paper producers that engage in clear-cutting or furniture produ-
cers that operate in countries that promote forestry with forced labor is 
high on the power curve. The curve discriminates in terms of production 
methods that are either designed to influence policy of other jurisdictions, 
much more likely to affect foreign as compared with domestic firms, or 
both. 
It is difficult to predict the viability of country-specific exceptions, 
save that a MAl dispute panel has ample grounds under international law 
to look behind the form of an exception and question whether it redistrib-
utes power under the MAl, coerces other nations with less economic power 
or otherwise frustrates the investor-protection objectives of the MAl. 
Taken as a whole, the assurance by U.S. negotiators that country-spe-
cific exceptions will protect U.S. state sovereignty interests is less than the 
sum of its parts. First, the "List A" for existing nonconforming laws to be 
"grandfathered" would do nothing to affect MAl constraints on future law-
making. Second, the exceptions do not cover the laws of most tribal gov-
ernments, which limit access to vast coal, mineral, timber, water, and other 
resources. Third, the level of technical specificity required to make an 
exception creates many options for narrowing the scope of MAl disciplines 
covered, and economic sectors and state laws actually listed. Fourth, the 
"List B" categories that would "carve-out" future sovereignty protection are 
opposed by other OECD countries and are thus still negotiable. Fifth, even 
if the "List B" categories survive as part of the MAl, there is a reasonable 
risk that dispute panels will invalidate the exceptions as applied to laws 
that use political or economic power of states to the disadvantage of foreign 
investors. And finally, if the MAl comes into force, MAl negotiators envi-
sion a long-term process of ratcheting back those exceptions into compli-
ance with the MAl through future rounds of negotiation. 
Conclusion 
The goals of the MAl are generally consistent with economic interests that 
are protected by the U.S. Constitution. But unlike the MAl, the Constitu-
tion balances those interests against the competing purposes of 
noneconomic regulation, just as it balances federal and state power. Fed-
eral courts defer to significant state roles in terms of regulation, subsidies, 
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and market participation. The MAl aims to subtract from the lawmaking 
capacity of state, local, and tribal governments. It would alter the delicate 
balance of power that the Constitution creates between levels of govern-
ment and between government and private investors. Defined as this bal-
ance of power, U.S. state sovereignty deserves greater attention from the 
Americans who have a role in the process of MAl negotiations and congres-
sional action. 
The MAl would act as a virtual amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
but for the buffering role of the United States government, which could 
control enforcement of the agreement against state, local and tribal govern-
ments. This federal buffer, however, is significantly weakened because 
investor-to-state dispute resolution reduces federal control of the negotiat-
ing process that exists with state-to-state dispute resolution. The federal 
buffering role does not alter the fact that the MAl would give that power to 
the federal government, which alters the political balance of power within 
the federal system. The MAl's shift in power is from the states to the fed-
eral government, but the shift in political leverage is from government to 
private investors. The risk of monetary damages would also put fiscal pres-
sure on the federal government to intervene on behalf of investors rather 
state and local governments. 
The power shift in federalism is already happening under the WTO 
agreements. Federal officials have mediated challenges under the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement (selective purchasing related to human 
rights), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (boycotts of Swiss 
bank subsidiaries rdated to treatment of Holocaust family assets), and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (labeling requirements). 
The MAl would enable multinational corporations to avoid the WTO 
diplomatic process by giving them their own forum to sue nation-states 
directly for damages based upon 14 investor-protection standards that go 
beyond the scope of existing agreements. Nonetheless, U.S. negotiators 
advertise the MAl as an insignificant sovereignty threat based on country-
specific reservations. These reservations, however, (1) have not overcome 
the opposition of European countries, and (2) do not yet conform to MAl 
standards of technical specificity for purposes of later standstill and 
rollback. Perhaps more importantly, federal officials have been relying on 
the assumption that country-specific exceptions can protect future lawmak-
ing from being effectively challenged if it limits market access or otherwise 
uses state economic or political power to place foreign investors at a com-
petitive disadvantage. That assumption was rejected by the Shrimp/Turtle 
dispute panel for purposes of GATT Article XX. The stage is set for inves-
tors to challenge U.S. exceptions to the MAl using the same arguments. 
Reliance on country-specific exceptions is not likely to afford full sov-
ereignty protection for U.S. states. The appendix to this article addresses 
the risk in this reliance by providing a detailed outline of other options for 
maintaining the constitutional balance of federalism and investor protec-
tion. These options include: 
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- Stronger congressional oversight. If the goal of U.S. negotiators is less 
than full protection for U.S. producers, then a more candid disclosure of 
the legal impact of the MAl will achieve truth in advertising. Options for 
a more open process of disclosure and congressional oversight are sum-
marized below in Part LA of the appendix on options for balancing fed-
eralism and investor protection. 
Implementing legislation. If, on the other hand, the goal is to protect 
state sovereignty, the most politically expedient approach is the cate-
gory of options for implementing legislation, which Congress can adopt 
unilaterally. These are summarized in Part I.B below. 
General exceptions or carve-outs. Multilateral options, while more diffi-
cult to develop and adopt, go to the root of the problem. Part II.A of the 
outline borrows from the model of GATT general exceptions to suggest 
the options that would prove most appropriate for the MAl. These same 
options could also be adopted as carve-outs rather than as exceptions, 
which would put sovereignty safeguards on a stronger foundation. 
- Limits on dispute resolution. Another multilateral approach would be to 
set limits on dispute resolution, either through limits on investor stand-
ing or claims, or through broader limits on the investor-to-state dispute 
process. 
With all of its checks and balances, the United States Constitution 
created the most successful free trade area in the world. The MAl would no 
doubt open up more foreign markets to U.S. investors, but it would also 
change the constitutional balance of power between states and the federal 
government and between government and foreign investors. This tradeoff 
is not necessary. In the previous decade, foreign investment coming into 
the United States increased an average of 24% each year, a ten-year increase 
of 202%.618 Foreign investment going out of the United States into other 
countries increased an average of 34% each year, a ten-year increase of 
785%. Should the United States change its constitutional balance of power 
in order to increase investment outflows from 785% to 1,000%? 
There are many tools to restructure the MAl or its emerging progeny 
into a framework that respects the balance of power within federal systems: 
general exceptions or carve-outs, limits on dispute settlement, implementa-
tion of legislation, and a more open and analytic process for congressional 
oversight of negotiations. Best of all, the strategy of defining sovereignty by 
subtraction should be replaced with the wisdom of positive checks and 
balances on the exercise of power. In the words of Professor Conrad 
Weiler: 
Above all, the Founders did not justify the dangers and risks of the first 
common market merely in terms of expected economic benefits and then let 
the chips fall where they may; they attempted to simultaneously devise a 
political solution to the problems as well as the opportunities of free trade, 
618. OECD, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICAL YEARBooK this. II, III 
(1996). 
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and they did this, as all else in the Constitution, in a federal fashion.619 
619. Conrad Weiler, Global Trade Challenges to State Powers: Are There Federalistic 
Limits to the Commerce Power? A Look at US Constitutional Law and the EU's Sub-
sidiarity Principle 32 (Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1996) (Paper for the 1996 annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association) (on file with author). 
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Appendix: 
Options for Balancing Federalism & Investor Protection 
I. Unilateral Options 
A. Process for Congressional Oversight and Approval 
The MAl did not receive public attention until a full year after the original 
deadline for negotiations.620 By adopting the following options, Congress 
could strengthen the process of disclosure and create an open forum for 
testing the assumptions of U.S. negotiators. If Congress does not adopt the 
following options, Congress will again vote "yes or no" on a global agree-
ment without time to analyze how the agreement affects U.S. sovereignty 
interestS. These optio~s are not a substitute for structural change of the 
MAl. However, they would strengthen public participation and accounta-
bility to inform the negotiating process. 
1. Legal Impact Statement 
Congress could require that before the President signs a trade or invest-
ment agreement (e.g., at least 180 days), the responsible federal officials 
must give Congress a legal impact statement. The statement could include 
the potential impact of the agreement on federal, state, local, or tribal 
capacity for lawmaking, law enforcement, or procurement, and on capacity 
of the United States to implement or enforce any international agreement 
on the environment, labor, or human rights. In addition, the President 
could include in this analysis the legal significance of proposing any agree-
ment as a treaty, as opposed to an executive agreement. 
2. Disclosure of Legislative History 
Congress could require that before the President signs a trade or invest-
ment agreement (e.g., at least 180 days), the federal officials must give Con-
gress a report that discloses material that is analogous to legislative 
history: 
- Complaints or requests from other countries related to federal, state, local, 
or tribal capacity for lawmaking, law enforcement, or procurement; and 
on capacity of the United States to implement or enforce any interna-
tional agreement on the environment, labor, or human rights. 
- Requests or suggestions from industry, members of advisory committees, 
and nonprofit organizations, including the record of communications 
from these parties regarding the negotiations. 
3. Hearings 
Before Congress approves a proposed trade or investment agreement it 
should hold public hearings, take public comments, and publish the rec-
ord. This is already congressional practice. However, without the previous 
steps, the hearings would prove superficial. 
620. Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?, supra note 
9 (statement of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairperson of the Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy and Trade). 
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4. Congressional Approval 
The ultimate oversight power comes with congressional delegation of nego-
tiating authority and later approval of a trade or investment agreement. 
Congress could adopt a positive and permanent statement of non-eco-
nomic goals that compliment the usual goals for negotiation of a trade or 
investment agreement. For example, the goals could address (l) preserving 
constitutional principles of democracy, and (2) preserving U.S. interna-
tional commitments to democracy, environmental protection, and human 
rights. The goals would apply to any agreement that Congress must 
approve, including fast-track agreements. 
The options listed in this section would create a significant fiscal bur-
den on the Office of United States Trade Representative because of the staff 
time necessary to support stronger legal analysis and congressional over-
sight. However, Congress has already anticipated that need by appropriat-
ing an additional $1 million to the USTR budget in order to identify the 
effect of the MAl and other agreements on state and local laws. 
B. Implementing Legislation 
Without congressional implementing legislation, the MAl would give inves-
tors direct access to enforce their rights in domestic courts.621 However, 
Congress can build on the sovereignty provisions it adopted for NAFTA 
and the WTO agreements to block this option, require congressional action 
before the MAl can preempt a state law, and provide other safeguards as 
follows. 
(l) Standing. Congress could copy the NAFTA and WTO implementing 
legislation to provide that only the federal government, not a private 
party or a foreign government, may use domestic courts or agencies to 
enforce the terms of the MAl. 622 
(2) Legal effect. Congress provided (in the NAFTA and WTO implement-
ing legislation) that a provision of the agreement has no legal effect if it 
is inconsistent with "United States" (federal) law, but this provision 
does not extend to state or triballaw.623 In implementing legislation 
for the MAl, Congress could extend the "no legal effect" treatment to all 
621. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Investor-State 
Procedures)(D)(2)(a). 
622. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (1994). 
623. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1994). The following sub-
section distinguishes "state law" from "United States law." It provides that, "No state 
law, or the application thereof, may be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance 
on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with the Agreement, 
except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or 
application invalid." 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312(b)(2), 3512(b)(2)(A) (1994). For purposes of 
this section, however, "state law" is defined to include (i) any law of a political subdivi-
sion of a State; and (ii) any State law regulating or taxing the business of insurance. 19 
U.S.C. §§ 3312(b)(3), 3512(b)(3) (1994). The result of this subtle drafting is that state 
law enjoys no protection from the legal effect of NAFTA or the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, except for local and state laws that regulate or tax insurance business. However, 
a court may declare the latter two categories of "state law" invalid if the action is brought 
by the U.S. government. As for other categories of state law, this section provides no 
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laws of a state, local, or tribal government. This would provide parity 
to subnationallaw. Extending the "no legal effect" language to subna-
tionallaw would inhibit legal action by the federal government to pre-
empt state law directly under the MAl. Instead, Congress would have 
to preempt state law under the MAl by repealing it (assuming that the 
WTO implementing language is used for the MAl). Through this 
action Congress could avoid a sweeping preemption of state law that 
could result from making such broad MAl terms as "treat-
ment ... required by internationallaw"624 applicable to state law.62S 
If Congress chooses not to change federal or state law, the MAl would 
still provide investors with a remedy for damages through an interna-
tional arbitration process.626 
(3) Subnational Consultation and Self-defense. In the WTO implementing 
legislation, Congress strengthened informal commitments under 
NAFTA. These informal commitments provided state and local offi-
cials notice of WTO challenges to their laws, an opportunity to partici-
pate in defending against those challenges, and notice of any U.S. 
complaint against subnationallaws in another country.627 MAl imple-
menting legislation could follow this model. 
Meaningful notice. State officials do not receive notice "on a contin-
uing basis of matters under the [WTO agreements] that ... will 
potentially have a direct impact on[,] the States."628 These matters 
include a WTO challenge to a Massachusetts procurement law or 
relationship of WTO obligations to MAl negotiations. In addition, 
the risk of retaliatory challenges to state law may prove a greater 
protection from legal challenges under NAFTA or the Uruguay Round Agreements. Tri-
bal law receives no mention and no protection. 
624. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. N(1). 
625. In june 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the constitutional right to free exercise of 
religion. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court struck down the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibited any law that "substantially 
burdens" the exercise of a person's religion, even if the law had nothing to do with 
religion and was permissible under the First Amendment. The Court held that Congress 
exceeded its authority by attempting to impose RFRA's quasi-constitutional standard on 
state and local governments, noting that, 
[RFRA's] sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, 
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and 
regardless of subject matter .... [T]his is a considerable congressional intrusion 
into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the 
health and welfare of their citizens. 
Id. at 2170. The Boerne decision is distinguishable because it interprets congressional 
power under First Amendment religious freedom. However, its approach to preemption 
of state law without clear standards of congressional accountability is analogous to the 
is.sues presented if the U.S. government sought to preempt state law under the MAl. See 
Karen Ryan Denvir et al., Survey of 1997 Nonprofit Case Law aanuary-]une), 32 U.S.F. L. 
REv. 365, 391 (1998). 
626. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Investor-State 
Procedures)(D)(2)(c). 
627. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b) (1994) with 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b), (c), (d) (1994). 
628. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994). 
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risk than an unprompted challenge.629 A country that wants to 
counter-sue the United States is likely to challenge laws at all levels 
of government. Therefore, a meaningful process of consultation 
should provide states notice of all imminent complaints by the time 
the United States is consulting with other governments. Addition-
ally, the process should ensure that states are aware of disputes that 
directly involve them, and regulations that could alter sovereignty 
protection. 
- Meaningful parties to notify. The United States Trade Representative 
sends notice of WTO issues to governors' representatives. While 
this system is efficient for the USTR, it ignores separation of powers 
at the state level and effectively excludes state legislatures and attor-
neys general, both of whom have a more significant jurisdictional 
interest in WTO (or MAl) legal impact than do governors. Federal 
notice should go to the relevant branch of state government. 
Meaningful consultation. The consultation process envisioned by 
the WTO implementing legislation presumes that "consultation" 
will actually occur. For example, federal consultation with the 
intergovernmental policy advisory committees (lAC) on trade63o is 
efficient because such an advisory committee integrates multiple 
branches of state government, and enables state officials to develop 
exper.tise. MAl implementing legislation should retain IPAC consul-
tation requirements. Most of the notice and consultation require-
ments, which already exist for NAFTA and WTO agreements, are 
not seriously implemented. MAl implementing legislation could 
strengthen these provisions by limiting federal enforcement options 
against states if notice and consultation requirements are not 
followed. 
(4) Notice of Adverse Decision and Hearings. Congress could mandate that 
when a dispute panel rules against a U.S. federal or subnationallaw, 
the USTR must notify Congress. Subsequently, Congress must hold 
hearings on the issue before they or the Executive Branch takes any 
action to enforce the decision. On the eve of the congressional vote on 
the WTO agreements in 1994, Senator Robert Dole proposed a process 
for congressional oversight of adverse WTO panel decisions.631 The 
Dole proposal required analysis of an adverse WTO decision by a 
629. After the United States challenged a New Brunswick statute in the Beer I case, 
Canada challenged 210 state and local laws in the Beer II case, prevailing in 60 of these 
challenges. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 206. 
630. See 19 U.S.C. § 35l2(b)(1)(A) (1994). 
631. See A Bill to Establish a Commission to Review the Dispute Settlement Reports of the 
World Trade Organization and for Other Purposes, S. 16, 104th Cong. (1995). BillS. 16 
was never reported from the Senate Finance Committee, primarily for reasons that had 
little to do with the merits of the review commission. Members of the Senate Finance 
Committee contested bill S. 16 because they opposed another Dole initiative to promote 
a WTO complaint to pressure Colombia and Costa Rica to withdraw from a banana 
framework agreement with the European Union. See Daniel Mazuera, The Americas: A 
Trade Dispute Gone Bananas, WALL ST.]., Nov. 17, 1995, at A19; Opponents of Dole 
Banana Bell Step Up Fight Against Measure, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 27, 1995, at 28. 
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panel of federal judges, prior to congressional hearings or considera-
tion of a motion to withdraw from the WTO. With or without the aid 
of a review panel, Congress could create a formal process for review of 
decisions from MAl panels (or any other panels) that are adverse to 
U.S. sovereignty interests. 
(5) Enforcement of Arbitration Awards. The MAl would provide investors a 
choice of international arbitration fora, each with its own rules for 
enforcement of awards.632 These include arbitration under the Inter-
national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),633 the 
ICSID Additional Facility,634 rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),635 and rules of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC).636 If Congress can use imple-
menting legislation to bar access to U.S. courts under NAFTA and the 
WTO agreements,637 then it can likewise limit the arbitration rules 
that it will recognize for enforcement of awards against the United 
States. For example, Congress might not recognize ICSID, which 
would require MAl nations to automatically enforce arbitration awards. 
Instead, Congress could support the less automatic process that is 
632. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(lnvestor-State Proce-
dures)(D)(2)(c). The MAl includes no provisions of its own for enforcement of arbitra-
tion awards. See id. art. V(Investor-State Procedures)(D)(l8). 
633. ICSID is an arbitration agency created by the World Bank in 1966. Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.l.A.S. No. 159 [hereinafter ICSID]. 
ICSID was submitted for ratification in March 1965 and entered into force on October 
14, 1966, after ratification by 20 countries. See id. art. 68(2). It is the only arbitration 
convention that provides for both adjudication and enforcement of its judgments. ICSID 
signatories waive sovereign immunity and, in federal systems, ICSID judgments are 
enforceable in sub-federal courts at the discretion of the national government. See id. 
art. 54(1). 
634. The ICSID Additional Facility rules are designed for disputes where only one 
party to the dispute has signed the ICSID Convention and the dispute does not result 
from an "ordinary commercial transaction." Rules Governing the Additional Facility for 
the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the ICSID, Sept. 27, 1978, art. 
4(3), 2ll.L.M. 1446 [hereinafter ICSID Additional Facility Rules]. 
635. The U.N. General Assembly adopted UNCITRAL rules in 1976 to guide investor-
to-investor dispute settlement before international arbitration bodies such as the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce. See United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 182 (1976). Parties to com-
mercial contracts often specify that they will use UNCITRAL rules to resolve a dispute 
under their contract. Because UNCITRAL rules were designed for private investor dis-
putes and not investor-to-state disputes, some OECD countries oppose using UNCITRAL 
rules for arbitration of claims under the MAl. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 
V(lnvestor-State Procedures )(D). 
636. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) founded an International Court 
of Arbitration in 1923. In 1995 alone, the ICC received 427 new requests for arbitration 
involving 1,012 parties from 93 countries. Contractual claims against nation-states or 
their agencies accounted for 14.1% of the parties. Several ICC cases involved claims 
exceeding $1 billion; 62% of the claims exceeded $1 million. See 1995 Statistical Report, 
in THE ICC INTERNATIONAL CouRT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 3-6 (1996). 
637. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (1994). 
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available under the New York Convention,638 which provides rules for 
enforcing awards under the ICSID Additional Facility,639 UNCITRAL 
or the ICC.640 Whereas ICSID awards "are binding and shall not be 
subject to any appeal,"641 the New York Convention provides a signifi-
cant role for domestic courts, 642 which need not enforce an award if it 
is "contrary to the public policy" of the United States.643 In effect, the 
New York Convention provides a role for Congress to define the public 
policy interests that domestic courts should consider in whether or not 
to enforce an award by a MAl dispute panel. In fact, there is already a 
model for this option in the implementing legislation for NAFTA and 
the Uruguay Round agreements, which provides that the agreements 
do not "amend or modify any law of the United States, including any 
law relating to (i) the protection of human animal, or plant life or 
health, (ii) the protection of the environment, or (iii) worker 
safety ... unless specifically provided for in this Act."644 
In the context of MAl implementation, Congress could create a 
similar list of essential public policy goals. Congress could expand the 
NAFTA/WTO implementation language to cover other policy interests 
such as GATT Article XX exceptions, state sovereignty, congressional 
authority to adopt unilateral measures that implement multilateral 
agreements on human rights, environmental protection, or core labor 
standards. A more inclusive oudine of essential policy interests is dis-
cussed below under multilateral general exceptions. 
II. Multilateral Options 
A General Exceptions or Carve-Outs 
The fact that the MAl includes only two of the thirteen GATT general 
exceptions is not only a break from tradition, it also creates a presumption 
that MAl negotiators chose to exclude consideration of policy objectives 
that they did not include in the general exceptions.645 The Shrimp/Turtle 
panel followed this logic when it cited a GATT exception (products of 
prison labor) that has been interpreted to permit limits on market 
638. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
june 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38-65 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 
(1988)) [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
639. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 634, art. 20. 
640. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(lnvestor-State Procedures)(D)(3), 
(5). 
641. ICSID, supra note 633, art. 53(1). 
642. The New York Convention was implemented by the United States Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1994). 
643. 9 u.s.c. § 202 (1994). 
644. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(2) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2) (1994). 
645. The maxim of construction is expressio unius est alterio exclusius. See WILLIAM N. 
EsKRIDGE, jR. & PHIUP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
TilE CREATION OF Punuc Poucr 637 (2d ed. 1995); George H. Taylor, Structural Textual-
ism, 75 B.U. L. REv. 321, 343 (1995); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Construc-
tion of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947). 
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access646 as authority for not permitting limits on market access under 
other general exceptions.647 This reasoning maximizes the jurisdiction of 
multilateral agreements and minimizes legislative jurisdiction under 
domestic constitutional law. 
Even if the MAl included all of the options for general exceptions, they 
still would not offer the level of sovereignty protection that U.S. negotiators 
claim that their country-specific exceptions can provide. Any additional 
general exceptions to the MAl would include the kind of language that 
introduces the exception for maintaining public order.648 That language 
sets a series of tests, including "discrimination," "disguised restriction" 
and "necessary," all of which trade panels used under GATT to define a 
contested measure as outside the scope of the exception or to limit the 
jurisdiction of the nation seeking to defend the measure.649 The Shrimp/ 
Turtle panel went even further and found that general exceptions cannot 
apply to measures that limit market access because use of the exception in 
that way would threaten the world trading system.6so 
The increasingly limited scope of general exceptions has led Canadian 
provincial officials to advocate sovereignty protections within categories 
like GATT Article XX, but in the form of "carve-outs" rather than general 
exceptions.651 There are several examples of general carve-outs already in 
the MAl. From a state and local point of view, the most prominent one is 
taxation carve-outs.6S2 
1 The logic of a general carve-out is that it would limit the scope of the 
agreement, whereas a general exception operates within the set of expected 
benefits of the agreement as a whole. Having stated the logic, however, it 
would have to be accepted by a dispute panel, which would have as much 
latitude to interpret a carve-out as a general exception. Nonetheless, the 
very concept of limiting the jurisdiction of an agreement like the MAl may 
hold up, considering that there is no other provision on the scope of the 
agreement except for the universal definition of "investment" as "every kind 
of asset. "653 
With both approaches in mind, general exceptions versus general 
carve-outs, the following options are offered as merely a classification of 
646. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX( e). 
647. See Shrimp Report, supra note 104, 'I 3.165, at 78 (Legal Arguments). 
648. That provision reads: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between Contracting Parties, or a disguised investment restriction, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting Party from taking 
any measure necessary for the maintenance of public order. 
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(3). 
649. See Steve Charnovitz, The Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, ]. 
WoRLD TRADE 49 (1992); Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA.]. 
lNT'L L. 689 (1998). 
650. See Shrimp Report, supra note 104, 'I 7.51, at 287 (Findings). 
651. See British Columbia, Testimony Regarding the MAl, supra note 556, at 11. 
652. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VIII(1}(3). 
653. See id. art. II(Definitions)(2). 
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legitimate purposes that merit consideration for protection of sovereign leg-
islative authority. The few MAl general exceptions are noted with a 
subheading. 
The following options are offered as a classification of legitimate pur-
poses that merit consideration for protection of sovereign legislative 
authority. 
1. Security Interests 
Other than a narrow scope of public order, the only general exception of 
the MAl is for security interests. The exception, however, does not cover 
provisions on expropriation or protection from strife.654 This means, for 
example, that the MAl provides an investor with a claim for losses sus-
tained in military action taken to enforce resolutions of the U.N. Security 
Council.655 The following are related to security interests: 
- MAI: Reservation of power to protect "essential security interests."656 
- MAI: Nondisclosure of information related to security interests.657 
- MAI: Reservation of power to implement obligations under the United 
Nations Charter to protect international peace and security.6SS 
2. National Economic Security 
While some of the following legislative purposes are based on humanita-
rian values, they all have direct economic consequences to the security of a 
nation's human and economic resources. 
- Relating to products of prison labor. 659 
- Protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or archaeological 
value.660 
- Relating to importation or exportation of gold or silver.661 
- Restrictions on exports of domestic materials that are necessary for a 
domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price 
is held below the world price under government price controls. 662 
Restrictions on exports of domestic materials that are in short 
supply.663 
654. See id. art. VII. 
655. See discussion of expropriation supra Part II. 
656. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI( General Exceptions)(2)(a) (defines 
essential s~curity interests to include: (i) action taken in time of war; (ii) non-prolifera-
tion policies related to weapons of mass destruction; and (iii) production of arms and 
ammunition). See also NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 2102(b); GATT, supra note 111, art. 
XXI(b). 
657. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. Vl(General Exceptions)(2)(b); 
NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 2l02.1(a); GATT, supra note 111, art. XXI(a). 
658. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. Vl(General Exceptions)(2)(c); 
NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 2102.1(c); GATT, supra note 111, art. XXI( c). 
659. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX( e); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.l. 
660. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(f); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.l. 
661. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX( c); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI. I. 
662. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(i). 
663. See id. art. XXG). 
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Measures necessary for collection of direct taxes or avoidance of double 
taxation.664 
3. Domestic Regulatory Powers 
Most of the GATT general exceptions are designed to preserve traditional 
regulatory powers. The Chairman's proposal for MAl limits on perform-
ance requirements recognizes three of these exceptions (health, conserva-
tion, and compliance) for two of its limits.665 The options for regulatory 
general exceptions or carve-outs include: 
MAl: Preservation of public order. 666 
Protection of public morals.667 
Protection of human or animal life or health. 668 
Conservation of exhaustible resources.669 
- Environmental protection, generally.670 
Protection of consumers and workers.671 
Enforcement of otherwise consistent laws. 672 
4. Domestic Constitutional Limits 
Two principal doctrines could serve this purpose: 
- Balancing test for regulatory measures under the Commerce Clause.673 
664. See GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV{d), (e). 
665. The proposed revision to performance requirements is: 
4. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable 
manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on investment, nothing in 
paragraphs 1{b) [achieve a given level of domestic content] and 1{c) [preference 
for domestic goods or suppliers] shall be construed to prevent any Contracting 
Party from adopting or maintaining measures, including environmental 
measures: 
(a) necessary to secure compliance with measures that are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement; 
{b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or 
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources. 
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(Environmental Related Matters)(6). See also 
144 CoNG. REc. H7262-77 (daily ed., Aug. 6, 1998) (amend. by Rep. Kucinich). 
666. See id. art. VI{ General Exceptions){3) n.2 ("where a genuine and serious threat is 
posed to one of the fundamental interests of society"); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV( a) 
n.2; AGP, supra note 181, art. XXIII(2) n.5. 
667. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(a); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(a); AGP, 
supra note 181, art. XXIII(2); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.l. 
668. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX{b); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(b); AGP, 
supra note 181, art. XXIII(2); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.l. 
669. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(g); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.!. 
670. See AGP, supra note 181, United States Annex II n.3; 19 U.S.C. § 33l2{a)(2)(ii) 
(1994); 19 U.S.C. § 35l2(a)(2)(ii) (1994). 
671. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(d); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(c); 19 
U.S.C. §§ 3312(a){2)(iii), 3512(a){2)(iii) (1994). 
672. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(d); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV{c). 
673. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 & amend. X. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 
449 U.S. 456 (1981); Exxon v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 {1978). See gener-
ally TRIBE, supra note 212, §§ 6-5, 6-13. 
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- Market participation exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause.614 
B. Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution 
The potential limits on investor-to-state dispute resolution include: 
Limits on investor standing and claims. The MAl would empower even a 
minority shareholder who resides in an MAl country675 to bring a 
claim on behalf of an enterprise or other investment located anywhere 
in the world if the claim is based on National Treatment or Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment.676 An alternative is provided by NAFTA, 
which takes a more cautious approach. NAFTA requires that for an 
investor to make a claim on behalf of an enterprise, the investor must 
own or control the enterprise.677 Nor does NAFTA permit an investor 
of any kind to "make a claim if more than three years have elapsed 
from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have first 
acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the 
investor has incurred loss or damage."67S 
Limits on investor-to-state dispute process. A much bolder limit on 
investor-to-state dispute setdement enjoyed a brief life in the taxation 
article of the MAl; however, it disappeared from later drafts. The May 
1997 draft of the article,679 which applies the MAl expropriation pro-
visions to taxation, provided that the national government challenged 
by the claim could refer the dispute to "Competent Tax Authorities of 
the Contracting Party of the Investor and the Contracting Party to the 
dispute,"680 which would have nine months to "determine that the 
measure does not involve an expropriation."681 If the tax authorities 
did not so decide, the investor-to-state case could go forward at the 
request of either government.682 This direct form of sovereignty pro-
674. See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8 &: amend. X. See White v. Massachusetts Council of 
Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); 
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 
(1903). 
675. The MAl defines "investor" as (i) a "natural person having the nationality of, or 
who is permanently residing in, a Contracting Party" and (ii) "a legal person or any 
other entity organised under the applicable law of a Contracting Party, whether or not 
for profit, and whether private or government owned or controlled, and includes a cor-
poration, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association or organisa-
tion." MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. II(Definitions)(1). 
676. See id. art. III. MAl negotiators intended to protect investments beyond a Con-
tracting Party's territory so as to "not to unduly limit the scope of the agreement, for 
example by excluding the international activities of established foreign investors and 
their investments." MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. III(National Treatment and 
Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(2). 
677. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1117.1. 
678. Id. art. 1116.2. 
679. Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: THE MAl NEGOTIATING TEXT art. VIII (May 13, 1997). 
680. Id. art. VIII(4)(b)(i). 
681. I d. art. VIII( 4)(b )(ii). 
682. See id. art. VIII(4)(b). The entire text of art. VIII.4, which provided for dispute 
settlement of taxation claims, was bracketed as language that had not reached a suffi-
cient level of consensus at that time. 
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tection disappeared in subsequent drafts.683 The concept, however, 
remains available for MAl negotiators to consider not just for taxation, 
but for broader sovereignty protection. 
683. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VIII(4) (retaining only the first para-
graph authorizing both state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlement). 
